# Consensus and Dissent in Ghana

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In the larger towns of Ghana, the Young Pioneers[1] used to parade through the streets singing party songs and carrying banners proclaiming that "Nkrumah never dies," "Nkrumah is the new Messiah." Meanwhile the press extolled the virtues of Nkrumahism and of African socialism, and the party controlled virtually all trade-union, cooperative, and similar activities. The local administration, too, had been "politicized" and both regional and district commissioners were party appointees.

Both administratively and ideologically the party was in charge. Of dissensus there was little evidence: the ballot boxes announced massive support; the mass media showed no dissent; Nkrumah (political scientists maintained) was a charismatic leader. Moreover, few if any of the many academic commentators who visited the country ventured to predict any radical change in the situation.

On February 24, 1966, Colonel Kotoka led a military coup against the existing regime. On this day, I spent some hours in the streets of the capital, Accra. The public reaction was immediate and visible, and the change-over was widely welcomed: almost at once posters appeared which caricatured the deposed

[1] The Young Pioneers was the youth wing of the one party, the Convention People's party (CPP).



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leader and cast aspersions on the circumstances of his birth; the relics of his rule were torn down from public buildings; market women danced through the streets wearing the white headscarves of victory; some Young Pioneers (just before they were officially disbanded) marched through the streets of the capital bearing banners that proclaimed "Nkrumah is NOT our Messiah."

Some two weeks after the coup I traveled to several small administrative centers in Northern Ghana that I had known over a period of years. Only the district commissioners and members of Parliament were in prison. Nevertheless the whole of the party structure had totally vanished. The Young Pioneer organizers had literally disappeared "into the bush"; the ex-party chairman of the small modern town of Salaca was busy making public gestures of commitment to the new regime (donations to the army, presents to the populace). The large majority of party supporters had become forthright in their criticism of its rule.

There are many questions which this situation raises. The main one that comes to mind is, How was such a sudden and complete reversal possible? Subsidiary to this are the questions, Why was it not foreseen and how permanent is the new situation? In this paper I want to try to elucidate some aspects of the change in "support" and to discuss some implications of the process for the study of political institutions.

In speaking of a reversal I am not primarily concerned with the method of changing political power—that was accomplished by the army. I am concerned rather with the reversal of "belief," "commitment," "ideology," "consensus," "attitude," "opinion."

## I

In the later years of Convention People's party rule, "support" was difficult to assess; the ballot box was no longer an adequate instrument for the measurement of opinion; at the time of the latest election (1965) many reliable reports spoke of the sealing of the "No" boxes, and the burning of negative papers. On the interpersonal level, it was generally thought injudicious to express critical opinions, and individuals one had known over many years avoided the subject of politics, except where their

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views coincided with those of the government; that is to say, the regime got considerable support from "intellectuals" over such issues as Rhodesia (the call for volunteers appeared on university notice boards and received a reasonable response) partly because of the reservations they had on other issues.

There had been, of course, a change in the nature of the "support" over time. Before independence, the Convention People's party received the majority of votes cast by the citizens of Ghana[2] at a period when it was possible to present alternative views to the voting public.[3] At this time there was no doubt at all about its popular appeal. With the proscription of other political groups and with the penetration of the party into virtually all fields of advancement, it became more difficult to gauge the level of "support"; the ballot box certainly provided no measure. Nor was there any satisfactory alternative. The failure to recruit many intellectuals (university students and lecturers, for example) to the party was some indication that things were not as they had been. But those who were committed to the *status quo* could easily dismiss such groups as unrepresentative or as holding views based upon particular (for example, bourgeois) interests. Moreover, the network of paid informers, the preventive arrests, above all the desire for a peaceful life, meant that open discussion of disapproval took place only between foreigners or between very close friends,[4] if at all. As a consequence, expatriate commentators were always inclined to equate official statements with popular attitudes, while even the dissenters themselves could never be sure of the extent to which their views were shared by others. There was no community of dissent.

[2] Even here, the dropping of a paper into a box with a similar mark cannot, as many numerical studies tend to assume, be taken as an equivalent act in different communities at different times. Voting is a social action whose meaning depends upon the particular situation; this fact presents a source of complication for cross-cultural psephology.

[3] The "balance of presentation" clearly differed from place to place, depending upon the local political situation, control of mass media, and the like.

[4] In this kind of situation the reactions of foreign residents need to be treated with particular care; since their major ties (of kinship and citizenship, for example) lie elsewhere and since they are occupationally more mobile, they are freer to take risks in their comments; in any case, these would not have earned them detention, but at worst expulsion. Unlike a country's citizens, they always carry a return ticket in their pocket, a fact that conditions their assessment of the political situation.

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Some two weeks after the events of February 24 (originally known as coup or revolution depending upon the political persuasion of the speaker), Colonel Kotoka told me that he had estimated ninety-five per cent of the people would be behind the coup and had therefore anticipated little bloodshed. His forecast proved correct, but such prescience was rare. Few foreign commentators (and fewer political scientists) came out with such a view (in advance), and it is clear from the ex-President's post-coup exhortations from Guinea that he was equally misinformed about the temper of the populace; otherwise he would have realized the futility of trying to galvanize the Young Pioneers and the Workers Brigade into action against the new authorities.

And so, both among the politicians, hearing what they wanted to hear, and among the political scientists, located in some newly created *zongo*, whether university compound, international hotel, or "residential" area, there was a tendency to gauge present support in terms of past evidence. But such an approach failed to take account of trends in ruler-subject relationships. In no political system, business organization, or university department can the leadership fill all the expectations of the personnel. The less "realistic" the demands, the greater the gap between wish and fulfillment. When Ghana achieved independence, certain of the expectations of the people were economically "irrational" under the conditions that obtained. In 1957, my assistant (later a Young Pioneer Organizer) thought of increased American imports, especially of "cowboy" hats, as the most desirable of the future benefits. Others, with the general interest more at heart, pinned their faith on mechanized agriculture, still not successfully tested in West Africa. Hopes of this kind (found in all modern political systems) are bound to remain at least partly unfulfilled; from the standpoint of the supporters, all political programs have an aspect of the cargo cult about them.[5] While the failure, or postponement, of expected benefits may lead to a temporary reinforcement of beliefs, in the end a measure of disillusionment is bound to set in.[6] In multi-party regimes, the movement in and out of power

[5] See P. Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (London, 1957).

[6] See L. Festinger's work on cognitive dissonance, and, in particular, L. Festinger, H. W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis, 1956).

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provides a mechanism whereby such beliefs can continue to be sustained without rejecting the system itself; the possibility of a new president, or the next prime minister, represents the prospect of a new dawn, at least for a substantial part of the electorate; even the cabinet reshuffle has its cathartic effects. In monarchical regimes a similar function is served by the natural turnover of royalty; a new ruler brings into being new hopes, "a new Elizabethan age." Indeed, in some societies a new era began with every reign; the calendar was a calendar of kings. In others, the desire to install a new ruler may have led to the extinction of the old.[7] But in one-party states, succession to high office can rarely be routinized; even open discussion of the problem is likely to be identified as potential rebellion. Consequently there is no such outlet, no safety valve, for the frustration that inevitably arises not only out of the power situation, but also from the inevitable discrepancy between expected and actual returns.[8] In the absence of either institutionalized "rituals of rebellion"[9] or anticipated changes of personnel, commitment (if not "consensus") is bound to diminish with the passage of time; the revolutionary momentum cannot be indefinitely sustained; slogans such as "Nkrumah will never die" are no balm for incipient discontent.

The rise and fall of such a ruler's "popularity rating" (or that of his government), the developmental cycle of support for change-oriented leadership, is concealed by the manipulation of ballots, by organized demonstrations, and by people's inhibitions about openly expressing their views.

In many respects this progress of events, the disenchantment of the populace, exemplifies Frantz Fanon's model for the aftermath of independence.

> The bourgeoisie who are in power vainly increase the number of processions; the masses have no illusions. They are hungry; and the police officers, though they are now Africans, do not serve to reassure them particularly. The masses begin to sulk; they turn away from this nation in which they have been given no place. . . . Since [independence the]

[7] This is, of course, a central theme of Sir James Frazer's work *The Golden Bough.*

[8] See my discussion in Jack Goody (ed.), *Succession to High Office,* Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, Vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1966).

[9] M. Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion* (Manchester, Eng., 1954).

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> party has sadly disintegrated; nothing is left but the shell of a party, the name, the emblem, the motto. . . . Today the party's mission is to deliver to the people the instructions which issue from the summit. . . . After independence, the party sinks into an extraordinary lethargy. The militants are only called upon when so-called popular manifestations are afoot, or international conferences, or independence celebrations. The local party leaders are given administrative posts, the party becomes an administration. . . . The party is becoming a means of private advancement.[10]

Fanon regarded this progression as characteristic of "bourgeois" parties alone. The Convention People's party was not of this kind, though for some it became a means of attaining bourgeois status: indeed, the system of stratification in Africa south of the Sahara hardly allowed of the growth of parties which were differentiated along lines of economically based classes. Orthodox Marxist attempts to apply class analysis to Africa usually fail to recognize the quite different kind of production relationships that existed in the pre-industrial systems, and that still exist today.[11] Neither here, nor in other spheres of social life, does the mechanical importation of European schemes have much to contribute to Africa. As far as Fanon's analysis is concerned, his idealistic viewpoint prevents him from isolating the general factors in the growth cycle of popular support that are common to all regimes, whether the parties are "single" or "multiple," "bourgeois" or "mass," "progressive" or "reactionary," "Left" or "Right."

When the regime in Ghana ended, by sudden and unantici-

[10] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London, 1965), 137-38.

[11] This point is appreciated by Max Gluckman and W. Arthur Lewis. The latter comments: "West African politics is not a Marxist-type struggle between haves and have-nots. Neither is it a struggle between a new modernising middle-class elite and a backward aristocracy. . . . West African society does not fit into the Marxist categories. The area is under-populated, so land is abundant, and in most tribes a man has a right to as much land as he can cultivate. Hence landlords, rents, oppressed peasants and landless labourers are rare. . . . Landlordism is not a political factor. Neither is capitalism." (*Politics in West Africa* [London, 1965], 18.) The basic reason behind this situation is technological; nowhere in Africa do you find any great development of intensive agriculture because nowhere do you find the plough. The implications of this fact are rarely understood by those historians who talk of African "feudalism," nor yet by those agriculturalists who want to jump straight from hoe to tractor.

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pated military moves, the reaction was powerful and immediate: consensus, at least about the immediate past, was overwhelming, and even ministers and confidants of the ex-President hastened to express their misgivings; at least in the towns, the masses enthusiastically celebrated their relief; the university became, overnight, a center of vigorous discussion about the affairs of state, and has continued as such to this day.

The reaction to the coup was primarily negative in the sense that it was directed first and foremost toward eliminating the faults of the past. "What went wrong in Ghana?" was the title of a popular series of lectures, launched in March 1966 by the extramural department of the university. On the day of the coup itself, an element of spontaneous regression was very noticeable. I overheard a couple refer jokingly to their country as Gold Coast rather than Ghana, and there were shouts for the former opposition party (National Liberation Movement) until it was rumored that army policy was against all parties, not only the one which had recently monopolized political office.

This situation did not, of course, persist. Agreement about the past was accompanied by an increasing diversity of views about future action. Many constitutional flowers are now in bud. Some would reject political parties, single or multiple; others would retain military rule, and others stress the role of traditional rulers.[12] No doubt this plurality of belief, this condition of loose ideological structure, will persist until the situation is crystallized, until opinion is mobilized, for example, by the formation of political parties that serve to polarize in simple binary form the current diversity of views.

If any new consensus were to develop this might be expected among the fairly homogeneous body of students at the University

[12] The Joint Standing Committee of the House of Chiefs submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Committee who were hearing views on future political organization. In presenting this statement the Adansihene advocated no-party government because of the "inherent evils" of the party system. "Western democracy was imposed on this country by a few educated people . . . our proposals can create for this country a government by consent without incurring the unsavoury features of party politics. . . . He said although they recommended the banning of political parties, they were not against people with common political ideology coming together. The Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, the Chief Justice of Ghana, then asked them to reconsider this view." (*Daily Graphic*, June 23, 1967.)

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of Ghana, Legon. However, a recent survey[13] shows a considerable range of views even about something as basic as the return to civilian rule. "About one third think civilian rule should come within eighteen months, but 43% think it will take at least five years or that no limits can be set" (p. 7). While students were in complete agreement about rejecting one-party rule, a tenth of the students rejected political parties altogether. As with the chiefs, parties were seen as instruments of conflict rather than as bases of consensus.

The issues on which the students did show large measures of agreement, namely, the desirability of a unitary constitution (seventy-six per cent) and a unicameral legislature (seventy-two per cent), were rather less significant than those on which they showed a great spread of opinion, or even a retreat from decision-making. The desire for a prolongation of army rule was expressed before Dr. Busia's reminder of the dangers facing military governments, a timely reminder that was quickly followed by an attempted coup on April 17, 1967.[14] But the basis of this desire appears to be not so much a positive inclination to military government as fear of the alternative possibilities. Indeed, the same might be said for no-party proposals supported by the chiefs, for as yet no one knows what a no-party electoral system would look like. In putting this view before the Constitutional Committee, one of the supporting speakers said "the chiefs did not have in mind that the country should stick forever to no-party government; they intended the system to be only a stop-gap, while the country was getting 'ripe' for party politics."[15] This lack of certainty is also apparent from the fact that twenty-five per cent of students gave no answer when asked "What measures would you suggest for encouraging a stable and continuous democratic system in Ghana?"

[13] M. Peil and E. O. Odotei, "Return to Civilian Rule (Report on a survey of university students)," *The Legon Observer*, June 9-22, 1967; a randomly selected ten per cent sample of 198 students were interviewed in February 1967.

[14] See K. A. Busia, "One Year after the Coup," lecture delivered on March 30, 1967, *The Legon Observer*, April 14-27, 1967: "Military regimes are notoriously unstable. Africa has so far not shown any signs that her military regimes will be an exception to the historical pattern." Dr. Busia was commenting on a speech of Brigadier Afrifa and was in turn criticized by Professor Adu Boahen for wanting so swift a return to civilian rule.

[15] *Daily Graphic*, June 26, 1967.

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The effect of relaxing the general pressure toward "enforced consensus," of lifting the lid, can be seen not only in ideological uncertainty but also in restlessness to discipline of any kind; the more permissive atmosphere is more tolerant of protest and of dissent. The results of political decompression are most visible in the student population where "revolts" have occurred both at the universities and in the schools. The former were discussed by Professor A. Kwapong, vice-chancellor of the University of Ghana, in his address to the Congregation on March 26, 1966.

> Since the return of freedom to this country, we have witnessed a wave of restlessness and a sense of malaise among the young in our schools and Universities. In a way, this questioning of authority and restlessness have always been the natural condition of the young throughout history, and we have all of us been young before. . . . For the past six years, until the 24th of February, 1966, freedom of expression and conscience, and with this, freedom of the young to rebel had been effectively silenced. Now, with the removal of our frustrations and the return of liberty, there is the danger that the sudden access of this almost unfamiliar blessing may be taken by some for licence. . . .[16]

These reactions against authority occurred at the Universities of Legon and Kumasi (where they led to the resignation of the principal) and in a number of secondary schools. It has been suggested that these activities were connected with the tightening up of entrance standards to the university. While educational advancement is certainly a matter of considerable concern (since the ban on party politics, the university has become second only to the army as the main avenue of social advance), the revolts started long before there were any announced or even anticipated changes.[17] And

[16] Reprinted in *Minerva*, IV (1966), 542-54.

[17] For example, the Asanteman Secondary School, Kumasi, was temporarily closed for a month (May to June 1967) following student violence. Students claimed that the headmaster registered five students as private candidates for the G.C.E. examination, an allegation later denied by the African Examinations Council *(Evening News*, June 19, 1967). The extent of the problem can be seen from the fact that two days earlier the *Ghanaian Times* reported the warning of Lt. Col. E. A. Yeboah, member of the Eastern Region Committee of Administration, against students' strikes and demonstrations. Conflict at Asanteman had developed over the year and was partly due to the measures introduced by a new headmaster trying to rectify a situation that had arisen under the previous non-graduate head. But, as at Nungua and elsewhere, an element of

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in the university at least, the aims of the students were domestic rather than educational or "political."[18]

In Ghana today there is continual exploration of alternative possibilities for good government. Many are in favor of a multi-party system, and they are backed by a good deal of legal thinking which, having been in the forefront of the early phases of nationalist endeavor, is now oriented toward those "Western" forms in which they see "the law" and themselves as most easily operating. All, however, are aware that a multi-party system can simply be a prelude to the establishment of a one-party regime by the victors. Nowhere in independent Africa has a regime allowed itself to be changed by means of the ballot box.[19] This situation does not arise from "political immaturity" but from the rejection (primarily by political leaders) of specific ways of transmitting office implicit in the electoral system. Unless these rules of the game are accepted by the participants, the result must be a one-party regime, either nominally (as in the regions of Nigeria) or legally (as in Ghana). When this happens, the only instrument of change is the armed forces.

It is the fear that the multi-party system will be manipulated by those who do not accept its basic rules which makes many Ghanaians wary of recourse to a political system where the party is the all-dominating institution it has so often become in Africa and elsewhere. But such hesitation is also motivated by the fear of a return to the violence of extra-electoral conflict that occurred between the CPP and the NLM during the years 1954 to 1956.[20]

The discussion concerning the no-party state is a widespread reaction to one-party rule and the violence that marked the final

"student power" was present; the freer atmosphere encouraged protest. Moreover, Nkrumah himself had been overthrown by force; and the process of "destooling" a leader by pressure from below was and still is a widespread feature of the traditional sector of Akan life.

[18] For example, in July 1966 the students at Akuafo Hall, Legon, wanted to use a room reserved for senior staff as a television room and turned to activist methods when they were refused.

[19] In 1967 Sierra Leone almost effected such a change, but a close finish in the electoral competition and a subsequent recourse to the army led to the collapse of the parliamentary system and its replacement by a military regime.

[20] For a detailed account of these struggles, see Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-60* (London, 1964).

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years of the two-party system. A recent example of this discussion is found in K. O. Adjei, "No Party System—A Revolution in Political Thinking," *The Ashanti Pioneer*, June 17, 1967. In "Proper Approach to Party Politics is Needed," *The Ghanaian Times*, June 17, 1967, H. K. Bidi Setsoafia advocates a return to party politics, but he does so very guardedly, giving sympathetic treatment to both the chiefs' case and to the suggestion put forward by Mr. Yaw Twumasi, university lecturer in political science and editor of the influential *Legon Observer*, that "perhaps the safest way to take in planning the future constitution of this country was to build on our chieftaincy, our institution which has for many years been practised in this country, than perhaps adopting again party politics which is completely foreign to us in Ghana." In a situation of political reversal, where a new system of government and its operators have been found wanting on grounds both of morality[21] and social organization, it is not surprising that there should have been a renewal of interest in the chiefship and in churches.

It is considerations of this kind, combined with a general distrust of "politicians" (which has increased since a plethora of commissions publicly revealed their private activities) that makes many people advocate a prolongation of military rule or express an aversion to party government. Such an attitude immediately raises grave problems. If parties are out, the main problem for an electoral system becomes the selection of candidates and the formulation and communication of alternative policies. The suggested solutions to the initial choice of candidates (the selection of the "eligibles") vary between central nomination by Parliament or by temporary parties ("to be dissolved after the election") and local nomination by bodies of rate-payers, chiefs, trades unions, etc.

Such ideas, as yet adumbrated only in memos to commissions, letters to the newspapers, and in personal discussions, are countered by the constitutional traditionalists. These others believe that it was

[21] There are those who are still interested in a secular Socialist morality, but disillusion with the political representatives of such a view has gone far. A widespread attitude is that illustrated by the comment an electrician made to me on the day of the coup (February 24) as he poured a libation from the E of the neon sign KWAME NKRUMAH, just ripped from the decorations of what is now known as National Liberation Circle: "In this country it was socialism for the poor and capitalism for the rich."

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the party and the politicians who have failed, not the system itself.[22] As one journalist recently asked, "If party politics has succeeded in many other parts of the world, why should it not succeed in Africa?"[23]

## II

An attempt to answer this fundamental question is an essential preliminary to the planning of any new governmental system. It is not sufficient to pronounce upon the necessity for, or the futility of, the "Westminster model" without trying to analyze the particular difficulties involved. We should begin by recognizing the costs (as well as the gains) of the multi-party system. Such a system means nothing unless there is some oscillation between the parties; in a situation of "pure" competition, the developmental trends we have already noted will ensure that such changes occur. If the opposing parties do not simply offer the electorate a change of personnel, but a change of policy as well, then it is clear that an element of discontinuity will be introduced into key areas of planning. The problem is a basic one for all Socialist parties in an electoral regime, whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa, and in just the same way the system often acts as a brake on unrestricted "capitalism." But continuity of planning and the mobilization of national effort may be seen as having greater importance in those new nations where rapid development is the major aim of the ruling elites; and these ends the single party can more easily promote.

However, the principal threat to multi-party rule is not, I think, the planned economy. Nor (as I have remarked) is it a question of "political immaturity"; there is nothing immature about wanting to consolidate one's power. Neither is it only a matter (as some of the present defenders of the multi-party system suggest)[24] of the venality of particular politicians. While the "intellectual" politicians of present-day Ghana are certainly not "rogues," the demagogic atmosphere of competitive politics will bring to the fore less conscientious contestants and less scrupulous tactics.

[22] See, for example, the argument of J. K. Tawiah, a lawyer *(Daily Graphic,* June 26, 1967) and the Chief Justice's criticisms of the proposals put forward by the chiefs for a period of no-party rule.

[23] H. K. Bidi Setsoafia in the *Daily Graphic,* June 19, 1967.

[24] See, also, Lewis: "It may even be true that half the ministers in West Africa are rogues" (p. 34).

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If the problem existed only on the "political" level, it would be easier to deal with. But in a situation where superiors are traditionally offered gifts of solicitation and thanksgiving, where politicians (like chiefs in earlier times) can easily influence appointments to jobs, where these jobs are becoming increasingly scarce as the growth of education outstrips the capacity to absorb the educated in non-traditional occupations—under these conditions, support is easily bought by those who succeed in reaching positions of power. Moreover, those holding such positions, lucrative in terms of both salary and power, have little to fall back on when they relinquish their grip on office. In Britain, the defeated M.P. can retire to a company directorship or a trade-union post; in West Africa, a change to the position of village schoolmaster or council clerk represents a great drop both in salary and status, and even these jobs may fall within the patronage of one's political opponents.

This general problem of developing countries crops up in a particular form in present-day Ghana. While the party machinery virtually disappeared overnight, the absorption into other jobs of former members of Parliament, district commissioners, and party officials was a major social problem. In those areas in Northern Ghana with which I am personally acquainted, the majority of such individuals have returned to their former occupations, usually school teaching. But some had no substantial qualifications for "white-collar" jobs, and others have been unwilling to make the adjustment; these are either "roaming" or "farming," that is, sitting around the house. Clearly this category of ex-functionary represents a potential focus for dissatisfaction; even those among them who now express doubts about the previous regime cannot help regretting the glory it imparted to their lives. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the coup of Lieutenant Arthur on April 17 looked as though it would be successful (he had captured the radio and proclaimed his victory), some of these former officials openly celebrated the demise of the National Liberation Council, even though there was no suggestion that the new junta was more inclined to support Nkrumah than the first. Many of the individuals who engaged in this premature rejoicing were promptly placed under protective custody. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to show that the majority was primarily interested in the re-establishment of the previous regime. It was rather the reoccupation of their former po-

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sitions; and they will be equally anxious to "get their own back" when an electoral system offers them the opportunity.

The problems of party government in developing countries like Ghana, then, lie not so much in a lack of political education, nor in the failure to achieve consensus, as in the economic and social situation of the third world. With the virtual absence of private employers, those who want jobs have to get them from government agencies; the educated exceed the employed. The temptations to manipulate are enormous and there is little institutional plurality to compensate, and few checks and balances to the exercise of politicians' power. Under such conditions we cannot visualize effective multi-party government of a Western kind, while to many, the costs of one-party rule make this a yet less attractive proposition. The military provide the only ultimate sanction against the monopolization of power, and, while they claim to regard their rule as only temporary (and indeed appear to act on this assumption), their first intervention is hardly likely to be their last.

The alternation of civilian and military rule will, I think, dominate the pattern of West African government over many years to come, and such a pattern will to some degree reflect popular demands, or at least receive the approbation of the masses. But the swing of the pendulum could be controlled, by trying to limit the role of political parties and of the military forces.

In suggesting that an attempt could be made to restrict the power and function of parties, we need to remind ourselves that there is, after all, no divine law that allows them to operate, everywhere, in a situation of uninhibited competition; one could even legislate for a regular rotation between alternative lists (as in nineteenth-century Portugal), a system which provides a considerable check upon the action of the political haves against the temporary have-nots. What would be the sanctions against a breach of the rules? Here one has to recognize the *de facto* role of the army in political systems of all kinds, but especially in the new nations. It would seem possible to allocate to the army (or perhaps a supreme court, backed by the army) the function of preserving the agreed constitution. To specify the conditions under which the army should intervene might at least limit its arbitrary role in government and make its interference less unpredictable than it is now in so many West African countries. To make this attempt is to recognize that,

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for any political system, consensus is desirable, but force is essential.

## III

There are many reasons why academic observers of the Ghanaian scene, political scientists, historians, sociologists, failed to assess reaction to a coup, in particular the virtually complete disintegration of the party and its auxiliaries. To discuss all these reasons here would be unnecessary, but there is one point of general interest which is not easily sidestepped.

Academic observers from Western Europe and America have inevitably tended to extrapolate from their own cultural experience in analyzing contemporary Africa. They have placed great stress on research into the growth of political parties, on electoral processes, on the development of consensus, and on other elements in the political system that strike a chord in their own tradition. They tend to make a rigid distinction between consensus as the instrument of politicians and force as the instrument of the military. A clearer appreciation of their own past and indeed present might have modified this view; so, too, would a recognition that a state organization involves the control of armed force.

The idealist position over-emphasizes the role of ideological consensus, and such a view is reinforced by the anthropological approach, recently imported into "modern" political studies, that calls for an analysis of the "political culture." As in many "anthropological" studies, culture gets reified, norms rigidified, social action homogenized, and "models" acquire a specious generality and an unsanctioned authority.

The situation in contemporary Ghana illustrates the ease with which apparent support can evaporate, especially following a change from a condition of "enforced consensus." One aspect of the reaction to political decompression is a state of ideological restlessness, and a proliferation of solutions to the problems of social organization. In Ghana, these proferred solutions do not derive primarily from any systematic ideology, but consist of attempts to arrive at "more adequate" social arrangements by building upon certain pre-existing elements of organization and belief, and trying to arrive at new combinations.

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Just as Western social science has tended to place too much stress upon consensus, as against coercion, so, too, it has given too much attention to ideology and belief as "systems" on the group and individual level.

In the recent volume *Ideology and Discontent*,[25] we are offered little by way of a definition of ideology, apart from the editorially approved statement of Erikson that it is "an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific thought as well as political thought."[26] Given the somewhat limited techniques that social scientists have produced to deal with conscious elements in verbal (and quasi-verbal) behavior, it is difficult to see them making much headway with the unconscious. Indeed, another contributor finds the term ideology "so muddied by diverse uses" that he substitutes "belief system," defined as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."[27]

In the last analysis, all behavior of man and nature is "functionally interdependent." The question here is one of relevance. Too great a stress on the systematic aspects of beliefs, ideologies, societies, and cultures renders incomprehensible the inconsistencies in behavior (on "normative" and "actual" levels), the contradictions between attitudinal elements ("personal" and "group"), and the developmental aspects of belief. The logic behind the internal dynamics of the changing situations that characterize Africa today lies not so much in functional interdependence of belief, nor in the coherence of culture, but in the conflicts within social structure and in the fact that on the folk level, beliefs are rarely as systematic, as consensual, as univalent, as they are presented analytically. Comprehensive ideologies, systematic structures of belief, these are social artifacts of strictly limited distribution, both within and across societies.

[25] David E. Apter (ed.) (Glencoe, 1964).

[26] p. 21. Quoted from E. H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (London, 1958).

[27] P. E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems of Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent*, 207.

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# The Polish Intelligentsia and the Socialist Order: Elements of Ideological Compatibility*

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The main interest of this study is the relation between the intelligentsia and the Socialist system in Poland. This interest was prompted by the remarkable development that took place after 1956: the process of accommodation between the intelligentsia and the regime, and the virtual restoration of the intelligentsia to its traditional position of ascendancy in the Polish social structure. This development provided a sharp contrast to the conditions during the early postwar period, when the bulk of the intelligentsia found itself locked in an unmitigated conflict with the Communist regime, and when its traditional elite status appeared to be doomed under the Socialist order.

What is the significance of this development? The obvious approach would be to look for an explanation of the changing components of the situation—mainly in the changes in the political system during the post-Stalinist period, and in the structural and ideological transformation of the postwar intelligentsia. This study acknowledges the significance of these factors. In addition, however, it introduces another proposition: the affinity between the ideology of the intelligentsia and the Socialist system. This is the main thesis presented here. It is developed through a historical analysis of the position of the intelligentsia within the social structure, and

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of its function within the modernizing process that occurred in Poland during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The general proposition may be formulated in the following manner:

*Historically, the Polish intelligentsia was either indifferent or had a negative attitude toward industrialism and economic modernization. This was associated with the conservative bent in the intelligentsia value system, and with the view of economic activities as a low-status function, assigned to the inferior strata. However, whenever confronted with the secular pressure of modern industrialism, the intelligentsia tended to opt for the Socialist (not necessarily Marxist), rather than for the capitalist solution. The determining factor in this choice was the anti-entrepreneurial bias inherent in the intelligentsia ideology. Related to this were the elitist perspective of social organization, inherited from the gentry society, and the authoritarian concept of polity—both of which enhanced the compatibility between the intelligentsia outlook and the Socialist order.*

The limited claim of this statement should be noted: it does not suggest a causal relation between the ideology of the intelligentsia and the establishment of the Socialist order (indeed, in the particular case of Poland the historical facts seem to preclude this kind of interpretation). It merely points out the elements of compatibility that enabled the process of accommodation to occur and made it so significant.

On a more general level, this hypothesis draws attention to some interesting characteristics of the Polish situation: the persistence of social continuities in areas and under conditions where sharp discontinuities could be expected. The process of rapid industrialization and the disintegration of the traditional economic system, such as Polish society experienced during the last twenty years, usually carry with them expectations of social discontinuities. In the Polish case, this condition was compounded by the profound demographic and territorial changes due to the war and by the imposition of the Communist regime. Indeed, an observer may have little difficulty in bringing out the elements of discontinuity and relating them to all these changes. From that point of view, the manifestation of continuities in such areas as the stratification framework or the general value system of the society may appear even more striking, and may deserve some special attention.

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Necessarily, the interest in social continuity places accent on the peculiarities of the Polish structure. This, however, does not preclude generalizations to other societies. Indeed, implicit in the proceeding analysis is the notion that the link between the structural conditions that gave rise to the phenomenon of the intelligentsia and the propensity toward the Socialist order has validity also outside Polish society. This is, of course, not an entirely new notion, except perhaps for the emphasis on the interpretative structural approach.[1] In this sense, the present analysis may be seen as a case study of the function of the intelligentsia within the process of modernization.

### *The Concept of Intelligentsia*

Whenever we speak about "intelligentsia" we refer to a phenomenon the prototype of which was provided by Russian society during the second half of the nineteenth century. Undoubtedly, it was under Russian influence that the term, and the concept, came into use in Poland with reference to a new class of urban elite. It is certainly not easy to render the meaning of "intelligentsia" in Western terms. The German usage of equating "intelligentsia" with "intellectuals" or "professionals" does not seem to reflect its East European significance;[2] a closer approximation would be the occupational category of "non-manual workers," but this also would ignore some crucial elements of intelligentsia status. The obvious difficulty is that the phenomenon of intelligentsia as a specific pattern of social-class identity remained outside Western experience, and any analogy with Western structure is bound to be incomplete. Perhaps the following attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of intelligentsia may help to reveal the nature of the problem: *The intelligentsia is a social class phenomenon that is peculiar to the condition of modernization in societies where the elitist-dichotomous framework of social stratification is preserved. The main criteria of*

[1] "Russian socialism was born amidst a class more archaic than the bourgeoisie —the gentry or aristocracy (*dvorianstvo*), a class in which, according to all recognized canons in such matters, Marxist or otherwise, socialism ought not to take up abiding historical residence." Martin Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 1.

[2] See Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1949), 12-19.

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*intelligentsia status are education and non-manual occupation: the educated non-manual strata form a new class that, within the traditional dichotomous framework, acquires the status of "modern" elite. A usual concomitant of the phenomenon of intelligentsia is the absence of an articulate modern business class.*[3]

Implicit in this definition is the notion that the phenomenon of intelligentsia is associated with "late" modernization; and this would fit well with the experience not only of Eastern Europe, but also of some Asian and perhaps other undeveloped societies.[4]

[3] This definition follows quite closely the analysis provided in Alexander Hertz, "The Case of an Eastern European Intelligentsia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XI (1951), 1-14.

It might be helpful to clarify some of the main concepts. *Modernization* is conceived here along the lines provided by Reinhard Bendix: "Modernization (sometimes called social and political development) refers to all those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many countries of Western civilization. Among these are urbanization, changes in occupational structure, social mobility, development of education—as well as political changes from absolutist institutions to responsible and representative governments, and from a laissez-faire to a modern welfare state." *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York, 1964), 5. An extension of this definition seems to be the notion that the modernizing process may be (and, indeed, usually is) selective, both in terms of intensity of institutional change, and in retention of elements of the traditional structure. To a large degree, this selectivity is determined for each society by the nature of its "modernizing agents." *Elitism* is defined by Lipset in his introduction of the equalitarian-elitist variable in value patterns: "In an equalitarian society, the differences between low status and high status people are not stressed in social relationships and do not convey to the high status a general claim to social deference. In contrast, in an elitist society, those who hold high position in any structure, whether it be in business, in intellectual activities, or in government, are thought to deserve, and are actually given, general respect and deference." This is followed by an important qualification: "In actual fact, no society is ever fully explicable by these analytic concepts, nor does the theory even contemplate the possible existence of such a society. Every society incorporates some aspects of each polarity. We may, however, differentiate among social structures by the extent to which they emphasize one or another of these polarities." Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963), 211-12. (Italics and footnotes omitted.) This concept of elitism is modified by the notion of *dichotomy* of class structure. The essence of the dichotomous condition is a clear-cut division between the "elite class" and the "commonality," and the absence of any significant intermediary strata, as well as of any secondary claimants to the status of elite. For a stimulating analysis of the concept of dichotomy in social structure see Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, trans. Sheila Patterson (London, 1963).

[4] "All of these similarities [between the Russian and the Chinese intelligentsia] tend to support the thesis that the phenomenon of the intelligentsia is a universal concomitant of the confrontation of a 'traditional' society with a modern

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The intelligentsia in Poland emerged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century in a development somewhat parallel to that in Russia: under conditions of decline of the landed gentry system and of expansion of the industrial system. The core of the intelligentsia was provided by what later came to be known as the "creative intelligentsia"—writers, journalists, artists, scientists, and educators. Usually, those were people of gentry origin, committed to patriotic values and permeated with Western humanistic culture. Around this core were formed the new strata of professionals and non-manual workers recruited from the impoverished gentry youth who were forced to leave their ancestral homes and to move to the city in search of employment. By the rules of gentry society, entry into small business or artisan-type employment meant loss of status; a small minority were able to establish themselves in professions; for others, office work and administrative jobs, preferably in government service or large industrial enterprises, appeared as the only employment compatible with their position. By origin, education, and perception of their own status set apart from the traditional urban classes, they maintained their sense of identity; and by accepting the leadership of the creative intelligentsia, they found ideological adjustment to the new conditions and were able to attain self-identification as the new urban elite.

With the passage of time, the social content of the intelligentsia underwent some changes through the influx of individuals from the lower classes, mainly from the wealthier peasantry. But this affected only in a limited way the original character of the intelligentsia as an elite by ascription: gentry, as long as they did not enter manual occupations or small business, had ready access to its ranks.[5] Also in its ideological outlook the intelligentsia remained an extension of the gentry society:

> The gentry, who for various reasons entered intelligentsia occupations, did preserve their old notions with regard to social and cultural relations, their style of life, their sense of estate solidarity, their prejudices, and their sense of superiority and distance in relations with the "lower"

West." Benjamin Schwartz, "The Intelligentsia in Communist China: A Tentative Comparison," in Richard Pipes (ed.), *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York, 1961), 176.

[5] Alicja Iwanska (ed.), *Contemporary Poland* (Chicago, 1957), 102.

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> classes. The gentry were also able to impose these attitudes upon those members of the intelligentsia who were of different origin—upon those who came from the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, or from peasantry. This was an important factor in producing the cohesiveness of the various occupational groups [who formed the intelligentsia], and it contributed to the intra-occupational solidarity and to the institutionalization of the intelligentsia as a stratum.[6]

With the increasing degree of institutionalization, the criterion of admission into the ranks of the intelligentsia became defined, at its minimum level, as the acquisition of the *matura*—the certificate of secondary education, prevalent among the gentry but only rarely available to youth of labor or peasant origin. Economic position per se was not significant, but a measure of congruence in occupational status and a style of life compatible with participation in the "good society" were required. Manual labor of any kind and small-business activities were incompatible with intelligentsia status; on the other hand, even a lowly non-manual job appeared acceptable. In this way, the modern occupational distinction between manual and non-manual occupations became assimilated to the traditional division between commonalty and gentry.[7]

The special role that the educational system assumed in the social structure can be seen clearly here. By defining elite status in educational terms, the intelligentsia provided a unique framework for adaptation of the traditional structure to the exigencies of modern life: the educational system became an important channel of mobility in an otherwise closed society, and, at the same time, it served as an effective mechanism of control and a check against the influx of low-class elements, inadequately socialized to the value system of the elite, into the upper ranks. In this way, the traditional structure was able to undergo considerable modernization without jeopardizing the elitist character of the society.[8]

[6] Jan Szczepanski, *Inteligencja i spoleczenstwo* (Warsaw, 1957), 22-23.

[7] A Polish sociologist noted: "Probably nowhere else was the social distance between nonmanual work, even in subordinate position, and manual labor, even that of high importance, as obvious as in Poland." S. Rychlinski, "Warstwy spoleczne," *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, VIII (1938), 180.

[8] "There [in Poland and in some other East European societies] education is not a means to achieve personal success but rather a permanent asset which sets the individual apart and gives him access to a higher social sphere. . . . It is easy enough to trace a parallel to the ancient tradition that went with the bestowal of a title of nobility." Hertz, 13.

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An essential element in this situation was the virtual exclusion of the business class from the main social body. Historically, the bourgeoisie in Poland was formed on the fringes of society. It never developed a strong economic base, and it operated mostly within the framework of a pre-industrial, artisan-type, and small-commerce system. Except for the towns in the western part of the country where a solid element of ethnically Polish business class appeared, there was a sharp ethnic and cultural barrier between the bourgeoisie and the rest of the nation: the entrepreneur, the merchant, and the tradesman were usually of Jewish or German origin. This barrier helped effectively to maintain the isolation of the traditional urban classes; in this sense, they never lost some of the characteristics of an estate. To the peasant and to the worker entry into business might have appeared attractive, mainly because of economic advantages. But this kind of mobility denoted limited advancement only; truly significant mobility meant entry into the ranks of the intelligentsia. Movement toward the business class in one generation was merely a stepping stone toward advancement to the intelligentsia in the next generation.

### *The Ideological Framework*

The exceptional hold of the intelligentsia over the rest of society can be understood within the twin-context of the educational system and the elitist ideology.

The traditional system of education was the only route for *significant* social advancement; also, it was an instrument of socialization to the value system of the intelligentsia. This situation provided the intelligentsia with a quasi-monopoly over the nation's ideology. It is noteworthy that, despite the deep cleavages that rent Polish society and despite the absence of elements of cohesiveness such as political and economic unity, no competing ideologies capable of challenging the intelligentsia's monopoly emerged. Even such significant departures from the main tradition of social thought as the "positivist" movement (to which reference will be made later) or the peasant populist movement at the end of the century were not able to free themselves from the gentry-intelligentsia perspective of social structure. In this sense, Polish society appeared as a

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remarkably integrated system—the result of the intelligentsia's ability to absorb all the articulate elements of the nation and to mold them upon its own pattern.

The ideological framework of the intelligentsia provided a design for living which served to enhance the distinction between the elite and the commonalty. It was largely patterned along gentry lines. The intelligentsia retained the aristocratic notion of inferiority of economic pursuits and an outward contempt for monetary matters; related to this was disregard for all types of utilitarian activities, including technology and applied science.[9] Another element in this ideology was the notion of primacy of political power within the social system, a concept that fitted well within the anti-mercantile bias of the aristocratic philosophy. This was reflected in the penchant of the gentry-intelligentsia toward civil service careers. Chalasinski suggests that this was the result of a historical development through which the state replaced the magnates of the old Polish Kingdom as the main source of power, and eventually came to be regarded as the major provider for the lesser gentry. Civil service offered an acceptable solution to the impoverished gentleman who was deprived of his traditional sources of income but was anxious to preserve his elite status; the notion of authority associated with serving the state allowed him to maintain a measure of identification with the source of power.[10]

This inclination of the intelligentsia toward civil service was able to manifest itself fully only after 1918, with the regaining of national independence. Until then, the main theme of political ideology was patriotic commitment and repudiation of alien rule. One of the peculiarities of the Polish situation was that, throughout most of the nineteenth century, the cause of national independence was the concern of the gentry (and later of the intelligentsia) to the virtual exclusion of the lower classes. Some change in this respect took place at the turn of the century when industrial workers joined in significant numbers the revolutionary patriotic struggle; but, essentially, patriotism continued to be regarded as a commitment of the upper classes and, indeed, as an attribute of elite status.

The patriotic movement of the late nineteenth century produced

[9] Iwanska, 73-75; Jozef Chalasinski, *Przeszlosc i przyszlosc inteligencji polskiej* (Warsaw, 1958).

[10] *Ibid.*, 66-71.

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two types of philosophy, largely opposing one another, though both grounded in the gentry-intelligentsia society. One orientation came to be known as positivism, in reference to the theories of Auguste Comte. In its Polish variant positivism became mainly a blueprint for national survival through economic and social modernization. Implicit in the positivist approach was pragmatic accommodation to the political conditions of the period and acceptance of the Western capitalist model of social organization. The movement derived its ideological support from the flourishing historiography, critical of traditional aristocratic values, and from *belles-lettres*. The writings of Boleslaw Prus, the most prominent protagonist in the latter field, represented a kind of manifesto of entrepreneurial spirit and a call for economic and cultural innovation. Characteristically, this was primarily an appeal to the gentry and the intelligentsia to take over the functions of the modernizing elite; in this sense, positivism continued to operate within the traditional social framework.

The second approach was provided by the militant movement, aimed at gaining independence by force. Ideologically, it derived its inspiration from the national past, especially from the insurgency of 1863, as well as from the modern Socialist movements in Russia and in the West. This dual orientation produced a specific blend of "progressive nationalism" in which the revolutionary Socialist elements provided a distinct coloration that separated it from the positivist approach. There was no apparent difficulty in reconciling gentry tradition with Socialist aspirations; indeed, the gentry-led uprising of 1863 already contained some elements of the Socialist ethic.

In this confrontation between the capitalist-inspired positivism and the Socialist-oriented nationalism, the latter prevailed. Except for a relatively narrow circle of intellectuals, the positivist model of bourgeois pragmatism had little appeal; there was an obvious incongruity between the capitalist-style egalitarianism and utilitarianism on the one hand, and the general system of ideas and values dominating intelligentsia thought, on the other. The typical intelligent, with his links to the ancestor's manor still so close, responded more readily to the Socialist variant of nationalism. With its romantic attachment to the gentry past, its repudiation of bourgeois values, and its implicit elitist outlook, Polish socialism fitted well within the general system of the intelligentsia ideology. The

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main exponent of this orientation was the Polish Socialist party, which after 1918 played a major role in shaping the new state; one of its early leaders was Jozef Pilsudski whose influence during the interwar period was second to none.

### *The Period of Interwar Independence*

Until 1918 the intelligentsia existed somewhat in the shadow of the gentry society and derived its status mainly from this association. It was only in independent Poland that conditions arose for crystallization of the intelligentsia identity as the nation's new elite. The historical identification with the cause of national independence, combined with the ability of the intelligentsia to integrate all the mobile elements from the lower classes, seemed to determine its function as the catalyst of the nation-building process; throughout the interwar period, the special right of the intelligentsia to shape the new nationhood was hardly challenged. In addition, there were, of course, the practical exigencies of the hour—the need for literate civil service and for modern administration—that helped to establish the intelligentsia in a position of ascendancy. With this, Poland became "an intelligentsia-dominated society,"[11] and there was hardly an area of public endeavor which did not bear the imprint of the intelligentsia's presence. A German observer noted:

> Sociologically, the intelligentsia remained a unity [despite political cleavages] more than ever before. It took over the administration of the country and the management of political, municipal, economic, and cultural organizations. The specific atmosphere of a mixture of *szlachta* [gentry] culture and of West European education—a peculiarity of the Polish intelligentsia—was prevalent.[12]

The system of government which, after an initial experiment in parliamentary democracy, moved toward quasi-military dictatorship bore all the markings of the gentry-intelligentsia philosophy. It combined authoritarian rule and administrative constraint with a *sui generis* tolerance for individual dissent reserved mainly for the elite. It is significant in this respect that even during the peak of the pro-Fascist orientation during the late thirties, the regime was

[11] Hertz, 10.

[12] Harald Laeuen, "Die Polnische Intelligenz und Führung Schicht," in Werner Markert (ed.), *Polen* (Cologne, 1959), 15.

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not able to establish an effective totalitarian rule. Characteristically, the army officer corps, which produced most of the governing cliques during the interwar period, regarded itself as an integral part of the intelligentsia; and indeed, probably more than any other single group, it represented the intelligentsia ideology in action.

The propensity of the intelligentsia for bureaucratic careers found ample opportunity for fulfillment not only in the civil service, armed forces, and the general administration but also in the area of economic activities. The mainstay of the economic policy through most of the interwar period was *etatyzm*—state ownership and state control in industry. According to some estimates, state-owned enterprises in 1932 represented between fifteen and twenty-five per cent of national capital investment;[13] and undoubtedly, with the intensification of state intervention during the years of economic depression, this share continued to increase. Besides railways (ownership of which devolved to the state after regaining independence), the state entered such fields as merchant marine, heavy equipment, mining, and the chemical and textile industries. In effect, state ownership became, next to foreign capital, the controlling element in big industry.

One could argue to what degree *etatyzm* was a response to sheer economic conditions—the urgency of industrial development and the limitation of native investment capital—or whether it reflected the anti-entrepreneurial bias and the inclination among the ruling groups toward state-sponsored solutions. In all probability both elements were present to a significant degree, and acted in mutual reinforcement. It is certain that *etatyzm* accorded well with the intelligentsia perspective of economic activities and with the attraction of civil service status. Needless to say, it was not socialism in the Marxist sense; it was the nearest form of repudiating the onset of a bourgeois society available to a conservative system faced with the pressure of modernization.

[13] Tadeusz Bernadzikiewicz, *Przerosty etatyzmu* (Warsaw, 1936), 20-22. Other estimates placed the share of state-owned enterprises between ten and fifteen per cent of the total capital investment. See, also, John Michael Montias, *Central Planning in Poland* (New Haven, 1962), 49-50. The significance of these data should be considered against the general background of the Polish economy: the predominance of agriculture and of traditional small business, and the heavy concentration of foreign capital in the big-business sector. State ownership was obviously concentrated in the modern, large-scale industries, too.

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### *The Stalinist Interlude*

Under the Communist order that came into being after 1944, the intelligentsia appeared an obvious loser. In sheer political terms, the intelligentsia was seen as the mainstay of anti-Soviet opposition, and this itself seemed sufficient to doom it into extinction. The new regime was committed to a profound transformation according to the Stalinist blueprint, and its aim was to break up the institutional props of the traditional system, particularly those that served to maintain the ascendancy of the intelligentsia.

The anti-intelligentsia policy developed a two-pronged action: (1) the removal of the intelligentsia from managerial jobs and from positions of control, and their replacement with manual workers advanced primarily for political considerations, and (2) the reform of the educational system with a view toward producing a new "working class intelligentsia"—a managerial elite that would be committed to the Marxist outlook.

It would be difficult to provide statistical evidence on the number of workers advanced to managerial positions. According to an official party account, the number of "advanced workers" in industry reached fifteen thousand by 1949;[14] this was at the beginning of the Socialist reconstruction drive, and undoubtedly the number increased considerably during the early fifties. On the other hand, the sheer practical needs for professional competence made a thorough displacement of the intelligentsia quite an impossible undertaking; a more frequent pattern was to place the old managers in a subordinate position and to subject them to the surveillance of the party commissars.

There was also another factor, of a different nature, that tended to strengthen the position of the intelligentsia, and which eventually contributed to the frustration of the anti-intelligentsia policy. This was the reaction of public opinion, not only among the "old-regime" strata but also among labor, which in effect denied the legitimacy of the advanced-worker status. It is not difficult to see how government policy in this respect was bound to run counter to established values; the notion that low-status individuals, without proper education, could be placed in positions of control and in charge of people

[14] Jan Szczepanski (ed.), *Wyksztalcenie a pozycja spoleczna inteligencji*, (Lodz, 1960), II, 462.

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with high status appeared incompatible with the proper order of things. If anything, this policy served to underline the alien origin of the regime and its imposter nature. The following statements (published under conditions of post-Stalinist liberalization) seem to be representative of popular sentiments:

> Probably only in Poland a situation may exist where a worker with merely elementary education is placed in charge of a plant, and where a Master of Engineering works as his assistant.[15]

> [Among workers] there is animosity against the so-called intelligentsia through advancement, that is, against former co-workers who took advantage of the opportunities available in the past, and who became managers, superintendents, and supervisors. I know some who have no qualifications whatever: they have elementary education only. It seems fair that those people are despised by their former comrades (whom they pretend not to know any more). There is a saying applicable to them: "God save us from the churl who became a squire."[16]

It is noteworthy how persistent in the above quotations is the association of managerial status with "proper" education, to the virtual exclusion of all other criteria.

Educational reform provided a program for modernization on all levels of schooling; eventually, it led to the eradication of illiteracy among the urban and rural population and opened secondary schools to large numbers of working-class youth. At the university level, the aim of the reform was to provide a framework for professional training, with emphasis on technology and science. Also, there was the political goal of producing a new educated stratum that would be free from the ideological commitments of the past. In this latter respect, a number of significant changes were introduced. In order to insure a "desirable" balance in social-class composition of the student population, a minimum of sixty per cent of enrollment was reserved for youth of worker and peasant origin; in addition, admission to university became open to candidates without formal high school education—to graduates of special "preparatory courses" established for the specific purpose of training worker youth without

[15] Teresa Izydorkiewicz, "Praca zawodowa i pozycja spoleczna absolwentow Wydzialu Matematyczno-Przyrodniczego Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego," in *ibid.*, 437.

[16] Letters to the Editor, *Polityka*, III, No. 2 (1959).

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access to the *matura*. Finally, a three-year course, aimed at producing intermediary-level specialists, was introduced in addition to the existing *magister* program.

Characteristically, the plan to reform the traditional system, and particularly the admission of candidates without proper credentials, was perceived not only as an attempt to dilute the academic status, but also as a challenge to the elite position of the intelligentsia and to the whole established structure. The question of university reform became a focal point for anti-regime resistance and a kind of test of strength between the government and its opponents: "The attempt to undermine the traditional road to university education through the introduction of preparatory courses produced considerable resistance, and resulted in many arguments within the academic circles and among the 'old' intelligentsia."[17]

Opposition against the reform was remarkable in its thoroughness. Newcomers without the *matura* were treated by regular students as interlopers who had no place within the academic system, and they were exposed to everyday harassment. Similarly, the graduates of the Three-Year Course were denied recognition of their university status, and had a difficult task in living down the marginality of their position, both as professionals and as members of the intelligentsia.[18] The movement against the reform was apparently sufficiently effective to persuade the government to abandon it before it even dented the system.

### *Patterns of Accommodation*

The installation of Gomulka to power in 1956 provided conditions for a new relation between the Communist regime and the intelligentsia. The essence of the "Polish road to socialism," associated with the new administration, was accommodation to the prevailing value system of the society and legitimation of the regime within the national context. Implicit in this was the return to forms of government more in consonance with national tradition. In terms of political standards that evolved during the interwar period, this did not have to

[17] Waclaw Piotrowski, "Zagadnienie socjologicznych badan nad inteligencja," *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, XI (1957), 291.

[18] Wladyslaw Milczarek *et al.*, *Ze studjow nad kursami przygotowawczymi* (Wroclaw, 1962); Izydorkiewicz, 403-04.

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entail the abandonment of authoritarian rule; indeed, the main framework of dictatorship was preserved without much change. But at the same time the instruments of government underwent considerable transformation: the party dissociated itself from the patently alien, Russian-derived style in totalitarian controls and in propaganda, and gradually redefined its own function as a platform for accommodation, rather than as a tool of administrative control. In a manner quite similar to prewar practice, but greatly enhanced by the special position of the Socialist state, patronage replaced police action as the main lever of governmental constraints. With the dilution of doctrinaire commitments, membership in the party came to be regarded as a token of generalized political loyalty, and eventually became rationalized as an inevitable contingency in career advancement, particularly for managerial cadres.

In comparison with the pre-1956 regime, the Gomulka administration was free from the stigma of Soviet allegiance and this, in itself, was a factor in the process of its legitimation. It would probably be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the population at large, and particularly the intelligentsia, identified with the new government; but Gomulka was brought to power in the aftermath of a popular upheaval and, at least during the first years, he was able to capitalize on this by appealing to the sense of national solidarity. It is within this context that the formidable barrier that separated the intelligentsia from the Communist regime became dissolved.

It is difficult to say to what degree the changes in the social content of the intelligentsia, and related changes in its ideological outlook, provided the momentum for the accommodation process. But it may be assumed that the pull from that source was significant. The vast expansion of the educational system brought a considerable influx of lower-class youth into the ranks of the intelligentsia; by the late fifties more than half of all secondary school graduates and a not much smaller proportion of university graduates were children of peasants or workers.[19] Also, the occupational orientation of the postwar intelligentsia changed considerably: during the 1928-37 period the proportion of engineers among all university graduates was thirteen per cent; during the fifties it exceeded thirty per cent.[20] A new category of intelligentsia—the "technical intel-

[19] Szczepanski, *Wyksztalcenie . . . inteligencji*, 462.

[20] Michal Charkiewicz, *Kadry wykwalifikowane w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1961), 26, 33.

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ligentsia"—emerged. This new industrial stratum maintained its identification with the traditional intelligentsia, but it differed considerably in the degree of professional commitment, in career orientation, as well as in perception of its own occupational status. It seems reasonable to relate to these changes the perceptible transformation that took place in the intelligentsia ideology. The stereotype of the old intelligentsia—the humanist-dilletante-patriot of noble origin—did not disappear entirely or lose its attraction, but next to it appeared the model of the "new intelligentsia"—the expert-manager, usually seen as a first generation professional. With this came into the open a definite trend toward articulating material values, a taste for pragmatic solutions in social and political issues, and a measure of contempt for the old romantic commitments.[21]

Here it is possible to draw a historical parallel with the positivist orientation of the late nineteenth century: like the defeat of the 1863 uprising, the experience of the Second World War and postwar conditions produced a pattern of social discontinuities, and with this a search for accommodation and readiness to compromise with political reality.[22] The rationale behind this interpretation seems to be sound. But historical analogies are seldom, if ever, complete, and this one seems to end here. The new "pragmatic approach" became much more pervasive than the positivism of past. It derived its momentum from the socio-economic pattern of change and, mainly, from industrial expansion.

A major point in the Gomulka accommodation program was the abandonment of the policy of advancing workers to managerial positions and the recognition of professional and educational status as the main criterion in recruitment of management. The new policy was embraced with considerable thoroughness; special "clearance boards" were instituted to investigate the status of worker-managers without proper education, and tens of thousands of medium- and higher-level jobs were affected.[23] No doubt, the exigencies of mod-

[21] Interesting data in this respect are provided in "Poland's New Generation," mimeographed, Radio Free Europe (Munich, 1963).

[22] See Adam Bromke, "Political Realism in Poland," *Survey*, No. 51 (1964), 111-17.

[23] A report produced by one clearance board which investigated 59,000 managerial cadres found that forty per cent lacked required educational status;

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ern organization and the need for skilled management were at the basis of this change; the net effect, however, was the opening of new and unusual opportunities for the young intelligentsia for fulfillment of their career aspirations. On a more general level, the new policy meant the restoration of the intelligentsia's monopoly over managerial positions and validation of its special status within the Socialist framework.

### *Aspects of Continuity: The Dichotomous Division*

At this stage of the discussion one question of crucial importance to our argument should be considered. Implicit in our line of reasoning is the assumption that the new intelligentsia, including the technical intelligentsia, represents a continuation of the old elite relationship. To put it in a somewhat different way, the underlying proposition here is that some elements of the traditional stratification system, significant in defining the position of the intelligentsia, remained unchanged. To what degree is this proposition justified?

It was noted earlier how the postwar transformation introduced important changes in the social and occupational composition of the intelligentsia, and also resulted in a significant reorientation in its ideology. All that was part of the levelling-off trend that started during the war and continued, with various degrees of intensity, throughout the whole postwar period. The change in the intelligentsia ideology deserves particular attention: by veering toward a more pragmatic perception of reality and by allowing a shift in the hierarchical value arrangement, the intelligentsia seemed to discard some elements of its elitist outlook and embraced some clearly plebeian notions. On a more concrete level, this trend was clear in the diminution of social distance between the intelligentsia and the working strata in cultural and economic conditions, and in the general style of life. The main factor here seemed to be the considerable improvement in the position of the peasantry and low skilled labor, and the parallel economic degradation of non-manual cate-

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two-thirds of those were directed to make up their deficiencies within a specified time limit. The others were excused because of advanced age, health conditions, and other considerations. Jerzy Metera, "O niektorych problemach kadr inzynieryjno-technicznych," *Nowe Drogi*, XVI (1962), 21-22.

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gories.[24] In comparison with the prewar situation, Polish society moved undoubtedly toward a more egalitarian system. Considering all this, is it possible to speak about the intelligentsia as the elite class, in the traditional meaning of the term?

The essence of the elitist concept on which the old class system was based was the dichotomous distinction between the elite and the masses. The historical roots of this distinction and its relevance to the stratification system were discussed above; the main characteristic of this dichotomy was intolerance of any intermediary class categories that could bridge the main division inherited from the gentry society. Like any stratification system, the Polish structure was not free from marginal strata, but here those strata were kept outside the main social body; thus, they were not able to perform any significant mediating functions, nor were they capable of challenging the traditional system as a new competing elite. It is within this context that the status of the intelligentsia acquired its full meaning. We may attempt to find an answer to our question by exploring this particular aspect. The question may be recast in the following terms: To what degree does the concept of dichotomous class system continue to serve as the framework of social organization?

One of the aspects of the equalizing trend during the postwar years was the remarkable expansion in the field of education; the old division between the cultured elite and the illiterate masses became greatly diminished. With this came a decrease in the social significance of the secondary school diploma; the *matura* ceased to be a mark of distinction, nor was it able any more to provide immunity from low status jobs. A concomitant process was the loss of status of non-manual work—of the white collar categories without professional specialization. Significantly, this development was followed by a gradual separation of the white collar class from the intelligentsia; with the decrease in the social value of secondary education and with the degradation of unskilled office work, the old

[24] According to an estimate for the year 1960, real income of non-agricultural gainfully employed population increased by 36 per cent over 1937; the income of manual labor increased by 75 per cent, while that of non-manual workers decreased by 26 per cent. Michal Kalecki, "Porowanie dochodu robotnikow i pracownikow umyslowych z okresem przedwojennym," *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, VIII (1964), 35-40. The same source estimated that the income of the agrarian population increased by some 250 per cent.

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identification of non-manual occupations with elite status lost its validity. Szczepanski notes this situation in the following manner:

> Our definition of the intelligentsia is as follows: the intelligentsia comprises occupational categories which are engaged in creative cultural activities, in organization of work and collective activities, and in tasks requiring theoretical knowledge. According to this definition we may exclude from the ranks of intelligentsia all those occupational groups which, though they are engaged in non-manual work as defined by the law, in terms of other criteria do not differ from manual labor.[25]

This definition represents a significant departure from the traditional view, but there is a growing recognition of the validity of the new distinction. What it actually suggests is that, with the increasing "commonness" of secondary educational status and of white collar status, the mechanism of controls that separates the elite from the masses was moved upward to the university; during the fifties, and possibly somewhat earlier, the status of the intelligentsia became increasingly confined to holders of university degrees. The new definition is in no way a deviation from the original concept; its main significance is that, by separating white collar categories from the intelligentsia, it is able to preserve the distinctiveness of the elite status, in consonance with the dichotomous perspective.

Admittedly, this redefinition of the elite is not able to eliminate all ambiguities, particularly those arising from inconsistency of status. This is often the case of the technical intelligentsia with secondary education only, who during the immediate postwar period acquired high occupational positions and were able to entrench themselves against later changes. Markiewicz, in his study of a large mining complex, describes the marginality of their situation:

> The social importance of a university degree is so great that . . . sometimes it is treated like a fetish. There are instances when elder employees, with many years of professional practice and with considerable theoretical knowledge . . . but who have no degree, are considering ways of acquiring the magic title of "magister" or "engineer." Their main consideration is to avoid humiliation in relations with younger

[25]Jan Szczepanski, "Struktura inteligencji w Polsce," *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, IV (1960), 33.

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> colleagues who possess a university degree. This behavior reflects the attitudes of the petit-bourgeois and intelligentsia *milieu* who treat all those without a university degree . . . as upstarts, without regard for their actual position or performance.[26]

Other studies seem to confirm this conclusion. The interesting fact that arises from these observations is the degree to which the technical intelligentsia identifies with the traditional intelligentsia; it is from this identification, rather than from their occupational function, that the technical experts derive validation of their status.

The same pattern of intolerance toward blurring the distinction between the elite class and the lower strata appears in the non-industrial environment as well. Nowakowski, in his description of the social structure of a modern settlement in the Western Territories, notes the relatively egalitarian distribution of income and of everyday amenities, and contrasts this with the persistence of sharp divisions on the level of social relations, not only between labor and management, but also between the lower white collar strata and the intelligentsia:

> Among local teachers there is a sharp division between teachers of primary and secondary schools. During common meetings teachers of secondary schools avoid sitting together with teachers of primary schools. In one primary school, a teacher who was the wife of an engineer refused to attend common parties, and avoided the company of other teachers during the lunch hours and in the lounge.[27]

It is of special significance that the ascendant position of the intelligentsia within the prestige structure is usually translated into ascendancy within the power system on the level of community relations and in the work organization. Limitation of space allows only for a short reference to this problem. Bauman, in his study of party organization in the industrial enterprise, suggests that a virtual coalescence between the managerial cadres and the leadership of the party organization takes place:

[26] Wladyslaw Markiewicz, *Spoleczne procesy uprzemyslowienia* (Poznan, 1962), 63-64.

[27] Stefan Nowakowski, "Tendencje egalitarne i nowa hierarchia spoleczna w przemyslowo-miejskim srodowisku Ziem Zachodnich," *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, XVII (1963), 51.

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> On the basis of our investigation it is possible to hypothesize that, on the factory level, a fusion of the Party organization and of the technical intelligentsia takes place at present. This fusion adds weight to the engineer's view in matters concerning the enterprise. . . . It introduces essential changes in the traditional style of work of the Party organization, in the distribution of power within the organization, . . . and in its modes of operation.[28]

Newspaper items reporting on litigation between workers and their employers often are able to provide detailed insights into this situation. One report seems to be worth mentioning here, since it apparently refers to some typical patterns. The matter in this case concerned the grievance of a dismissed worker—"a woman with incomplete secondary education plus a course in accounting"—against the head of a district health center—"a physician with private practice and with a car." Ths dismissal was obviously illegal, but neither the attempts of the local political mediators nor the intervention of a special trouble-shooter sent from Warsaw by the trade-union headquarters were able to persuade the doctor to rescind his order. In fact, the interplay between managerial authority and the community power structure was such that even a court order hardly would have helped to restore the worker to her employment:

> In the town of Chlapy it is not permitted that an office assistant with incomplete secondary education, such as Krawczykowa, should win against a physician, such as doctor Twardy. . . . In this town Krawczykowa would not be able to get another job. . . . The law, the court of justice, the sense of fair play are on the side of Krawczykowa, but the town is on the side of Twardy. The doctor has to approve the law in order for Krawczykowa to remain in Chlapy.[29]

The survival of the old patterns in power relations appears clearly here. What is remarkable in this situation is the support which

[28] Zygmunt Bauman, "Czlonkowie partii i aktyw partyjny w zakladzie produkcyjnym," *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, VI (1962), 68-69. An English version of this report is provided in Bauman, "Social Structure of the Party Organization in Industrial Works," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, Nos. 3-4 (1962), 50-64. The significance of the coalescence of the party *aktyw* with managerial cadres is discussed in S. J. Rawin, "The Manager in the Polish Enterprise: A Study of Accommodation under Conditions of Role Conflict," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, III (1965), 1-16.

[29] Hanna Krall, "W Chlapach . . . ," *Zycie Warszawy* (March 17-18, 1963).

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the traditional elite derives from public opinion, and also the ineffectiveness of institutional controls. There is also another element of some importance: under the Socialist order, with the expansion of the bureaucratic organization to the economic system, the bureaucrat-*inteligent* is able to add a new dimension to his position of dominance—the dimension of economic constraint. It is this merging of high prestige status with managerial power —a situation that was not unknown before the war, but which came to the fore after 1956—that adds special meaning to the process of accommodation between the Socialist system and the intelligentsia.

All that has been said here points to a pattern of continuities in the stratification system that answers affirmatively our earlier query: it appears that, notwithstanding the diminution of the economic and cultural distance between social classes, the traditional dichotomy that in the past determined the relations between the masses of commonalty and the elite did not disappear or lose its significance under the Socialist order. If anything, a new dimension, arising from the coalescence of prestige status and economic power, was added to this situation.

### *Elements of Ideological Compatibility*

Assuming the validity of this conclusion, it is possible now to turn to the primary interest of the discussion: the relation between the intelligentsia ideology and the Socialist system. The meaning of this relationship can be grasped fully against the background of the peculiarities of the process of modernization as it developed in Poland. It may be taken as a measure of the weakness of the modernizing forces in the Polish system that the intelligentsia—in essence, an offshoot of gentry society—became the main agent of modernization. The ideological commitments of the intelligentsia in this respect were clearly selective: the intelligentsia embraced readily the notion of citizenship in modern nationhood, but it rejected any innovation that could undermine the elitist system inherited from the gentry. In the area of economic organization, this means repudiation of capitalist development along Western lines since it was historically associated with the obliteration of the dichotomous structure and with the onset of bourgeois-

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type egalitarianism. The apparent paradox of conservative philosophy and of Socialist bias—a recurrent theme in the intelligentsia ideology—may find its explanation here: within the context of inevitability of industrialism, the Socialist alternative appeared by far more compatible with the intelligentsia outlook than the capitalist system.

It is in order to present here some data that will illustrate the nature of this compatibility with reference to present conditions. These data are derived from a public opinion study among Warsaw students, conducted in 1958 and repeated in 1961.[30] The majority of the students in the sample (71 per cent in 1958, and 58 per cent in 1961) described themselves as non-Marxists; only 2.4 per cent of respondents during the 1961 poll regarded themselves as being "definitely" Marxists, and 16 per cent were inclined toward Marxism. At the same time, however, 72 per cent were in favor of world-wide expansion of socialism "in some form," and only 5.7 per cent were against it. The area where student opinion coincided most clearly with Socialist practice was with regard to ownership of industry and land; a large majority were against private ownership, except on the level of self-employment. Another area where the students seemed to accept the Socialist perspective was, significantly, in matters of civil liberties and political constraints: 66 per cent of respondents were in favor of "preventing people whose views and activities one regards as particularly harmful to the society from gaining influence upon public opinion," and 74 per cent endorsed the right of the state to restrict civic freedoms "under exceptional conditions and for a short period of time, in order to attain important social objectives."[31]

It is, of course, not clear to what degree the student data may

[30] Zofia Jozefowicz *et al.*, "Mity i rzeczywistosc," *Przeglad Kulturalny*, July 17, 1958; *idem*, "Studenci," *Nowa Kultura*, Aug. 10, 1958; Anna Pawelczynska and Stefan Nowak, "Swiatopoglad studentow w okresie stabilizacji," *Przeglad Kulturalny*, Nov. 16, 1961.

[31] The researchers who provided the report on the first poll rated 72 per cent of respondents as "below medium tolerance level" in matters of civic liberties. Jozefowicz *et al.*, "Studenci." Another report based on the same investigation rated 50 per cent of students within the low tolerance range, 32 per cent within the medium, and 18 per cent within the high tolerance range. Wieslaw Wisniewski, "Tolerance and Egalitarianism," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, No. 1 (1963), 21-32.

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be regarded as representative of the intelligentsia at large, but there is reason to assume that the agreement in this respect is considerable. If this is so, we may have here a measure of congruence between the Socialist framework and the value system of the intelligentsia.

Before concluding, one more point should be considered. The gist of the preceding analysis was the notion that, in historical terms, the determining factor in orienting the intelligentsia toward socialism was the anti-bourgeois and anti-entrepreneurial bias in the intelligentsia ideology. There is no evidence that this bias disappeared under the Socialist system, but it may be assumed that it lost some of its original importance, if not for other reasons, because, under prevailing conditions, capitalism ceased to provide a realistic option. It seems that at present the main element in the "fit" of the intelligentsia within the Socialist order is the elitist pattern of social organization, especially within the industrial system. The premise of social solidarity and the repudiation of interest conflicts, inherent in the conceptual framework of socialism, is essentially a translation of the elitist perspective into terms of modern organization. In ethical terms, it may be seen as a continuation of the historical notion of "responsibility" of the elite for the society. The alternative to interest solidarity would be the recognition of plurality of interest groups, with its implicit negation of elitism. The *inteligent*—the manager, the professional, or the bureaucrat—does not see himself necessarily in agreement with the regime; he may be critical of the inefficiency of the bureaucratic over-centralization, and may be scornful of the irrationalities arising from doctrinaire rigidity. But at the same time, he has no difficulty in fitting within a system that provides him with a clear definition of status and offers him protection against the uncertainties of a pluralistic structure.

## *Concluding Note*

The compatibility of industrial transformation under socialism with the elitist system offers room for some interesting generalizations. The crucial element in this compatibility seems to be that the traditional elitist framework presents a ready-made pat-

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tern for legitimation of status of the new managerial elite that emerges from Socialist industrialism. In this sense, elitism may be seen as providing support to the Socialist variant of modernization. A corollary of this would be the hypothesis that, for societies dominated by the elitist system, socialism provides a more congenial option for modernization than capitalism. To put it in other words, industrial modernization within the Socialist framework may result in fewer strains on the traditional value system and may provide less challenge to the established structure than the capitalist pattern.

Needless to say, this statement does not purport to provide a "unique" or a "full" explanation of the phenomenon of socialism; social developments of that scale are too complex for this. But it seems to offer a helpful insight in this area, particularly into the propensity of some late-modernizing societies toward the Socialist solution—a situation that still remains a source of puzzlement in terms of the Marxian doctrine itself.

This brings out another question that, in a sense, may be seen as a test of this hypothesis. The European international settlement that followed World War II brought under the Socialist order a variety of national systems, some of which clearly do not fit within the concept of elitist structure. If our generalization is valid, one could expect that differential patterns of accommodation, resulting from variation in structural strains, will develop along the lines of the elitist-equalitarian distinction. Obviously, the Yugoslav development comes to mind first here; and, conceivably, the recent changes in Czechoslovakia could have a similar significance. Perhaps a period of twenty years is not sufficient for articulation of latent differential patterns, but there are indications that we are dealing here with variations of generic significance that might give rise to important systemic divergencies. Within this context, the hypothesis forwarded here appears to introduce a useful heuristic perspective.

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# The Myth of Hyperfactualism in the Study of American Politics

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To introduce his work on functionalism, Robert Merton[1] employs that intriguing phrase of Whitehead's: "A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost." If Whitehead meant to caution against allowing past generations to "impose their stencils upon an unknown future,"[2] who, in a scientific domain, can possibly quarrel with this injunction? But Whitehead also remarked (as Merton noted) that everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not discover it. Whether so or not, it is germane to my purpose to change some wording and suggest that everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not *name* it. In substituting the act of naming for that of discovery, I mean to emphasize the crucial importance of close inquiry into the logic and procedure of analysis. For a science which forgets its founders too soon may lose in considerable measure. What it loses it must again find, often at great waste of time and energy.

The title of this paper was selected with this in mind. It has to do also with the altogether too hasty use of such terms as hyperfactualism and traditionalism. These have become synonyms in contemporary political science and they are used to refer to a mode of inquiry which employs real types, whose research is in-

[1] *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1957), 3.
[2] This is Walter Lippmann's phrase. *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922), 137.



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formed by meliorism, and whose rules of procedure lead only to fact-gathering and social prescription. They designate, in short, a normative orientation frequently described as a premature policy science which suffers from a "theoretical malnutrition and surfeit of facts." Moreover, this tradition is traced back to the founders of the modern discipline.[3] They were the ones who set us upon this track.

In these days of "hyperconceptualism," when theory is the password, such characterizations are rather damning. Somehow, we seem to operate in a single universe, with only one concept of reality, one set of rules, one standard of knowledge. The idea that we may be dealing with a multiverse, with multiple realities, with many sets of rules, with different kinds of knowledge seems only to be inchoate. To the "traditionalist," so called, now so much on the defensive, the notion of a positive science of politics is a hypothesis in no way to be entertained. Those who seek it are fiddlers who are yet to see the fires of Rome. Or maybe it doesn't really matter since they will soon see other fires; for as one pleasant gentleman put it, "They go whoring after the natural sciences." And if there is only one way for the traditionalist, to so many of my scientific brethren the knowledge of the traditionalist is at best a common-sense knowledge which is always seen as less probable, unreliable, incomplete, and in general of a lower order. In Harold Garfinkel's phrase, traditionalists are "cultural dopes" who in accepting the typifications of the real world as given thereby demonstrate an inferior knowledge. Here, too, the traffic is one way only. But it might give us all pause to see what happens when the maxims of ideal scientific procedure are introduced into situations of every-day life.[4] What they do is to multiply its anomic features, and it may very well be this fact alone which warrants a place for common-sense interpretations

[3] See David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), Chap. 3.

[4] See Harold Garfinkel, "The Rational Properties of Scientific and Common Sense Activities," *Behavioral Science*, V (1960), 72-83; "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," *Social Problems*, II (1964), 225-50; "Common-Sense Knowledge of Social Structures: The Documentary Method of Interpretation," in J.M. Scher (ed.), *Theories of the Mind* (New York, 1962), 689-712; and "A Conception of, and Experiments with 'Trust' as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions," in O. J. Harvey (ed.), *Motivation and Social Interaction: Cognitive Determinants* (New York, 1963), 187-238.

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of politics. My point here is that scientific and practical inquiry are different enterprises, with different goals, proceeding in terms of different rules; that they are not antithetical and may in fact sustain and supplement each other.

This, however, is a digression. More immediately I am concerned that the easy use of hyperfactualism or traditionalism is misleading. It tends to obscure the common paradigm developed by the founders which more or less bound the work of a half-century. Understood, it is possible that that ubiquitous phenomenon—the constant rediscovery of the typewriter—would have been prevented. In stating this, I do not suggest that the architects of the discipline are the Aristotles who said it all before. On the contrary, we now possess concepts and procedures that would have staggered their imaginations. But it is my intention to show that much of our work—specifically that which we call functionalism—is a continuation of the original paradigm. Functionalism, reintroduced by way of sociology in recent years and absorbed by the notion of system, has forced its devotees to relearn formulations known to our fathers who, most unfortunately, forgot to name them.

In what follows, I make no effort to judge the claims of structural-functional analysis. My interest turns on the matter of theoretical continuity and I limit myself to an analysis of the foundations of the discipline and one case in point—the political machine.

## I

To those who have studied Woodrow Wilson, he appears as perhaps the first American political scientist to break with nineteenth-century tradition. When Lord Bryce, Henry Jones Ford, and Frank Goodnow are joined with Wilson, we have the nucleus of that original group of early "realists" who set the future of the discipline on the rule of observation.

The magnitude of this development may be measured by the fact that "no American institution [of higher learning] honored the function [of empirical research] until Johns Hopkins opened in 1876."[5] Where before the discipline had been marked by a

[5] W. H. Cowley, "Critical Decisions in American Higher Education," in *Current Issues in Higher Education* (National Education Association, 1963), 1. See

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high warfare of principle, legendary debates over sovereignty, the veneration of legal discourse, and the construction of grand systems, now it was the problematic character of the institutions of government that was to claim its attention. We are the first to doubt, the young Wilson wrote, the first to think of new models, the first to propose new forms.[6] No longer was it to be assumed "that the founding fathers had handed from Sinai all we needed to know about government."[7]

Viewed from contemporary perspectives, however, it may seem plausible to suggest that the architects of the new realism were not as pioneering as their words indicate. Indeed, so far as Easton's analysis is concerned, the early realists "stood with one foot securely lodged in traditional legal description."[8] The full formulation of Easton's appraisal is this: when looked at from their own time perspective, the realists took a tremendous stride beyond legal phenomena; when examined in the perspective of the whole progress of empirical political science, they took only a short, "although vital," step. Short, in the sense that the efforts of the realists were still largely confined to the formal structure of government or such near-governmental structures as party; vital, in that they rejected legal description as a true picture of government and sought to discover the actual locus of power in government and the ways in which it was distributed. This, as Easton notes, led to the consideration of a new class of phenomena and thereby extended the definition of the "political situation" so as to comprehend, beyond law, the actual patterns of political relations in government. Yet, he holds, the "genus of data" was the same in that it was confined to the formal features of government. Accordingly, he considers them to be "captives of the juristic framework of thought" to the extent that they failed to pass beyond the legal structure to the broader political matrix which conditioned it. There is, however, a point to be

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Anna Haddow, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities* (New York, 1939).

[6] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (New York, 1956), 27. The first edition was published in 1885.

[7] This is Henry Seidel Canby's phrase quoted in Haddow, 178.

[8] *Ibid.*, 167; see, also, 161-70.

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missed by such appraisals and it has precisely to do with "the framework of thought."

The crux of the change which occurred is not to be seen in the concept of "scope of coverage" despite the fact that this concern has so often been a feature of disciplinary criticism. In political science, the negative connotation and persuasive use[9] of the term "narrow" is suggestive of the notion that the larger the number of variables or classes of phenomena to be considered, the "richer" is the discipline—an assumption which may be quite at variance with the production of knowledge. Scope, moreover, is initially hypothesized by whatever definitions of politics are employed.[10] And in Easton's case, his appraisals are grounded on a definition of politics that is so extensive as to comprehend all social activity influencing the "authoritative allocation of values." Given so comprehensive a field of interest, the early realists must perforce appear narrow. But what this means is that the class of phenomena they chose as relevant to their purpose constitutes a subset of Easton's general reference class.[11] That is, they choose to delimit a more restricted segment of experience as their object of inquiry. They chose to fix upon that class of behavior that manifested itself as concrete governmental activity. This was their field of focus and their treatment of it bore as much resemblance to the juristic tradition as Wilson did to Theodore Dwight Woolsey. For in the course of development of the discipline, their decisions must be understood as reflecting the profound epistemological shift that had occurred.

## II

We must at this point recall that a dominant metaphor entails important methodological consequences. The transfer of meaning

[9] See C. L. Stevenson, "Persuasive Definitions," *Mind*, XLVII (1938), 331-50.

[10] All definitions of "politics" which are not ostensive are the products of "abstractive differentiation." They are concepts. In theoretical sciences, the scope of a concept is a hypothetical matter. That is, its range of coverage is determined by empirical research. "Scope," thus, cannot be legislated nor is it. It is always demonstrated. And it sometimes happens that a particular formulation originally thought of as "narrow" is shown to possess a range of application that is truly extraordinary.

[11] Against the standard of general systems theory or the general theory of social action, Easton's formulations also appear "narrow." The important factor

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from one context to another serves to introduce new modes of thought, new systems of analysis, which undoubtedly affect and oftentimes subvert the procedural rules which have guided a given generation. A change in image is a change in method.[12]

At the time that Wilson began to write, the implications of the theory of evolution were of such proportions that no field of intellectual endeavor remained beyond its influence. Like mechanics before, it was so widely extrapolated as to alter the "common understanding" of the day. The rich afterglow of the Enlightenment had faded and its images lay shattered. Where once the universe had constituted a closed system, now it was to be seen as an open and endless process of change. The human mind, "more time-conscious than it had ever been under the reign of Euclidean and Newtonian science,"[13] no longer carried its paradigms as impeccable doctrine. The Zeitgeist had been transformed and all that was became problematical. Even physics was not immune, as when Charles Sanders Peirce asked, "who will deliberately say that our knowledge of these laws [gravitation, elasticity, electricity, and chemistry] is sufficient to make us reasonably confident that they are absolutely eternal and immutable, and that they escape the great law of evolution."[14] Nothing in science, in art, and in philosophy it seemed escaped this great metaphor—and in England, on the continent, and in the United States. For American political science, its most important effect is to be seen in the development of pragmatism.[15]

In the eighteen-seventies, a rather unique group of Harvard scholars came together to consider the epistemological implications of evolutionary theory. It was there, in the Metaphysical

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in appraisals of this sort, however, is not "bandwidth," but what—with respect to a given problem—offers the more powerful explanation.

[12] See Martin Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis," *Social Research*, XXVIII (1961), 331-53.

[13] Philip Wiener, *Evolution and the Rise of Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), 10.

[14] Quoted in Wiener, 94.

[15] I make no effort to consider Social or Spencerian Darwinism which were brands of "moral Darwinism" that transformed evolution into dogma. While these obviously influenced Woolsey and Burgess, they are of negligible importance to our discussion here. See R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (rev. ed., Boston, 1955).

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Club—as Peirce called it—that the name and doctrine of pragmatism was formed. Provoked by the "unevolutionary character" of both British empiricism and German idealism, all effort was directed toward a reconsideration of reason and experience.[16] Kant had used the term *pragmatisch* to stand for contingent beliefs which formed the basis for choice in a means-end situation, and Peirce, for whom all reasoning was hypothetical, stripped it of its transcendental cover and assigned the term as the name of the new philosophy. The philosophy itself constituted a new "rule of method" to make ideas clear and to test claims to truth. To reach this goal, emphasis was shifted from antecedents to consequences, from the origin of ideas to their verification. First causes were set aside as the *how* of life was stressed rather than the *why*. Along with a primary concern for the process of development, there came a rejection of the characteristic monism of the grand philosophies. No single formula was deemed capable of comprehending the rich complexity of life, and the acceptance of this position led to a pluralism that not only sustained specialization but permitted methodology to be adapted to the problem at hand. The pragmatic attitude was experimental in nature; all ideas, all theories, all hypotheses were to be subjected to empirical test: only those proposals that could be verified and only those maxims that could be shown to influence behavior were to be deemed significant.

These were the pegs upon which pragmatism hung, and out of the welter of its thought came the emphasis on practical results and possibilities for action. When James popularized the philosophy, it had already come to mean "looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." This is the essence of James' *practicalism*—the form by which pragmatism took first root in American social science—and it underwrote a new empiricist temper. The pragmatic worker, James wrote, "turns away from abstraction . . . from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes . . . . He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, towards power."[17]

[16] See Wiener, Chap. 2, for a full discussion of the problem before the club.
[17] William James, *Pragmatism* (New York, 1907), 51.

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This is the tough-minded attitude that overthrew the hegemony of the moral philosopher. Ranging over the entire gamut of social life in the broadest and most comprehensive strokes, his criteria of relevance seemed unlimited and his reference class unbounded. Nor was it that the principle of specialization eluded him or that the concept of a "field" escaped him. It was, rather, that his epistemology did not require the close and intensive empirical description that sustains a specialized field of observation. For the moral philosopher, knowledge was deemed a function of reason; the empirical fact was minimized and evidence meant logical truth.

For the new social science, in almost direct contrast, knowledge became a function of experience, the fact became crucial and warrant was to be based upon the rule of observation. To follow the pragmatic mode meant to look at social life as it really was, to attend to social institutions as they *really worked*, to find the *how* of things—not the why. And to find out, it rejected the ways of the moral philosopher, carved his whole world into special parts, and began to institutionalize the process of "selective" or "disciplined" observation. By the turn of the century, the specialized pursuit of knowledge, that is, the establishment of specific fields, had become a characteristic feature of social science. For each domain, a distinctive profession had emerged to assume the control and direction of inquiry. By 1886 economists moved to strengthen their claims by forming the American Economic Association; in 1892 the American Psychological Association followed suit; and in 1903 the American Sociological Society and the American Political Science Association were established.

To constitute a field, however, means that some principle of selection is operative. And whatever the proclaimed atheoretic bias of the new pragmatic science, it could in no way transcend this requirement. Its movers may not have dealt with principles of selection explicitly, nor were their categories matters of deliberate conceptualization, but that they classified is beyond doubt. What they did was to organize their fields in terms of the typifications and conceptualizations of the common-sense world.

The political concepts current after the Civil War present themselves on two levels. There were, first, such abstract general concepts—in the tradition of *Staatslehre*—as sovereignty, state,

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natural law, and the like; and second, the more specific terms as legislative, executive, and judicial. The former were the "pretended absolutes" to be abandoned. They were constructs which bore little visible relation to the process of government as it was generally observed. But the latter were not invisible; they appeared as real. They were concrete; they could be pointed to, observed, and touched. They could be examined for their operations. They were, after all, names of on-going and working institutions that everyone knew existed. And in the context of pragmatism, what could be more logical, more natural, than to turn toward the *concreteness* of institutions, the *facts* of their existence, the character of their *actions*, and the *exercise* of their power. This was James' instruction to the pragmatic worker, and "institutionalism"—institutional economics, institutional sociology, institutional political science—was its product.

It does not do, therefore, to say that the new political science merely passed over legal forms to the study of actual government. For this passage followed an epistemological route that was of revolutionary consequence. No longer to be contained by the a priori framework of their predecessors, this generation effected the "revolt against formalism." They took the "givens" of their teachers and transformed them into problematic features of life. They shifted from a mechanical model to an evolutionary model, from the logic of geometry to that of induction—and thereby built an empirical discipline. This is the difference which obtained between the *juristic* and *realistic* frameworks of thought.

Nor is this to be gainsaid by the fact that the pragmatists "prescribed remedies." To be sure, they were reformers and inevitably so, since meliorism is a necessary product of institutionalism. That is, the decision to develop a discipline in terms of institutional categories must direct it to socially significant problems. By establishing its categories as synonymous with real institutions, the problems of the institutions become the problems of the discipline. These, by definition, are practical problems, and the efforts of the discipline are accordingly just as practical. "Real type" analysis inevitably produces melioristic researches and is a necessary beginning for any science.[18]

[18] See, in contrast, Easton's discussion, 78-89.

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## III

Were it now to be said that "in the beginning was Woodrow Wilson," it would not be too much of an exaggeration. The point here is not that Wilson was *sui generis*, that he arrived as a complete novelty; on the contrary, who can minimize the circumstances of the time and such powerful influences as those, say, of Walter Bagehot. It is, rather, that Wilson's pioneering efforts present so striking a fusion of image and method as to be taken as the first clear instance of the new pragmatic politics.

The prologue to his work is more than a demand for the reform of government; if it directs itself to the excesses of *Congressional Government*, it also turns our attention to the fact that the American system "has *never* received complete and competent treatment at the hands of *any*, even the most acute, of our constitutional writers." Directing his thrust at the moral Newtonianism that had controlled for so long, he rejected a scholarship born of paper pictures, of long accepted but erroneous formulas, a scholarship that had transformed the constitution into an object of worship as it had shielded it from the examination and criticism. Any observer, he quotes Bagehot, who looks at the living reality will wonder at the contrast to the paper descriptions. He will see in life much that is not in books and he will not find the many refinements of literary theory in the rough practice of government.

And in a remarkable passage, he warns us of the power of language and the confusions it may engender when one does not distinguish between a sign and its referent, a model and reality, a name and a thing. Names, he cautioned,

> are much more persistent than the functions upon which they were originally bestowed; . . . institutions constantly undergo essential alterations of character, whilst retaining the names conferred upon them in their first estate; and the history of our own Constitution is but another illustration of this universal principle of institutional change.

There has been a constant process of growth, a vast alteration of the conditions of government, and so radical a change in the function of government as to be "no longer conformable with its original pattern." Yet all of this has happened "without perceptibly affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional language." It is this language that forms the "literary theory" which has ob-

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scured the realities of government. If we are to understand government, if we are to exercise control over its movements, we shall have to lay aside the niceties of the theory of balance in the search for the facts of its operations. These "do not obtrude [themselves] upon the observation of the world." They run through the undercurrents of government and take shape "only in the inner channels of legislation and administration which are not open to the common view." It is, therefore, "the difficult task of one who would now write at once practically and critically of our national government to *escape from theory and attach himself to facts* . . . striving to catch the delicate *organism* in all of its characteristic parts exactly as it is today." This is an undertaking all the more arduous and doubtful of issue *"because it has to be entered upon without guidance from writers of acknowledged authority."*[19] Such was Wilson's evaluation of the political science which had come before.

This, with all of its implications, presents the shift in metaphor which was to direct the course of inquiry for succeeding generations to follow. Where once the language of mechanics had reigned, now was the language of biology. A political system, Lowell writes, is not a mere machine which can be adjusted to the fancy of its designer. "It is an organism, and in order to appreciate its possible forms and the causes of its development, stability, or decay, it is necessary to investigate the laws of its organic life."[20] Investigation, however, was to proceed in accordance with James' rule; the "thin abstraction" would yield to the "thick particular fact." For Wilson, this meant inquiry "unclouded by theory." For Bryce, the "temptations of the deductive method" were to be resisted. And for Goodnow, only a policy of "opportunism" was likely to achieve desirable results; adherence to fixed general theories is productive of harm, not good, and the postulation of universal principles is "mere useless opprobrious theory."[21]

Here was the "fresh and original approach" which was to pro-

[19] Wilson, *Congressional Government*, especially 28-32, from which these quotations are drawn. Emphasis added.

[20] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Essays on Government* (New York, 1890), 2-3.

[21] Frank J. Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution* (New York, 1911), 3-4.

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vide the escape from a political science which "thinks, argues and dogmatizes only about a constitution, about the nature of the state, the essence of sovereignty,"[22] but which fails to realize that "the growth of a nation . . . would snap asunder a constitution which could not adapt to new conditions."[23] Government, Wilson was later to declare, falls under the theory of organic life: "It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its function by the sheer pressure of life."[24]

This is the formulation that mandated *realism*. "A knowledge of the actual workings of a political system," Lowell wrote, "is an essential." And there issued forth a spate of volumes on *Actual Government as Applied under American Condtions* (which was the title of A. B. Hart's text in 1903). "How it grew, what it does, and how it does it" (which was the subtitle of another volume) became the primary concern of the discipline. But this, Lowell cautioned, "is the first step in the study of government; . . . only the first step." It would do no violence to present concepts to call this first step "functional analysis."

## IV

We return now to hyperfactualism as Easton originally defined it:[25] a method that elevates fact as it depreciates theory and is productive of random collections of factual researches, each of which seems to "stand alone." It is an apparent plausibility to assign this property to the early realists and I have done so myself.[26] There is no doubt, of course, that to the early pragmatic workers observation was to come first; the fact stood paramount and the secondary—even dangerous—character of theory was stressed. And there is no doubt as to the lack of effort to codify researches explicitly and organize findings into systems. Had this occurred, however, our institutionally oriented forbears would not have been in-

[22] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, II (1884), 482. I have changed tenses.

[23] *Congressional Government*, 30.

[24] *Constitutional Government* (New York, 1908), 56.

[25] See 67-78.

[26] See "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Science" and "The Concept of Decision-Making in the 'Field' of Public Administration," in S. M. Mailick and E. Van Ness (eds.), *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1962), 1-28.

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stitutionalists, which is to state that the foundations of the modern discipline would have been theoretical to begin with—a situation that would have been an inversion of the development of every other science, physical or social.

Yet hyperfactualism in this instance is a somewhat misleading[27] and certainly incomplete description of their approach. The fact is that there were codes, there was a logic of relationships, and there was a distinctive methodology—all of which was made operative by the entrance of the Darwinian metaphor into political science. Once the transfer took hold, and it dominated the discipline by 1900, inquiry was directed by the rules of biological analysis as they were then understood. Indeed, such was the power of the metaphor that its hypothetical character was virtually lost. So firm were the rules of biology established that few if any questions obtained. It was a natural logic to follow, sustained as it was by the Zeitgeist, and before too long to follow it was to "talk prose."

The resultant analysis, of course, was far less formal than one expects when research is a matter of conscious theoretical development. But the line of inquiry was nevertheless set by such concepts as structure, function, process, and adaptation. It presupposed an "open system" and therefore "boundary exchange." It assumed the principle of "self-regulation" and therefore "steady state." It did not use this vocabulary, but when it turned to its object of interest, it saw a governmental *system* (it did use *this* term, however) as a set of functionally interrelated processes. And here we must call attention to Lowell's statement of procedure; written in 1889, it has a familiar form:

> . . . a government is an organism whose various parts act and react upon one another; and it follows that a change in any one of them will cause changes more or less great in all the others until the system settles down with a new balance of forces. In order to understand the organic laws of a political system, it is necessary to examine it as a

[27] It is really misleading in every instance. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a fact pure and simple, chaste and inviolate. The doctrine of immaculate perception (Nietzsche's phrase), which we may know better as the "tabula rasa," has long been put to rest by researches in language, perception, and cognition. Observation presupposes cognition and cognition supplies the stereotypes, images, maps, belief systems, categories, types, or whatever which direct our observation. These may be taken as *learned dispositions* to see, and they range all the way from hallucinatory images to scientific models.

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> whole, and seek to discover not only the true functions of each part, but also its influence upon every other part, and its relation to the equilibrium of the complete organism.[28]

Intended as a preface, it turns out to be a summary of the methodology of the time.

Lowell's formulations clearly exhibit the "central orientation of functionalism." Following Merton, functionalism is the practice of interpreting data by establishing their consequences for the larger structures in which they are implicated.[29] And this is the practice that Wilson, Lowell, Goodnow, and company pursued. They even extended to the concept "latent function" (which is another way of expressing "adaptation"), as when Wilson, having described the disintegrative (we would now say dysfunctional) effects of the committee system on the total governmental structure, interprets the caucus as an "antidote to the committees." Where the "multiplicity and mutual independence" of the committees tend to destroy the cohesion necessary for a stable government, where there is in Congress "no *visible* and . . . no *controllable* party organization," it is the caucus which supplies cohesion, "the only bond of cohesion." Or, at another point, this time by implication, in a fragmented party system the function of log-rolling is to secure a majority vote. Fifteen years later, always sensitive to the "constant subtle modifications . . . of form and function" in living systems, Wilson is quick to note the adaptation of the Speaker and the House Rules Committee so as to *function* as a "steering ministry," as the integrating agency of the House. And he adds with analytic consistency, as this function has evolved, the congressional caucus has fallen into the background.[30]

But it is the work of Henry Jones Ford that serves to suggest that if we had not forgotten our founders so soon, functional analysis in political science might well have advanced beyond its present ambiguous state.

## V

In that now classic statement on the latent function of the political machine, Merton asks the following question: "In view of the mani-

[28] Lowell, 4.

[29] Merton, 46-47.

[30] *Congressional Government*, see the Preface to fifteenth printing, Chaps. 2, 3, 6. Emphasis in the original.

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fold respects in which political machines, in varying degrees, run counter to the mores and at times to the law . . . how [do] they manage to continue in operation?" The theorem which warrants this question states that persistent social patterns and social structures (however negatively they are perceived) perform positive functions which, at the time of their operation, are not adequately fulfilled by other existing structures. Historically, the political machine exhibited a remarkable vitality in the face of extraordinary attack, and Merton suggests that the continuity of the organization may be explained by the fact that it satisfied basic latent functions.[31]

Basing himself on Sait,[32] Merton notes that the constitutional framework of American political organization precludes the legal possibility of highly centralized power and thus discourages effective and responsible leadership:

> The key structural function of the Boss is to organize, centralize and maintain in good working condition "the scattered fragments of power" which are at present dispersed through our political organization. By this centralized organization of political power, the boss and his apparatus can satisfy the needs of diverse subgroups in the larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally devised and culturally approved social structures.[33]

Two variables are involved here, as Merton indicates—the "structural context" which makes it difficult, "if not impossible," for morally approved agencies to fulfill necessary functions, and the community "subgroups" whose needs are not met save through the latent function of the machine.

With respect to the first, the political machine may be taken as an administrative agency *par excellence* and the Boss as its general manager or chief administrator; with respect to the second, it appears as a broker, a connection or coupling device which eases community strain and tensions in any number of ways (from humanizing the provision of public services to easing social mobility), thereby contributing to its integration.

[31] Merton, 71-72.

[32] Edward M. Sait, "Machine, Political," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (1930), 657-61.

[33] Merton, 72.

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Sait's analysis, some twenty years earlier, comprehends all of this. The theorem remains informal and the variables are not named, but the analysis is of the same form. One quotation makes this clear:

> The rise of the machine must be connected also with a feature of American government which discourages the growth of effective and responsible leadership. The framers of the constitution, . . . distrusted power as dangerous to liberty; and therefore they spread it thin and erected barriers against its concentration. In our state governments, where the principal executive officers were elected and thus made independent of one another, this fatal weakness was still more pronounced; and these officers had been deprived by minute and specific statutory directions of all latitude in the discharge of their official duties. A similar dispersion of power marked local areas. As a consequence, when people or particular groups among them demanded positive action, no one had adequate authority to act. The machine provided an antidote. There was built up, in the words of Herbert Croly, "a much more human system of partisan government, whose chief object soon became the circumvention of government by Law. . . . The lawlessness of the extra-official democracy was merely the counterpoise of the legalism of the official democracy. The lawyer having been permitted to subordinate democracy to the Law, the Boss had to be called in to extricate the victim, which he did after a fashion and for a consideration.' " (*Progressive Democracy* [New York, 1914], 254).
>
> The boss is the kind of leader that the machine develops. He typifies its efficiency as an instrument of power, which in contrast to the arrangements in American states and municipalities objectifies the principle of concentration. His operations are facilitated, it is true, by certain more or less accidental conditions of American democracy: the existence of the spoils system, the over-elaboration of electoral processes, the indifference of "good citizens," the pliability of the ignorant masses; and his opportunities for aggrandizement have been vastly enlarged during the past half century by his traffic with big business —he has become the broker, the indispensable intermediary in the purchase and sale of political privileges. But these various factors hardly make clear his essential function. The boss is the man who, like the prime minister abroad, brings together the scattered fragments of power. Leadership is necessary; and since it does not develop readily within the constitutional framework, the boss provides it in a crude and irresponsible form from the outside.[34]

[34] Sait, 658.

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The last sentence of this passage is characterized by Merton as "rigorously functional," and it is of interest that Sait is even more precise in distinguishing state and local structural contexts from the national. Despite the principle of separation, the national system provided for a central executive and over time it was the presidency that evolved to meet the "need of a unifying agency," often with "a big stick and a contempt for legal restraints." Thus, "there has never been a national boss." Bosses and machines, then, derived from the functional deficiencies produced by the scattered powers of state and local governments. As Merton generalized this, "the functional deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more effectively." And all of this stems from the axiom that "structure affects function and function affects structure."[35]

If the calendar is now moved back to 1900, we shall find Professor Ford instructing that "structure and function are correlative." The use of this language is not a mere coincidence, nor does similarity end with phraseology. Expressed in a review of Goodnow's celebrated *Politics and Administration*,[36] this principle was the axiomatic foundation of all of Ford's work. One needs only to examine that remarkable work on *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* to realize the grip of the Darwinian metaphor and its consequences for analysis.[37] Here everything is taken as in flux; everything changes, adapts, has meaning for the system—that is, performs functions, even latent functions. An institution, or practice, or procedure is to be interpreted "by establishing its consequence for the larger system" and it is—whether it be the electoral college or the press or the political party. And its function changes over time and circumstance. During the Adams administration, the function of

[35] Merton, 82.

[36] "Politics and Administration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XVI (1900), 185.

[37] (New York, 1898). Resort to Darwinian formulas was quite conscious in Ford's case. It can be said, thus, that for him evolutionary theory was more a model than a metaphor. Following this line, Ford concluded that it was a necessary corollary of Darwinian theory that the state (whether taken to cover every polity or only a particular type) has a "natural history"—that it is "a phase of development from associations formed among animals of a species included in the subject matter of natural history." For Ford's analysis of this proposition, see *The Natural History of the State* (Princeton, 1915).

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party was to prevent the second American revolution; its formation was "the great unconscious [we may say "latent"] achievement of Thomas Jefferson [serving] to open constitutional channels of political agitation, to start the processes by which the development of our constitution is carried on." Had this not occurred "the government would have blown up."[38] Once secured, however, so inflexible was the organization of the American governmental system that "political change had to take the form of functional development." Divergent processes evolve, a multiplicity of forms develop, characteristics vary widely and all these various species have American politics as their habitat.[39] But they do not come apart because "party organization acts as [serves the function of] a connective tissue, enfolding the separate organs of government, and tending to establish a unity of control. . . ."[40] Adaptation is still incomplete, still imperfect, which is to say that "American politics are in a transition state."[41] It will continue to develop but it cannot "be tinkered into some sort of mechanical excellence." Those who see only mischief in politics and seek to eliminate the mischief of politics would only do greater mischief, for the elimination of party organization would eliminate that which maintains union, establishes stability, and prevents the anarchy which is so disastrous to all social interests.[42] Here the second variable enters the discussion and it may suffice to call attention to the shattering pressures imposed upon the "national community" in the forties and fifties. "But still party organization continued to bear the strain, and it was the last bond of union to give way." Once it broke, there went that crucial "nationalizing" force and war became inevitable. After the war, however, it was "the powerful agency of party" which reincorporated the South into the life of the nation.[43]

So, too, did the boss and machine (party organization) act in city politics. It is, after all, the machine that is our reference point and we shall have to allow Ford to speak to this problem. But first we may note, as Ford did, Lord Bryce's puzzlement over a system

[38] *Ibid.*, 125-26.
[39] Ford, "Politics," 182.
[40] *Rise and Growth*, 215.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, 354-57.
[43] *Ibid.*, 303. See all of Chaps. 23, 24, 25.

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which multiplies elective executives and diffuses authority and responsibility amongst a myriad of offices. Will not such a scheme, Bryce asked, "want every condition needed for harmonies and efficient action? . . . Such a system seems the negation of a system, and more akin to chaos." To Ford, however, the mystery existed only because of the failure to comprehend the processes of evolution and adaptation. The mystery vanishes when one comes to understand that the "scattered powers of government are resumed by party organization." It is, to use Merton's phrase, "the functional deficiencies of the official structure" which generated the boss and which maintained his function.

In language which is again familiar to us, but which came so long ago, Ford wrote:

> The city boss is the nexus of municipal administration,—a centre of control outside of the partitions of authority which public prejudice and traditional opinion insist upon in the formal constitution of city government. . . . The state boss is the natural complement of the situation produced by the dissolution of executive authority in state government. The office restores outside of the formal constitution what is lost inside of it—*effective control.* In the national government no such dissolution having taken place, the case is different. There is no national boss but the President. . . . *Thus by a perfectly natural process of evolution, the structure and functions of party organizations have been elaborated,* so as to comprehend the political activity of American citizenship from the minutest subdivision of local government up to the formation of a national administration.[44]

When Ford turns to Goodnow's work, there is much to please him. Where Goodnow finds that but for the office of party in connecting divisive political structures "we should have anarchy instead of government"; where he holds that party supplies the "administrative connection among the scattered powers of government"; that party is changing our governmental system; that one characteristic of this change is "the integration of administrative authority within party itself"; that the boss is a stage in the process of integration; and that his role is attributable to the marked divergence between the national and local governments as regards the progressive centralization of administrative authority[45]—Ford is quick to appreciate his work.

[44] *Ibid.*, 300-02.

[45] Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York, 1900), Chaps. 8, 9, 10.

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And why not? As Sait followed Goodnow, Goodnow followed Ford. But there was something wrong in Goodnow's case: if Sait met Merton's standards of "rigorous functionalism," Goodnow did not meet Ford's. For Ford, the logic of his line of analysis had to extend as well to social reorganization.

It is a necessary implication of functional analysis that proposals for social reform take due account of the manifest and latent functions performed by the social institutions at issue. To seek change without such knowledge is "to indulge in social ritual rather than social engineering."[46] Clear understanding of this principle is what impelled Ford to reject Goodnow's scheme for democratizing party (including such classic reform devices as the primary) as exactly that kind of proposal which fails to see that "wholesale disintegration" of party control would bring disorder (dysfunction), not government. To Ford, Goodnow's program is a "strange nonsequitur" which in no way follows the logic of his analysis. The proper method of reform is not direct popular supervision of government, nor is it the diffusion of party control. The true method is that of "administrative centralization," of strong executives, of the short ballot, of transferrring the functions of the boss to the mayor.[47]

Here we can observe Ford's recognition of another functionalist theorem: "any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure."[48] So, upon the introduction of his own program, he is careful to state that reform should take due account of the institutions that exist and the functions they perform and therefore must be as simple as possible and innovate as little as possible. It should utilize existing political material and avoid the wholesale displacement of existing political interests. If proposals are functionally sound, their ordinary operation will, over time, "gradually purge conditions and supplant irresponsible boss rule by responsible leadership."[49] The documentation of the inverse relationship between boss rule and strong executives may be left to a Ph.D. dissertation.

[46] Merton, 81.
[47] Ford, "Politics," 184-88.
[48] Merton, 81.
[49] "Principles of Municipal Organization," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXIII (1904), 216.

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## VI

This was not conservatism, this was "actual workings" analysis. This was the realism of the pragmatist (now so necessary in developmental administration). Never formal, eschewing theory, concerned with fact, it nevertheless possesssed a logic of its own—the practice of functional analysis. In our time, we have tended to dismiss the pragmatic realism of these early scholars as a historic episode, as a moment in our development which did not count for too much. Theirs, after all, was a "traditional" political science, narrowly confined as it were, failing to make contact with psychology, economics, and sociology. What we have forgotten, however, is the simple fact that the model they employed constituted the common paradigm from which the puzzles of a half-century emerged. When the political scientist asked: what is the role of the Supreme Court; what is the role of the regulatory agency; of delegation of legislative authority; of conventions, committees, patronage, and the like?—in the context of this tradition he was seeking to find the functional consequence of each for the whole governmental system. When T. V. Smith cautioned Leonard White not to displace patronage by the merit system too abruptly,[50] was he not referring to its "latent function"; when Dean Landis referred to the independent regulatory agency as our generation's response to the inadequacy of the separation of powers, was he not aware of functional adaptation?[51] Presently, one may note, the search for a viable role for Congress founders on the inability to establish, as Lowell would say, "its true function."

Perhaps if we had been aware of this paradigm, we would have moved earlier to effect a more formal justification of its hypotheses. In the process of making these more explicit, we would have had to reduce ambiguity, probe the range of its application, and thereby provide for that precious element of science—"continuity of theoretically directed research." I wonder if this is not what Lowell called for in that sixth presidential address to "political science" when he lamented the lack of a "barbarous vocabulary"—namely, an exact vocabulary, incomprehensible to laymen, remote from ordinary us-

[50] Leonard White and T. V. Smith, *Politics and the Public Service* (New York, 1939), Chaps. 3, 5, 8.

[51] James M. Landis, *The Administrative Process* (New Haven, 1938).

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age, and therefore devoid of the very richness of the vernacular which makes only for an absence of precision. But there is no doubt that then, in 1910, he asked for a second step—the careful study of "the Physiology of Politics," by which he meant "not the functions which the organs are intended, or supposed, to perform, but those which they actually do perform." If I take this as the distinction between manifest and latent function, I do not think I propound an error. For it was Lowell's basic hypothesis, shared by so many pragmatists, that "the functions of an organ at work may in reality be quite different from what they appear."[52]

Had we followed his advice, functional analysis would not have had to be rediscovered. This bit of history may also commend a greater concern for methodology, that is, the logic and procedure of analysis. For those who are interested in science, this is a "functional requisite."

[52] *American Political Science Review*, IV (1910), 2.

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# Charles Gravier de Vergennes: Profile of an Old Regime Diplomat

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When Vergennes became secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1774, nearly thirty-five years had passed since he first entered the diplomatic service as a young protegé under the tutelage of his uncle Chavigny.[1] And, except for the short retirement at Toulongeon after his recall from Constantinople,[2] he had spent most of those thirty-five years in service at foreign courts. Inevitably, much had changed at home and abroad during this time, and in many respects he had become, as he himself admitted in a letter of 1769, a stranger to France, who had "no notions about anything."[3] This truth embarrassed him, and his opponents enjoyed reminding him of it whenever they got the chance. "Rather than a Minister of Foreign Affairs," mocked his enemy Linguet, "M. Vergennes is a foreigner become Minister."[4]

[1] Gaston de Bourge, "Le Comte de Vergennes; ses débuts diplomatiques en Allemagne auprès de l'electeur de Trèves et de l'electeur d'Hanovre," *Revue des questions historiques*, XLIV (1888), 43.

[2] Choiseul to Vergennes, April 25, 1768, Archives des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique, Turquie (hereafter, AAE-cp-Turquie), CXLV, 135. See, also, Vergennes to Tott, May 29, 1768, Papiers Vergennes, Lettres autographes à Tott, 1761-1775, Archives de la famille Vergennes (hereafter, AFV).

[3] Vergennes to ? , Sept. 14, 1769, *Documents originaux*, No. 1, Bibliothèque de Versailles.

[4] *Lettre de Mr. Linguet à Mr. le Comte de Vergennes Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en France* (London, 1777), 53.



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Despite the disadvantages of his long separation from the smoldering issues that troubled France domestically, Vergennes was a superior candidate for the post of secretary of state and minister of foreign affairs. He knew the diplomatic world as few men of his time knew it, and about that world he had neither great illusions nor dark despair. From his various posts he had studied all the critical issues disturbing European diplomacy. He had lived on the firing line of the problem of Russian expansion;[5] he was deeply aware of France's impossible status as both a continental and a sea power;[6] he had felt the jarring effects of the amazing ability of Prussia to survive every crisis and grow a little after each one; and he had watched with growing concern the merciless and exhausting competition for empire develop between France and England. Above all, he had learned the one irrefutable truth that no important decisions were made in the chancellory of state of any one power that did not echo in all the rest, for Europe had never known the luxury of what Americans have called "isolationism." To Vergennes and his colleagues the word never meant being safely out of reach of aggressor powers and self-righteously indifferent to the fate of Europe. When Vergennes and the diplomats he knew used the word in its European context, it meant being caught alone in a war with no friends.

Like most of his counterparts in the embassies of Europe, Vergennes was not given to abstract reflection about the nature of diplomacy; or, for that matter, about his own role in diplomatic affairs. He gave much thought to policies and tactics, but little to principles. Yet his disinclination to enter the world of abstraction and principle did not mean that he had no beliefs regarding diplomatic practices, international relations, or the qualities needed to be a successful diplomat. On the contrary, his memoirs, his dispatches, his personal letters, especially those to his son Constantine, all contain precepts and assumptions which can be extracted and assembled into a set of "principles."

[5] Vergennes was ambassador to Constantinople for fourteen years. See Louis Bonneville de Marsangy, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes; son ambassade à Constantinople* (Paris, 1894), 2 Vols.

[6] Vergennes to Ossun, Dec. 16, 1775, in Henry Doniol, *Histoire de la participation de la France à l'établissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique* (Paris, 1886), I, 315.

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## I

Vergennes shared with most of his contemporaries in the diplomatic services the notion that the purpose of diplomacy was the advancement of the self-interest of the state; the ruling principle of policy-makers, therefore, was *raison d'état*. Yet he probably would have had considerable difficulty defining precisely what was meant by "self-interest." For the term "self-interest," like "prestige" and "honor," was a catch-all phrase which justified a good deal of vicarious ambition, personal egotism, and, above all, class interests. Indeed, as to the latter point, it may very well be that the character of the diplomatic world in which Vergennes lived was in large part a reflection of class interests and class attitudes. Like the ruling aristocratic oligarchies, the great powers ruled for the benefit of themselves. Like the aristocrats who ruled them, the states saw force as normal in human relations. Like the aristocracies, the states made a distinction between private and public morality. The state, like the aristocrat, saw its existence as a constant struggle for power and prestige. Even the fascination of the diplomats for the chess-like character of balance of power may have been a function of the military codes of the soldier-aristocrats who filled the ranks of the diplomatic corps of Europe.

Although he had never been a soldier, Vergennes showed great respect for the concept of balance of power.[7] The idea originally developed as a means for protecting the sovereignty of states, a sovereignty which had the blessing of public law and philosophy and was considered one of the essential ingredients of a state's self-interest. Yet in his own lifetime Vergennes had watched the balance of power system develop from a European system to a world-wide system and to such a fierceness that it began to subvert its own original assumption about the protection of sovereignty. The concept became, in effect, an instrument for justifying intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state such as Poland and eventually an instrument for partitioning, sometimes out of existence, a sovereign power. And all in the name of balance of power. As the stakes in the game rose higher, royal treasuries were strained to

[7] *Ibid.*, II, 244; "Memoire de M. de Vergennes au commencement du Règne de Louis XVI, 1774," in L.P. Segur, *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe* (Paris, 1801), III, 161-62.

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their limits, states were pushed to the verge of bankruptcy, populations were reduced by recurring wars, and the political foundations of states were undermined. Nevertheless, like most practical men who rarely reflect whether their actions are consistent with their assumptions, Vergennes never questioned the validity of balance of power politics and never asked if it still served to protect sovereignty and self-interest. He was shocked at the cynical violation of Polish sovereignty in the first partition,[8] but he responded with nothing but impotent moral denunciations which his own actions at Constantinople, Stockholm, and later in America denied him the right to use. At best Vergennes, in common with other diplomats of Europe, was the prisoner of the cruel system of balance of power; at worst he and they were agents of a suicidal commitment to a narrow, deeply rooted belief which had almost achieved the status of an ideology but which no longer had a rational base. They were similar to the devout adherents of a fanatical sect: they obediently performed their ritual ceremonies, faithfully repeated their special formulas and vocabulary, and made their periodic sacrifices to the God balance of power.

In justification of balance of power Vergennes no doubt would have responded that the system had led to more civilized behavior among the European powers in that it moderated war aims, reduced the physical damages of war, and encouraged compromise. And there was truth in the argument. Still, even the most fervent defenders of the system could not deny its terrible costliness nor fail to realize that in the end it threatened the very self-interest it was created to serve.

Vergennes was from habit inclined to give top priority to France's self-interest and prestige abroad. His long absence from home reinforced the inclination. He was not ignorant of internal problems such as tax reform, economies, or the state debt. No one who knew France could be ignorant of these pressing concerns, but he considered domestic issues secondary to those relating to foreign policy. In fact, he said, "reasons of finance" are always the "natural" opponents of "reasons of politics"; it was the latter, however, which "assured triumphs."[9] And nearly every statesman and monarch

[8] *Ibid.*, 158-59.
[9] Doniol, *Histoire*, II, 577.

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in Europe would have agreed with him. Yet France was rapidly approaching the time when internal reform had to be given precedence over influence abroad. The question was not urgent when Vergennes became secretary of state, but it soon became so, and when it did it challenged his attachment to the conviction that the king's foreign policy took priority over reform at home. The debate over France's intervention in the American Revolutionary War and the intervention in the political crisis in the United Provinces revealed that Vergennes could not make those radical readjustments of priorities necessary to provide France with the respite needed to reform and recover.

On the other hand, Vergennes was not one to launch in haste any costly efforts to raise France's prestige. His long service in foreign courts had impressed him with the variety and complexity of man's motivations, and he was fully aware that not everyone agreed with the king of France or his secretary of state. He knew also that opinions which seemed quite reasonable at Versailles seemed immoral, deliberately insulting, or ridiculous at Constantinople or Frankfurt. Issues were never as simple as they seemed at first sight, and not every problem was subject to a speedy solution. Even if solved, the solution was not necessarily the one the French foreign office might have preferred. His recognition of the complexity of experience and of the inadequacies of men's solutions, plus his upbringing in a family of magistrates and solemn *noblesse de robe*, gave him the wisdom of prudence, of caution in dealing with affairs, and an ingrained sense of the limits of the possible and of his own efforts. As he said much later, he was "not at all desirous of calming singlehanded all the storms that may descend on Europe."[10] He could truthfully have added that neither was he desirous of raising such storms.

The corollary to this ingrained caution was an abhorrence of adventure. His opposition to Choiseul's plans to push the Ottoman Turks into a suicidal war against Russia,[11] his hesitations and

[10] Vergennes to Ségur, June 1, 1785, in Alfred Rambaud, *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France* (Paris, 1890), IX, 399.

[11] See Choiseul to Vergennes, April 21, 1766, AAE-cp-Turquie, CXLII, 82-84; Vergennes to Choiseul, May 28, July 14, 1766, *ibid.*, CXLII, 86-101$^{vo}$; also, Vergennes to Louis XV, Aug. 20, 1767, *ibid.*, Supplément XVIII, 19-19$^{vo}$.

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even fears in the face of the dangers bred of Gustavus III's coup d'état in Sweden,[12] all demonstrate a reasoned as well as an emotional reluctance to depart from the routine or to risk any encounter with the whims of chance. Some of his critics, including Choiseul, saw this personal trait as a sign of indecision, even as cowardice or a weakness of character; but for a full appreciation of his attitude, one must delve more deeply. Vergennes was of the old French school of diplomacy, a school which, in Sir Harold Nicolson's words, "was courteous and dignified; it was continuous and gradual . . . ."[13] Such rules of conduct did not encourage brashness, informal diplomacy, or incautious action. Admittedly, his point of view made him extremely suspicious of shirt-sleeve diplomacy, of innovations, whether in practices, institutions, or ideas; and such an attitude easily became an infirmity in the changing world of the later eighteenth century. Thomas Jefferson, who admired Vergennes, was disappointed to discover that the French Minister had "very imperfect ideas" about the newly established American institutions and had "no confidence in them."[14] But no doubt Vergennes would have answered Jefferson's criticism with the observation that confidence comes only after long experience and that the new American republic had not yet proven itself.

In his little essay, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, Sir Harold Nicolson described another characteristic of the "French" method of diplomacy which Vergennes illustrated in his career. This method, Nicolson claims, "attached importance to knowledge and experience . . . ."[15] Vergennes' trust in the opinion of experts in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and his encouragement of career service in the diplomatic corps reveal a fundamental respect for men with these qualities. According to Hennin, Vergennes harbored a deep distrust of those *négociateurs de hazard*, those chance negotiators, who dabbled in diplomacy for purposes of per-

[12] Vergennes to Aiguillon, May 21, 1772, AAE-cp-Suède, CCLXI, 221-223[vo].

[13] Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method* (London, 1953), 72.

[14] Letter to James Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, in Thomas Jefferson, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, edited by Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, 1955), XI, 95-96.

[15] Nicolson, 72; on Vergennes' view of the value of knowledge, see Vergennes to Tott, May 11, 1765, Papiers Vergennes; lettres autographes à Tott, 1761-1765, AVC.

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sonal prestige. And we gather from Hennin's words that there were more than a few of these dilettante diplomats loitering at Versailles waiting to be invited on stage.[16]

Vergennes' respect for experience undoubtedly grew out of his appreciation of the important role knowledge played in diplomacy. He wanted his ambassadors to be continually gathering political information, absorbing it like sponges for transmittal to Versailles. He seemed to have no interest in scandal, but he wanted everything else of a political nature. Such data were not to be accepted as knowledge, however, until they were sifted and organized by someone with experience; hence the importance of his career men, his specialists, and his *premier commis*. His own mind was trained to catalogue and organize information. "It is impossible," Thomas Jefferson said of him, "to have a clearer, better organized head."[17] Because he attached so much importance to knowledge, Vergennes sought and respected the opinions of his agents and diplomats abroad. "If my experience in [diplomatic] affairs has taught me anything," he confessed, "it taught me to consider opinions of those who, being on the spot, are in a better state than I am at a distance, to judge and appreciate what is the most expedient."[18] Unlike Choiseul, or some other ministers of foreign affairs of his century, he wanted the views of those close to a situation even when they did not agree with his own. At times, during the negotiations for the settlement of the American Revolution, for example, this permissiveness proved embarrassing. A subordinate in the French legation at Philadelphia wrote a letter to his superior at Versailles expounding his opinion as to what kind of settlement the Americans deserved. The British intercepted the letter and passed it on to the Americans, and John Jay, assuming that whatever was down in black and white in an official dispatch was policy, had all of his suspicions of French treachery confirmed.[19]

[16] Pierre-Michel Hennin, "Eloge: M. le comte de Vergennes, 1787," unpublished ms., Bibliothèque de l'Institut, R. 63A, pp. 8-9.

[17] Letter to James Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, XV, 96.

[18] Quoted in Paul del Perugia, "Le Comte de Vergennes au Ministère," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, LVI (1942), 87.

[19] Barbé-Marbois to Vergennes, March 13, 1782, in Francis Wharton, *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* (Washington, 1889), V, 238-41; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Bloomington, 1957), 220-21.

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But Vergennes demanded of diplomats more than simply the ability to gather and transmit facts. In his letters to his son Constantine, who aspired to serve alongside his father, Vergennes dwelt at length on those requirements he believed distinguished the ideal man and diplomat. The man Vergennes wished his son to become the "*homme raisonable*," the "*honnette homme*,"[20] the man able to give to his monarch "all the service" of which he is capable. Although he never clearly defined for the boy what he meant by his words, the context in which he used them and his admonishments, provide clues enough to his meaning.

## II

"It is in your power," Vergennes urged Constantine, when the lad was not yet in his teens, "to shorten your childhood."[21] He urged him to give up all his infantile habits;[22] he was to extirpate indolence,[23] frivolous amusements, and abandon his childish independence.[24] "You must be more docile and more submissive before the word of your masters," he told his son. And he made it quite clear that even the affection the boy received from his father was only a function of his willingness to follow paternal instructions. "Make no mistake," he warned, "my friendship for you always will be subordinated to the efforts you make to merit it."[25] Once he even warned the boy that his father's health was dependent upon the youngster's applying himself and responding to the hopes the father had to make him an *honnête homme*.[26] Only by following his father's advice, only by sacrificing present consolations for future ones,[27] only by cultivating and making fruitful the germs of talent and virtues which Providence had given him,[28] could

[20] Vergennes to Constantine (hereafter, V. to C.), Dec. 5, 1769, Dec. 10, 1770, May 6, July 19, 1771, Feb. 28, 1772, June 18, 1773, Papiers Vergennes; lettres autographes à Constantin, 1767-1786, AFV.

[21] V. to C., May 6, 1771, June 15, 1773, *ibid.*

[22] V. to C., Dec. 24, 1769, *ibid.*

[23] V. to C., Dec. 5, 1769, *ibid.*

[24] V. to C., Feb. 26, 1774, *ibid.*

[25] *Ibid.* See, also, V. to C., Jan. 2, 1771, *ibid.*

[26] V. to C., Dec. 5, 1769, *ibid.*

[27] V. to C., April 24, 1771, *ibid.*

[28] V. to C., June 22, 1771, *ibid.*

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the boy grow and earn the esteem and consideration of his father and society.[29]

The curriculum the father and tutors felt appropriate to train such a man included mathematics and geometry, the merits of which were that they taught "exactitude";[30] a strong dose of geography, including map drawing; a good deal of history, for the most part the genealogy of the dynasties of Europe, but including a sprinkling of what we might call cultural history, especially the religion and laws of other cultures; languages, French, Latin, and even Greek, which Constantine learned as a child at Constantinople; spelling; penmanship; drawing; and literature.[31]

Such a program differed very little from that offered by tutors of aristocratic children all over Europe. And in truth for generations it had well served the young as a basis for cultivating an understanding of tradition and culture. Diplomats, poets, kings, priests, and dramatists all were exposed to such a program and, although its effectiveness varied considerably from child to child and tutor to tutor, it contained the basic ingredients of a good education. When the program was terminated, as it was in Constantine's case, with an extended tour of Europe, it offered rich possibilities.

But, significantly, Vergennes directed and arranged the study program of his son to make it consistent with the father's personal preconceptions of the *honnête homme* and the *homme raisonable*. The most striking aspect of this direction is that the father eliminated from his son's study program every activity which encouraged creativity or innovation. He stressed accuracy and precision of expression;[32] he encouraged organization and trained reason and memory.[33] Read the ancient authors "to accustom yourself to think and to express yourself with their force and delicacy," he urged in one letter from Stockholm.[34] "Write more distinctly," he admonished another time, after noting that the boy's penmanship was sloppy.[35] Read the best authors, he advised, if you want to "famil-

[29] V. to C., Nov. 1, 1773, *ibid.*

[30] V. to C., July 2, 1771, June 18, 1773, *ibid.*

[31] V. to C., Aug. 6, Nov. 4, 1771, n.d., 1771, Feb. 28, May 11, July 24, Dec. 15, 1772, *ibid.*

[32] V. to C., May 11, July 24, Dec. 15, 1772, *ibid.*

[33] V. to C., Feb. 28, May 11, Dec. 15, 1772, *ibid.*

[34] V. to C., Nov. 1, 1773, *ibid.*

[35] V. to C., July 24, 1772, *ibid.*

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iarize yourself with a noble and correct elocution."[36] He scolded for faults in spelling and demanded more clarity. "Accustom yourself, my dear son, to putting what you know in order and to expressing it with clarity."[37] When Constantine reported that Mahomet had been chased from Mecca and had suspended himself in the air, Vergennes criticized him for accepting fables. Except for the impenetrable mysteries of religion, exhorted the father, and in this case he meant the Christian religion, everything else ought to be submitted to the tribunal of reason.[38] And whenever Constantine revealed a lapse of memory, as he frequently did in his long and complicated genealogies, the father corrected him and reminded him to cultivate his memory better.[39]

There was little room in the father's course of study for intellectual play, for that which had no immediate usefulness, for dreamy speculations, or for the cultivation of the trial and error which is so essential to creativity and innovation. The great literature of the West was read, in the original, but only in selected and edited morsels, and not for insights into human emotions or man's condition, but for its usefulness in training memory, teaching elocution, or serving as models for a graceful style. The father suggested in 1771 that the lad take up drawing "if you have the taste for it." But to insure that he was not opening the gate to frivolity, Vergennes warned, "Do not try the human figure or landscape; that sort of thing is only amusement." Instead he recommended that the boy try sketching military maps, or scenes of the Estate at Toulongeon.[40]

The youngster responded immediately to his father's suggestion and quickly revealed a budding talent, a talent which soon tempted him to try his hand at sketching a bouquet of roses. He was so pleased with his creation that he sent it to his father. But the father was less than delighted. To him such things were pure embellishments; he wanted drawings of fortresses and maps, sketches of practical things which would have the added advantage of preparing the boy for geometry.[41]

[36] V. to C., June 18, 1773, *ibid.*
[37] V. to C., Nov. 4, 1771, May 11, 1772, *ibid.*
[38] V. to C., Feb. 28, 1772, *ibid.*
[39] V. to C., Dec. 15, 1772, June 18, 1773, *ibid.*
[40] V. to C., Nov. 4, 1771, Feb. 28, 1772, *ibid.*
[41] V. to C., July 24, Dec. 15, 1772, *ibid.*

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But once tempted by the possibilities of creativity, the boy did not easily give up. For a New Year's gift he sent his father a sentimental sketch of four hearts linked together, symbolizing the father, the mother, Constantine, and his brother. It was a naïve and tender show of affection, a meek attempt at originality and a plea for approval and encouragement. From Stockholm the father thanked him for the drawing: "a very pretty gift." But he did not encourage him to continue. Draw maps rather than flowers and figures, the father had earlier recommended: "The first is useful, the others are *pur agrément*."[42] Thus, whatever artistic talent Constantine might have had was stifled before it interfered with the practical education of the *honnête homme* as Vergennes conceived him.

## III

Yet Vergennes was not insensitive to the dissimilarities of men's lives, and he felt other diplomats should not be. He wanted them to have a lively appreciation of various cultures and of the peoples among whom they lived. He grew indignant when he heard that Frenchmen assumed a superior, or "knight errant," attitude among foreigners.[43] He also encouraged the study of foreign languages, a skill in which he excelled with his ability to speak Latin, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and English. He never learned German, and he regetted it all his life.[44]

Vergennes' insistence on the value of knowledge and an appreciation of other cultures was not a personal whim; it grew out of his conception of how policy should be formulated. To be sure, the determination of the vital interests of his monarch was difficult enough, and required a thorough knowledge of France and its traditions and needs; but, in addition, he was aware that the interests of France could never be secure if they rested on a continual denial of those of the other European powers. What these were could only be determined by contact, exchange of information, and experience, in short, communication. His attitude did not mean that he accepted as legitimate every demand or claim of a foreign power, especially if it were chauvinistic in its blatant denial of the concerns

[42] V. to C., Dec. 15, 1772, *ibid.*
[43] Hennin, 8.
[44] *Ibid.*, 11.

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of others. He had a profound respect for the views of other nations and for their interpretation of what constituted their self-interest. One of the principal conclusions he had reached as a result of his own ambassadorial career was that aggrandizement was dangerous and, however seducing, was not in the long-range interest of France.[45] Aggrandizement created suspicions that were difficult to erase and that eventually led to coalitions that left France isolated. His attitude recalls Talleyrand's opinion that one's interest is always blind when it proceeds too much at variance with the way others see their interests.

His own experience also led him to consider honesty and good faith as necessary virtues for diplomats and diplomacy. In this he agreed with François de Callières, Louis XIV's ambassador, who in 1716 wrote a famous book on the practice of diplomacy. Callières admitted that while "a prince is often obliged to use diverse instruments to accomplish his ends," the instruments of dishonesty and deceit breed many perils. "It is a capital error, which prevails widely," Callières observed, "that a clever negotiator must be a master of deceit." Callières did not deny that the "art of lying" had been practiced "with success in diplomacy," but it "always leaves a drop of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success gained by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakens in the defeated party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a hatred which must always be a menace to his foe." And not only did the success of a nation's aims suffer from deceit, but so did that of the diplomat who practiced it. The negotiator must bear in mind, said Callières, that he "will be engaged throughout life upon the affairs of diplomacy, and that it is therefore to his interest to establish a reputation for plain and fair dealing so that men may know that they can rely upon him."[46]

Vergennes, like Callières before him, did not consider honesty and good faith as virtues that would merit their own rewards, but as the only solid base for negotiation and treaty-making. Honesty and good faith were a form of diplomatic currency which could not be debased without injury to all, because their debasement destroyed confidence and led to misunderstanding. Later in life he

[45] *Ibid.*, 15.

[46] François de Callières, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, trans. A.F. Whyte (London, 1917), 31-32.

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argued that "one need not always say what one thinks, but an honest man will always think what he says."[47] Vergennes did not always live up to his counsel for diplomatic conduct, and some of his contemporaries (and later historians) who did not approve of his policies have argued that he *never* followed them;[48] but on the whole his record in these respects for personal honesty and good faith is praiseworthy.

Maximum use of experience and knowledge requires yet another ingredient—that of hard work. Louvois, Colbert, Louis XIV, and, later, Napoleon confirmed this in their several careers. Vergennes, too, had this capacity. Bachaumont, in his memoirs, reports that in 1779 Vergennes was out of bed by four every morning and that he worked in the Ministry until 1:00 P.M. before he returned home to dine *en famille*.[49] Then, in the afternoon, he returned once more to his desk where he worked until evening. When Hennin drew up a description of the organization and practices of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1784, he estimated that Vergennes' workday was eleven hours. On reading the estimate, Vergennes objected and had Hennin revise the estimate to seven hours. But Hennin's estimate was certainly nearer the truth. Vergennes himself said: "Work, even the most burdensome, does not frighten me. A long time ago I contracted the habit of working, and it has become for me a sort of necessary nourishment." And on another occasion he wrote: "It is a misfortune of humanity always to feel that there is not enough time . . . . I waste little of it and in spite of that I find the day infinitely short."[50] To his son Constantine he continuously emphasized the value of work, and the degradation of laziness. "Only by increasing our labors, our efforts and our attentions can we attain that little bit of happiness which is the reward of

[47] Hennet de Goutel, *Vergennes et l'independence américaine: Vergennes et Wilson* (Paris, 1918), 26. See, also, Eliane Feifer, "Vergennes et Talleyrand," *Sciences Politiques*, LII (1937), 245; Perugia, 91.

[48] For a contemporary portrait of Vergennes as insincere and deceitful, see Anonymous, *Portrait du Comte de Vergennes* (Brussels or Liège [?], 1788), 28-29.

[49] Louis Petit de Bachaumont, *Memoires secrets pour servir à l'histoire de la République des lettres en France* (London, 1777-89), XIV, 95-96.

[50] Quoted in Perugia, 91; Simone Mercier, "Le Service Diplomatique Pendant le Ministre de Vergennes," unpublished ms., Bibliothèque de Versailles, Fonds Versaillais, H41, p. 67. See, also, Vergennes to Broglie, July 19, 1768, AAE-cp-Turquie, Supplement, XVIII, 142-43.

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humanity."[51] His colleague Maurepas, although not impressed with Vergennes' *lumières*, was astonished at Vergennes' capacity for work, Vergennes "well understands," Maurepas remarked, "how to work like a machine."[52]

## IV

Neither a *philosophe* nor a philosopher, Vergennes was profoundly religious, and he accepted without question the doctrine of divine right monarchy. Furthermore, he suspected anyone with ideas which challenged either his religion or his politics. His inability to appreciate the range of creative possibilities in the ideological ferment which he abhorred and his suspicion of the new, which Jefferson clearly recognized, cut him off from most of the exciting minds of his time and was one of his most obvious limitations. He would not have understood, if he had survived, the rapid changes that engulfed France after 1789. He would have accepted, indeed he favored, reform by an absolute monarch, but when that alternative failed, as it eventually did, he would have been lost. Still, he embarked on a policy during the American Revolution that would not only help circulate the ideas he detested, but would even involve his protecting those men who were determined to make such ideas the basis of their political institutions. He did not identify with the future, but ironically he helped create it.

Religion and absolute monarchy had important places in his hierarchy of principles, but he avoided any explicit statements about which of the two loyalties took precedence over the other. His friend Hennin, however, has revealed to us how he felt about this problem,[53] although his actions render almost unnecessary any articulated expression. He was Jesuit-trained, devout, and insistent that his children receive a solid religious education; and he sustained the Catholic religion in France (although he favored more toleration for the Protestants). But he never believed that, in diplomatic matters, the altar should be raised to the level of the throne. During his ambassadorship in Constantinople, he made it clear that

[51] V. to C., Feb. 26, 1774; see, also, on the theme of work, his letters to Constantine of Jan. 7, 1770, Jan. 2, 1771, Nov. 14, 1774. Papiers Vergennes; lettres autographes à Constantin, 1769-1786, AFV.

[52] Pierre Rain, *La Diplomatie Française* (Paris, 1945), 323, note.

[53] Hennin, 12-13.

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while he felt that the monarchy was obligated to fulfill its responsibilities as "Protector" of Christianity, the monarchy, not the church, would define the limits of these responsibilities. In Vergennes' mind the king had no obligation to exhaust his resources in a religious crusade against the opponents of the church. Such an attitude was in the diplomatic tradition of the time.

Clearly Vergennes was not a partisan of the innovative *esprit révolutionnaire* that eventually justified the destruction of the Old Regime. Furthermore, he was willing to use the power at his disposal to suppress any liberal ideas which, in his opinion, did not serve the state. To Louis XVI's censor he suggested that the "very pernicious doctrine" of nature and civil liberties of the English radical Dr. Richard Price be suppressed on the grounds that "it would be the better part of wisdom for the government not to permit the spread of ideas capable of contributing to or augmenting the fermentation of badly disposed minds."[54] When the journalist and pamphleteer Linguet published opinions critical of Vergennes' foreign policy, the latter did not hesitate to put his critic in the Bastille.[55]

Yet he felt no crusader's compulsion to stamp out the *philosophes* as a matter of principle. He tolerated, even helped, them if their writings or articles did not, in his opinion, conflict with the interests of the state. When Voltaire, concerned with the commerce of watches and clocks manufactured by a company he owned, wrote Vergennes asking for intervention with the French consul at Majorca, the French Minister responded immediately and favorably. "Although I have never had the honor of meeting you," he told the old *philosophe*, "I know you by reputation and I am very pleased that you have furnished me with the occasion to demonstrate to you my esteem and consideration." He continued by informing Voltaire that he had passed his letter on to Sartine, minister of the marine, with the request for intervention.[56]

In one important respect Vergennes did deviate from the attitude

[54] Archives des Affaires Etrangères-Memoires et documents (hereafter, AAE-MD-France), 582, folios 86-87, dated Nov. 11, 1776.

[55] Jean-Louis Soulavie, *Memoires historiques et politiques du règne de Louis XVI* (Paris, 1801), II, 6.

[56] Voltaire to Vergennes, June 7, 1776, Vergennes to Voltaire, June 14, 1776, Papiers Vergennes, Correspondance autographe: Voltaire, AFV.

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held by traditional diplomacy; that is, in his view of public opinion. For the most part, diplomats in Vergennes' time were convinced that negotiations should be carried on in secret. Their assumption was that the public, not being expert in diplomatic affairs, did not merit information on such subjects. But in the latter part of the eighteenth century the practitioners of the policy were having more and more difficulty maintaining their independence from public opinion.

Vergennes was sensitive enough to see the potential of this new force, and, rather than try to suppress or bypass it, he attempted to use it. To Louis XVI, he offered this word of advice: "Opinion, they say, is queen of the world. The government that knows how to establish it in its favor doubles . . . the consideration and respect which have been and always will be the compensation of a well-directed administration. . . ."[57] Despite Vergennes' appreciation of the role of public opinion in the making of foreign policy, he did not want his diplomats to engage in public debate over any aspect of that policy. When, on one occasion, it became necessary to dismiss his ambassador to London for certain indiscretions, Vergennes did everything within his power, including a request to the King to use his authority, to keep the issue out of the "public tribunal," on the grounds that no court would care to treat confidentially with an ambassador who might later repeat the private conversations in a public debate.[58] To a young collaborator, Vergennes outlined his rule of good behavior for a servant of the Department of Foreign Affairs. "Imagine," he said, "that this is the Palace of Silence, and that you ought not know any news, not even what appears in the *Gazette de France*." The perfect foreign office expert, the perfect secretary of the Council of State, the perfect ambassador, in Vergennes' eyes, was circumspect, "rare of word," and a person who operated for the most part behind closed doors.[59]

Furthermore, the idea that the public should be given information concerning every diplomatic exchange, every treaty negotiation, would have been shocking to Vergennes. The twentieth-century

[57] "Memoire de M. de Vergennes à Louis XVI sur la situation politique de la France relativement à differentes Puissances," dated 1774, Archives Nationals, K164, No. 22.

[58] Vergennes to Louis XVI, Feb. 21, 1775, Archives Nationales, K164.

[59] Perugia, 86.

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concept of "open covenants of peace openly arrived at," he would have found incomprehensible. Like the French diplomat Jules Cambon, he would have argued that "the day secrecy is abolished, negotiations of any kind will become impossible."[60]

## V

Vergennes' policies as minister have so often been likened to those of Choiseul, that historians have been inclined to see Vergennes' thinking as nothing more than a reflection of that of Choiseul. Such a view is not totally wrong, but it leads too easily to oversimplifications. Certainly Choiseul saw the possibilities of using American dissatisfaction as a club against England, and Vergennes' support of the American rebels was a fruition of the idea.[61] But the giving of secret aid to support rebels and revolutionaries who might distract or weaken an enemy power was a long established practice in Europe. Louis XIV supported Hungarian rebels against Austria, and Vergennes himself, while ambassador to Constantinople, found no moral objection to the encouragement of Hungarian rebels to rise against their monarch.[62] The politics of eighteenth-century Poland, Switzerland, Holland, and Sweden were more than once wracked by foreign-supported factions and parties trying to subvert the established government. Thus neither Vergennes nor Choiseul originated the idea of assisting revolutionaries as a technique for weakening one's foes. Nor could either claim parenthood of the awareness of France's necessity to avoid a continental land war while challenging England on the sea. If the wars of the eighteenth century taught Frenchmen anything, it taught them the folly of exhausting their resources by fighting concurrently on both land and sea.

In any event, Vergennes did not develop his policy in collaboration with Choiseul. Since the time of Vergennes' recall from Constantinople, the two were bitter enemies and certainly any collaboration between them would have been impossible.[63] In fact, much

[60] Jules Cambon, *Le diplomate* (Paris, 1926), 32.

[61] Doniol, I, 5-7.

[62] On Vergennes and French relations with the Hungarian rebels, see AAE-cp-Turquie, CXXVIII, *passim*.

[63] See Vergennes to Choiseul, Feb. 8, 1770, Choiseul to Vergennes, Feb. 15, 1770, AAE-DP-LXVIII, 24-24$^{vo}$, 25; also, Vergennes to Choiseul, March 8,

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later, in a letter to Louis XVI, Vergennes vigorously denied, somewhat inaccurately, that Choiseul had anything whatsoever to do with preparing his response to the American Revolution.[64]

Certainly, there were some fundamental differences of style between the two men. Choiseul was dramatic, impatient, essentially a gambler who played, win or lose, for large stakes. Vergennes, on the other hand, was slow and deliberate, extremely cautious, and, as Frederick the Great said of him, he achieved great things by means of little steps. Also the two men's conceptions of French policy differed in several respects. Vergennes, considering France's colonial system as less important than did Choiseul, sought to strengthen French trade by means of commercial treaties. Vergennes saw greater possibilities for rapprochement with England than Choiseul would have considered possible, and certainly Vergennes was considerably more reluctant to unleash the dogs of war than was Choiseul.

The man who really provided Vergennes with a model for diplomacy was the Cardinal de Fleury, the young Louis XV's first minister. Vergennes obviously approved of Fleury's approach to diplomacy, perhaps because it was based on attitudes which both men shared. Both were frugal and prudent; both saw France's role in Europe as that of arbiter; both resisted pressures for aggrandizement; and both considered the maintenance of peace in Europe a primary goal of their diplomacy. In a memoir to Louis XVI in 1782 Vergennes confessed his admiration for Fleury. "The late Cardinal de Fleury" was a man with "pure" and "right" intentions, Vergennes wrote. And in another context he referred to the "wise administration of the Cardinal de Fleury," who established a "happy order of things" in which, when the word "king" was mentioned in Europe, everyone knew it designated the King of France.[65]

Unfortunately, it has been a common error to believe that the diplomatists of Europe during the Old Regime together formed a cynical, selfish, and cunning pack of wolves and jackals who forever

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1770, Papiers Vergennes, Correspondance politique et particulière, Ministre de Louis XV, Archives de la famille Vergennes.

[64] "Memoire sur la Politique exterieur . . . 1782," AAE-MD-France, 446, fol. 352 *verso*.

[65] "Memoire sur la Politique exterieur . . . 1782," AAE-MD-France, 446, fol. 352.

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maneuvered in a jungle of deceit and corruption. To be sure, they often protected what they considered to be the interests of their sovereigns with great vigor, and this end could—and often did—justify a brutal opportunism. But if one sees only this side of the diplomatic practices of the Old Regime, one sees only part of the picture. The value of peace and compromise, the community interests and public laws and treaties of Europe, religious beliefs and even common codes of decency and humanity were also mixed into the motivations of diplomats and their *pot pourri* of policy. Liberal European historians and many American historians of all political hues have too long perpetuated a grotesque image of the old diplomacy which does not fit the facts.

Vergennes was not a philosopher or a saint, but neither was he a demon. He had extremely high standards for himself and his craft, but of course he could not always live up to them. Also, his attitudes and beliefs contained conceptions of service which did not encourage innovation. But one does not study in depth Vergennes' career without realizing the complexity of his character and the sincerity of his life. Admittedly, he rarely preached sermons for the press on his virtues and principles and, in the end, as perhaps with all men, his ideas proved incapable of sustaining the traditions and institutions he loved.

Perhaps his greatest faults grew out of his virtues. A hard-working, self-sacrificing, and practical man, he had neither the time nor the leisure to reflect and question whether his day-to-day decisions would ultimately subvert or constrain those deeply felt basic assumptions which gave meaning to his life and his civilization. And being conservative, as well as unreflective and practical, he suspected the critic and the creative innovator who might expose his inconsistencies by offering new and unfamiliar options. But until humanity has proven itself more prolific in producing philosopher-statesmen, it could do worse than have men like Vergennes in its embassies and foreign offices. He had the qualities of a true public servant.

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# Unlimited Debate in the Senate: The First Phase

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On March 9, 1949, during debate on an antilynching bill, Lyndon Baines Johnson, then junior senator from Texas, rose to defend the right of his Southern colleagues to filibuster:

> . . . if I should have the opportunity to send into the countries behind the iron curtain one freedom and only one, I know what my choice would be. I would send to those lands the very freedom we are attempting to disown here in the Senate. I would send to those nations the right of unlimited debate in their legislative chambers. . . . If we now, in haste and irritation, shut off this freedom, we shall be cutting off the most vital safeguard which minorities possess against the tyranny of momentary majorities. I do not want my name listed as one of those who took this freedom away from the world when the world most needed it.[1]

The fundamental issue for Senator Johnson, and for many like him, was the protection of minority rights. This argument may have had merit in its twentieth-century context, but those who participated in the early Senate decisions regarding unlimited debate were unaware that such lofty principles were at stake.

The Rules Committee of the First Congress of the United States did not anticipate the problems created by lengthy debate; certainly they did not envision the development of filibustering tac-

[1] U.S., *Congressional Record*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, XCV, Part 2, 2048-49.



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tics. The filibuster became a part of Senate practice only after precedents had been accepted allowing senators the widest possible latitude in debate.[2] Final acceptance did not come until 1856, after a half century of confusion and controversy over interpretation of Senate rules. An examination of the Senate's early efforts to agree on guidelines for conduct during debate provides some insight into the upper chamber's traditional reluctance to silence its members and demonstrates the haphazard way in which legislative precedents were established.

The difficulty in tracing precedents regarding Senate debate, or indeed any legislative precedent, is that they were often established by the lack of any positive action, and thus went unrecorded. The standard guides to Senate precedent rely only on formal rulings; by ignoring the occasions when rulings were *not* made, they overlook many of the important factors leading to the final establishment of the precedent.

The development of rules governing debate in the United States Senate was a result of previous tradition, political expediency, and pure accident. Thomas Jefferson's *Manual of Parliamentary Practice* (1800), which continues to be the primary reference manual for Senate procedure, stated that "No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluously or tediously."[3] During the half century that followed, Jefferson's dictum was to meet many challenges; in almost every instance it failed to withstand the test.

## I

The Rules Committee of the First Senate took specific steps to regulate debate. It provided for the accepted parliamentary practice of "moving the previous question," which, if passed by a simple majority, would bring the main issues to a vote without further debate; it also gave a specific grant of power to the presiding officer for maintaining order in the Senate chamber.

[2] The term "filibuster" was not used in its legislative sense until 1853, and then usually referred to any lengthy speech rather than an overt, concerted effort to talk a bill to death. Richard H. Thornton, *An American Glossary* (Philadelphia, 1912), I, 315.

[3] Thomas Jefferson, *A Manual of Parliamentary Practice* (rev. ed.; Philadelphia, 1843), 40.

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Although the rules of April 16, 1789, allowed for moving the previous question, this device was originally intended to postpone discussion and thereby delay proceedings on a bill rather than end debate and bring about immediate action. Yet on four occasions in the next seventeen years the previous question was used for its modern purpose, to end debate. Its effectiveness was limited; it was ruled out of order by the speaker once, and even when adopted, did not always succeed in silencing those senators determined to continue the debate.[4] The Senate finally dropped the rule providing for the previous question in 1806. The senators were not motivated by a desire to remove obstacles to free debate, but rather by the belief that the rule's infrequent use made it unnecessary. Indeed, the recommendation to strike out the rule was adopted *viva voce*, without any debate.[5]

Although the Senate repealed the rule providing for the previous question, it had, and continues to have, another potential weapon against long-winded or improper debate. Rule XVI, also adopted in 1789, ordered that,

> When a member shall be called to order, he shall sit down, until the President shall have determined whether he is in order or not, and every question of order shall be decided by the President without debate; but if there be a doubt in his mind, he may call for the sense of the Senate.[6]

The interpretation that Vice-President John C. Calhoun placed on this rule in 1826 strengthened the Senate's powers over its own affairs, assured greater latitude in future debates, precipitated an open break between Calhoun and President John Quincy Adams, and provided a focal point for Senate controversy during the next thirty years.

Appropriately, the man who forced Calhoun's controversial ruling was the indefatigable John Randolph, who, by 1826, was beginning to display more than occasional signs of insanity. Early in April 1826, Randolph had given a Senate harangue in which he denounced the Adams administration as the "combination . . .

[4] George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States* (Boston, 1938), I, 393; Lindsay Rogers, *The American Senate* (New York, 1926), 165.

[5] U.S., *Annals of Congress*, 9th Congress, 1st Session, 1806, XV, 163.

[6] *Ibid.*, 1st Congress, 1st Session, 1789, I, 21.

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of the Puritan with the blackleg." Not content with this, he called to task the parents of Henry Clay for bringing into this world "this being, so brilliant yet so corrupt, which like a rotten mackerel by moonlight, shined and stunk."[7] The angry Clay promptly challenged Randolph to a duel; the contest ended in a draw, with the most serious casualty being Randolph's waistcoat, but it nevertheless brought severe criticism upon Calhoun for allowing Randolph to speak so intemperately.[8]

Randolph first touched upon the issue of the presiding officer's duties to preserve order during a speech on a seemingly unrelated topic—the Senate's right to assume jurisdiction over committee appointments. The ultimate passage of this proposal, which wrested from the executive branch power over appointments, was an important step toward Senate independence from executive influence, but Randolph's peripheral remarks on the proposal provided the real center of controversy. Mindful that some were desirous of silencing him, Randolph argued that the vice-president was not authorized to call a senator to order for words spoken in debate. Calhoun, in a lengthy opinion, upheld Randolph's claim on the grounds that the vice-president's power was appellate in nature and could only be exercised after an elected member of the Senate had originated the call to order. To do otherwise, he reasoned, would give the presiding officer the powers of both prosecutor and judge.[9]

Calhoun's ruling remained in effect for only two years, but its consequences were far-reaching. Its immediate effect was to prevent executive interference with the legislative branch and to restore to the Senate control over its own affairs. More important, Calhoun stimulated a debate which would last for the next three decades.

President Adams reacted so strongly to Calhoun's ruling that he entered into a public newspaper debate with his Vice-President.[10] Basing his argument on Jefferson's *Manual*, Adams upheld

[7] Henry Adams, *John Randolph* (Boston, 1882), 289.

[8] Thomas Hart Benton, *Thirty Years' View* (New York, 1854), I, 70-77; John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren* (Washington, 1920), 204.

[9] U.S., *Register of Debates in Congress*, 19th Congress, 1st Session, 1826, XLIV, 573.

[10] There is some question whether President Adams or his clerk, Phillip

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the presiding officer's right to call a senator to order. Labeling Calhoun "the residuary legatee of General Jackson's pretensions to the Presidency," he condemned the South Carolinian for letting "the rhapsodies of a once powerful mind . . . prostitute the national money, time and character."[11]

Calhoun was quick to refute Adams' remarks on the constitutionality of the ruling. He did not consider Jefferson's *Manual* binding; it was only an informal guide to Senate conduct. Modeled after the rules of the British House of Commons, it had no official status in the United States Senate. Calhoun, citing Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, upheld the exclusive right of the senators to determine their rules, and repeated his belief that whatever power the vice-president exercised could only be that expressly delegated by the body over which he presided.[12] Thus, even in his days as a nationalist, Calhoun proved adept at utilizing a strict construction of the Constitution. He did not, however, base his case solely on constitutional grounds. He also appealed to the unwritten right of any senator, even the irresponsible John Randolph, to speak his piece on the Senate floor.[13]

Calhoun's ruling, and the spirited exchange that followed, was couched in the traditional constitutional language of the day, but the legalistic verbiage of the two combatants does not completely explain their actions. Some of Calhoun's legalism was undoubtedly sincere, as his entire career, even in its nationalist phase, was characterized by a concern, indeed a fetish, for drawing fine constitutional lines, but he did not always operate on the lofty plane of political abstraction. Although theoretically a member of the Adams administration, Calhoun felt little affection for the New Englander; as a presidential aspirant, he probably felt no qualms about the diminution of Adams' executive power.

Adams' reasons for opposing the encroachment on executive power are quite clear. He detested Randolph, and, at that stage in

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Fendall, was the author of the newspaper attacks on Calhoun. Charles M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun, Nationalist: 1782-1828* (New York, 1944), I, 333-36, argues that the style was distinctively Adams'. Whatever the case, Calhoun believed that Adams was the author, and Adams made no effort to dispel that belief.

[11] *The National Journal*, May 1, 1826.

[12] *The National Intelligencer*, May 20, 1826.

[13] *Ibid.*, June 27, 1826.

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his career, distrusted Congress. At the beginning of his administration Adams had proposed an ambitious legislative program; Congress had no intention of letting the President dictate what legislation was necessary, and, accordingly, had ignored every one of his major recommendations.[14] Adams held Calhoun personally responsible for many of these failures,[15] and Calhoun's action in the Randolph affair only served to bolster this feeling. The Senate action removing committee appointments from the jurisdiction of the executive branch seriously weakened Adams' control over Congress. Calhoun's ruling limiting the presiding officer's powers in controlling debate only added insult to the injured presidential prestige.

The Adams-Calhoun dispute did not end in 1826. In February 1828 Senator Samuel Foote of Connecticut introduced a formal amendment to Rule VI.[16] His supporters feared that the existing rule might be subject to different interpretations by future vice-presidents; they urged the Senate to make the rule more specific and thereby prevent misinterpretation.[17]

Foote's proposal restored to the presiding officer the right to call a member to order, but it allowed any senator to appeal the decision. Once an appeal was made the Senate could, by majority vote, overturn the chair's ruling. In the debate on Foote's amendment, it was argued that denying the vice-president the right to call a senator to order was of no practical significance, as a determined presiding officer could always obtain the aid of a friendly senator to do the job for him.[18] The heart of the amendment was the second part, as it would "remove the arbitrary and tyrannical power to decide all questions of order without appeal."[19] The two portions of Foote's amendment were voted on separately. The vote on restoring the presiding officer's right to call a senator to order was passed, 30-16. The vote on the section giving the Senate the power of appeal was overwhelmingly passed, 44-2. The division on the

[14] Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Union* (New York, 1956), II, 72-76.

[15] Wiltse, I, 333-36.

[16] By 1828, Rule XVI, previously cited, appears as Rule VI in the Senate Rules.

[17] *Register of Debates*, 20th Congress, 1st Session, 1828, XLVII, 279.

[18] *Ibid.*, 314.

[19] *Ibid.*, 304.

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first part of the amendment was strictly partisan, with a coalition of pro-Adams and anti-Calhoun men securing passage. The near unanimity on the second part was an expression of the Senate's determination to be the final arbiter of its own affairs.[20] The passage of this amendment was a Pyrrhic victory for Adams. Calhoun's rule of 1826 was overturned, but at the expense of granting the Senate a power it did not previously possess.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the discussion of the Foote amendment was the lack of concern shown for freedom of debate and minority rights. Both sides paid lip service to the principle of freedom of debate, but at no time did they make it a central issue. Senator James Noble of Indiana voiced the majority view. He expressed his pleasure at the approval of the amendment, but, in a passage indicative of his not-so-constant devotion to the principle of free debate, he stated his hope that "under the present regulation, the flood gates of the waters of the Roanoke would never be opened to flood the Senate chamber again."[21] The senators gained their coveted independence, but, as future generations would discover, the flood-gates had opened wider. The waters of the Roanoke had subsided with the deterioration of Randolph's health, but the Senate had established another precedent which would unleash an inundation from the Louisiana bayous a century later.

## II

The passage of the 1828 amendment marked the end of one stage in the evolution of Senate rules governing debate, a stage dominated by successful Senate efforts to eliminate executive interference. The upper house had assumed the ultimate authority for calling its members to order, but it remained for them to decide when that power should be exercised.

In later proceedings the two recurring problems were to be indecorum and irrelevancy in debate. In 1835 the senators took the initiative in setting the first precedent regarding indecorum in debate. In February of that year Thomas Hart Benton, referring to a

[20] *Ibid.*, 340-41; Ansel Wold (comp.), *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927* (Washington, 1928), *passim.*

[21] *Register of Debates*, 20th Congress, 1st Session, 1828, XLVII, 341.

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statement of John C. Calhoun as "a bold and direct attack on truth," was called to order by another senator. The presiding officer disallowed this objection, but under the revised rules of 1828, a member appealed the decision, and the Senate overruled its presiding officer and declared Benton out of order.[22] Despite this early precedent, there have been few instances where either the Senate or the presiding officer has effectively used the power to curb disorderly conduct.

Although indecorous conduct stimulated the early precedents and produced spirited exchanges between senators, the most persistent obstacle to Senate efficiency was the tendency of some individuals to speak "beside the question." The Senate's first recorded action on irrelevancy in debate took place in 1848, but the foundations for that ruling were laid long before. An obvious influence on the Senate's attitude toward this problem was the lengthy exchange between Senators Webster and Hayne. These famous debates, lasting from December 1828 to May 1829, ostensibly covered the subject of public lands, but, because of the personalities and sectional interests involved, they soon included such issues as the Tariff of 1828 and the exclusion of slavery from the territories. Webster and Hayne were clearly speaking "beside the question," but because of their skill and stature, and because of the intense drama surrounding their confrontation, none of their fellow senators protested. The failure of the Senate to silence the two men undoubtedly aided the cause of future orators whose skill, stature, and subject matter would not otherwise have commanded the Senate's toleration.[23]

Another unrecorded decision came during the heated congressional session of 1841, when, after much wrangling, Henry Clay secured passage of his coveted bill authorizing the recharter of a National Bank. From June 21 to July 12 Clay watched the opposition, led by Calhoun, attempt to talk the bill to death. An exasperated Clay finally avowed that he "was ready at any moment to bring forward and support a measure which would give the majority the control of the business of the Senate of the United States." Calhoun immediately challenged the constitutionality of

[22] *Ibid.*, 23d Congress, 2d Session, 1835, LXII, 427-32.

[23] See, for example, *Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, 1848, LXXXIX, 898.

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such a proposal, defending the minority's "undoubted right to question, examine and discuss those measures which they believe in their hearts are inimical to the best interests of the country."[24] On July 15, 1841, Clay was still threatening to introduce a gag law designed to shut off debate and bring his bill to an immediate vote. It became obvious that such a proposal would meet strong opposition. Senator King of Alabama, with obstructionist tactics obviously in mind, advised Clay to "make his arrangements at his boardinghouse for the winter."[25] Calhoun and Thomas Hart Benton also renewed their attack. Calhoun likened a gag rule provision to the Alien and Sedition Acts, and again defended the minority's right to dispute the Bank Bill's merits. Benton, anticipating that the proposed gag rule might take the form of a reintroduction of the previous question into the Senate's rules, vowed that "when the previous question shall be brought into this chamber . . . I am ready to see my legislative life terminated."[26] In the end the Bank Bill passed, a gag rule was never introduced, and Clay finally admitted that his supporters were equally guilty of drawing out the debate.

The gag rule proposal never became a formal motion, and thus does not appear on any list of Senate precedents, but the advocacy of such a rule, and the reaction that it induced, is suggestive of a growing concern for senatorial prerogative. Senate assent to a gag rule providing for majority cloture would have set a precedent making the later development of planned filibustering techniques impossible. Clay's personal prestige, the Whig majority in the Senate, and the importance of the bill at stake made circumstances for the passage of a gag rule more favorable in 1841 than at almost any time in the Senate's history. With all these factors in his favor, Clay was unable to get even his own party to back him.[27] The Democrats' reaction was vociferous. For the first time the principle of minority rights was invoked to defend lengthy debate; it was fitting that the senator from South Carolina was the first to utilize this defense. Senate aversion to a gag rule providing for ma-

[24] *Congressional Globe*, 27th Congress, 1st Session, 1841, LXXIX, 184-85.
[25] *Ibid.*, 203.
[26] *Ibid.*, 204.
[27] For a highly partisan account of Clay's failure to introduce the gag rule, see Benton, II, 247-57.

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jority cloture was obviously strong. In 1850, when Daniel Webster introduced a motion for reincorporating the previous question into the Senate rules, the Senate did not even bother to debate it. Webster's motion was promptly laid on the table, never to be revived.[28]

The first formal ruling on irrelevancy, like the informal ones that preceded it, was an accidental by-product of a major political controversy. In July 1848 the Senate Whigs introduced a resolution calling for an early adjournment of Congress; the Democrats labelled this move an irresponsible attempt to avoid the crucial issue of slavery in the territories and thus relieve the Whig presidential candidate from committing himself on the subject before the election. Senator Clayton of Delaware, in the midst of the debate on adjournment, launched into a defense of General Taylor and a vigorous attack on the Democratic candidate, General Cass. Clayton was immediately called to order by Senator Niles of Connecticut. Vice-President Dallas sustained Niles' point of order, Clayton appealed, and the matter went to the floor for further debate. The discussion that followed centered around three issues. Many of the senators present had witnessed the Webster-Hayne debate nineteen years before. They reasoned that if Webster and Hayne could speak beside the point for five months, then surely the Senate could indulge Senator Clayton for a few minutes. Second, the senators invoked the long-standing tradition of senatorial courtesy. They argued that Clayton was merely answering the Democrats' charges, and while it was unfortunate that the debate had deviated from the subject of adjournment, it was only fair to allow Clayton the opportunity to reply. Finally, the presidential election was only a few months away and the Whigs were in favor of any speech praising Taylor and attacking Cass. The last reason was probably the most compelling of the three; the Senate, by a 26-22 vote, allowed Clayton to proceed.[29]

Hardly a month had passed when the Senate was forced to rule once more on irrelevancy in debate. The issue at stake was again crucial, sectional interest was high, and tempers inflamed. As could be expected, John C. Calhoun and his Southern supporters were in

[28] *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 1850, XCIII, 1688.
[29] *Ibid.*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, 1848, LXXXIX, 897-98.

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the thick of the fight. The Oregon Territory Bill had shuttled back and forth between the House and the Senate for several months, and by August 12, 1848, had secured House approval and awaited Senate action. The Southerners found the final version of the bill offensive, as the House had insisted on inserting a provision specifically excluding slavery from the new territory. The Senate finally overrode the South's objections, but only after a grueling twenty-four hour session which did not adjourn until 10:00 A.M. on the morning of August 13.[30]

The bill's supporters had succeeded in gaining Senate passage, but there remained a final obstacle to overcome. The Senate had adjourned too hastily; August 14 was the last day of the session, and Rule 17 of the joint rules of Congress specifically stated that "No bill . . . shall be presented to the President of the United States, for his approbation, on the last day of the session."[31] When the Senate convened on August 14, 1848, it was immediately apparent that the forces in favor of suspension of the seventeenth rule were going to have a long, hard day. Senator Turney of Tennessee, a staunch opponent of the Oregon Bill, started the day's proceedings by demanding that the previous day's *Journal* be read in its entirety. This ploy exhausted, Senators Turney and Calhoun commenced, at great length, to voice their objections to the suspension of the seventeenth rule. They argued that the President could not possibly weigh the merits and demerits of the bill in less than a day's time.[32] This line of defense necessitated the recapitulation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Oregon Bill itself, and was admirably suited to the senators' purpose—that of delaying a vote on the suspension of the rules.

Daniel Webster, seeing that only two hours remained before adjournment, lost all patience with his colleagues and called Senator Turney to order for irrelevancy. Calhoun then attempted to draw Webster into a debate over the propriety of the point of order. Webster would not be deterred; the pages of the *Congressional Globe* fairly bristle with his anger. In a short speech, heavily laced with irony, Webster replied that:

[30] *Ibid.*, 1073-80.

[31] U.S., *Rules of the Senate of the United States* . . . (Washington, 1859), 26.

[32] *Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, 1848, LXXXIX, 1083.

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> . . . he had no desire to go into any metaphysical views, aware as he was, that if he were to engage with the Senator from South Carolina in a contest of that character, he should be involved in a maze from which there would be little probability of extrication before the hour of adjournment would terminate the session.[33]

Webster's opponents greeted these remarks with shock and disbelief. The Southern wing was soon placated, however, for the presiding officer ruled that Turney was in order and allowed him to proceed. Surprisingly, no one appealed the decision. Equally surprising, the Southern minority did not press its advantage. Turney briefly finished his remarks, and Senator Foote, speaking on behalf of the Southern wing, announced that "he now felt authorized to declare that they were now willing to yield and let the majority take the responsibility." With that, the resolution suspending Rule 17 was speedily adopted and the bill was sent to the President, where it was signed into law.[34]

An explanation for the Senate's willingness to let Senator Turney proceed, and of the Southern senators' subsequent decision to yield to the majority, must be speculative. It seems likely that the senators supporting Webster's point of order realized that an appeal to the chair's ruling would only provoke further debate and therefore be self-defeating. The South's decision to abandon the delaying tactics is less easily explicable, but probably stemmed from battle fatigue. Having once gained a ruling which upheld their dignity and right to be heard, they ceased their delaying tactics. It is apparent that both sides were glad to be rid of the Oregon Bill; the easygoing atmosphere of the Senate was restored as soon as the matter was settled. Immediately after the resolution of the Oregon Question, one of its staunch opponents attempted to obtain action on a bill to complete "the system of ventilating and warming the Senate chamber." A tired Thomas Hart Benton thundered, "I object to the taking up of the resolution, which, I understand, relates to ventilation. No Sir, no more ventilation! We have quite enough wind Sir! Yes Sir, quite wind enough!" The senator withdrew his resolution and the Senate adjourned *sine die*.[35]

[33] *Ibid.*, 1084.
[34] *Ibid.*, 1085.
[35] *Ibid.*

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The two 1848 decisions were important steps toward a policy of unlimited debate, but by 1850 there were indications that these precedents would not be allowed to stand. On April 4, 1850, just four days after the death of John C. Calhoun, Vice-President Millard Fillmore addressed the Senate regarding the duties of the presiding officer in preserving order. The senators must have marveled as the usually irresolute Fillmore openly repudiated Calhoun's 1826 ruling and declared that henceforward the presiding officer would take a more active part in calling senators to order. In view of the senators' long-standing aversion to disciplining their own members, Fillmore thought it necessary to take the initiative if order was to be maintained.[36]

Considering its previous concern for legislative prerogative, the Senate's reaction to Fillmore's remarks is surprising. Rather than defend their conduct, many of the leading violators of Senate decorum vowed to help Fillmore fulfill his pledge to maintain order. The Senate then unanimously agreed to enter the Vice-President's statement into the *Journal*.[37] Fillmore's remarks would not have been accepted so casually had the issues before the Senate been as pressing as they were in the years between 1846 and 1848, or as they were to be a few weeks later when the Compromise of 1850 was debated on the Senate floor. It is unlikely that Fillmore would have spoken at all had the venerable John C. Calhoun been present in the Senate chamber.

Fillmore's resolve was put to the test just two weeks later. The Vice-President proved hopelessly inadequate to the task. Thomas Hart Benton touched off the spark when he denounced Calhoun's farewell address as a deliberate attempt to disrupt the union. This was all that was needed to break the existing calm. Senator Foote, who a fortnight earlier had been the first to promise aid in preserving order, was so incensed that, in the midst of his reply to Benton, he rushed toward him with cocked pistol in hand. Pandemonium reigned, while Benton cried, "Stand out of the way, and let the assassin fire!" The two combatants were finally dragged back to their seats; this accomplished, Foote continued his defense of Calhoun, without ever being called to order.[38] The Benton-

[36] U.S., *Journal of the Senate*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 1850, 248-52.
[37] *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 1850, XCII, 632-33.
[38] *Ibid.*, 762-63.

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Foote fracas produced no formal rulings except an ordinance by a special committee that henceforth senators should not wear arms in the chamber.[39]

Incidents such as the Benton-Foote affair convinced some senators that formal action was necessary. Ironically, it was the Senate's failure to reform its rules which marked the beginning of an era of almost unlimited debate. On June 26, 1856, the Senate Rules Committee proposed that Rule 3 be altered so that it might read: "Every member when he speaks, shall address the chair, standing in his place, *and shall confine himself to the question under debate. He shall avoid personality, and shall not reflect improperly on any state;* and when he has finished shall sit down."[40] Thus, in one motion, the Committee recommended to eliminate the major sources of conflict during debate.

The discussion on the amendment, while lacking the powerful rhetoric that a Calhoun might have provided, cogently summarized thirty years of Senate aversion to infringement upon the right of free debate. The arguments covered all the familiar ground. The senators questioned its practicality, declaring that the amendment would only encourage frequent calls to order; these would lead to protracted debate over whether the member in question was really out of order. Since the question of "whether or not a gentleman is in order . . . is one of the most difficult questions on earth to determine," it was thought the proposed amendment would probably be self-defeating. Senator John Crittenden appealed to his colleagues' sense of history. He thought it presumptuous for the Senate to suppose that it could, "by some twenty or thirty lines, add to those rules which have grown out of the experience and wisdom of a thousand Parliaments and Senates." No discussion on freedom of debate would have been complete without an appeal to the dignity of the senators themselves, and this one was no exception. "The true criterion to govern debate," it was argued, "is to be found in the breast of every gentleman." By this reasoning, any attempt to define rigidly the rules of debate would insult the gentlemen involved. Finally, the abstract principle of the right of free speech and debate was defended on the grounds that it had "been baptized in the blood of martyrs on the scaffold, and comes to us

[39] *Ibid.*, 1481.

[40] The italicized section contains the proposed additions to the rule.

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by the blessing of the good and true, who have manifested their fidelity to the great principles of civil liberty in the history of our country ages and ages back."[41]

Of the many old arguments dusted off before the Senate that day, the most effective were those that appealed to the principle of senatorial courtesy. The Senate possessed an exalted image of itself, and even at that crucial stage in sectional animosity few senators were willing to admit that a member of their body could be guilty of indecorum.

The most vigorous denunciation of the amendment was also the most original. Senator Toombs of Georgia opposed it because he did not believe

> that all those rules which are made for debating societies and for boys are fit for the Senate. Whenever you get men together—grown up men, who are really men and no shams—they will quarrel and they will fight. Why sir, the first great assembly of Christians which ever met . . . bruised and battered one another's noses and heads about the question of whether they should insert or exclude a Greek diphthong from the faith of the faithful. They were real men. Such things have existed . . . and will exist until men lose their manhood.

Senator Toombs suggested the Senate follow the laws of his home state, which, "properly and wisely, consider opprobrious words as an assault justifying a battery."[42] Shortly after Toombs' exposition on liberty and justice, Southern style, the amendment was put to a vote. It was no contest; so strong was Senate feeling that they rejected it *viva voce*, with no one calling for a division.[43]

## III

The defeat of the 1856 amendment requiring a senator "to confine himself to the question under debate" marked the beginning of over a century of virtually unrestricted debate.[44] The rulings pre-

[41] *Congressional Globe*, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 1856, CX, 1477-84.
[42] *Ibid.*, 1482.
[43] *Ibid.*, 1484.
[44] The occasions when debate has been restricted in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are extremely rare. Senators have often imposed time limits on speeches when appropriation bills are being considered, but, because of the special nature of those bills, senators have not objected. For a partial list of the exceptions to unlimited debate, see Herbert

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ceding this event offer ample proof that the Senate has not always been a citadel of protection for minority rights or a haven for filibusterers. When the Senate abandoned the previous question in 1806, it did so because it was thought unnecessary; long-winded orators had not yet become a permanent feature of Senate proceedings. The decisions of 1826 and 1828, giving the Senate ultimate authority in disciplining its members, stemmed from a concerted effort to weaken executive influence over the upper chamber. There is little evidence that principles of free speech were instrumental in their decisions. Finally, the rulings beginning after 1828, culminating in the defeat of the 1856 amendment, were the inconspicuous by-products of the major political and sectional controversies of the period. John Caldwell Calhoun, a permanent fixture in the Senate chamber from 1824 until his death in 1850, was in the forefront of this fight for wider latitude of debate. Even after his death, Calhoun's speeches and rulings were evoked to defend lengthy debate. The author of the doctrines of nullification and the concurrent majority was important in this fight because he embodied the traditions of senatorial courtesy, not because he stood for principles of minority rights. What for Calhoun and his Senate colleagues had been a matter of honor and courtesy, became for their successors an inalienable, abstract right.

H. Gilfry, *Precedents and Decisions on Points of Order* (Washington, 1914), 400-16, 458-60.

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# Book Reviews

Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice *by Arthur Lall. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xii, 404 pp. $8.95.*

This book is a modern diplomat's manual of the principles and techniques underlying international negotiation. Because of the author's great diplomatic experience, as Indian government representative in numerous international conferences and organizations and particularly as Permanent Representative and Ambassador of India to the United Nations from 1954 to 1959, but also because of the wealth of practical illustration and the clear and simple manner in which the material is organized and presented, this book is likely to become a standard text for students of international diplomacy and organization.

International negotiation is defined as "the process of consideration of an international dispute or situation by peaceful means, other than judicial or arbitral processes, with a view to promoting or reaching among the parties concerned or interested some understanding, amelioration, adjustment, or settlement of the dispute or situation."

Because of the continuing weakness of the judicial or arbitral processes in international relations, the more flexible methods of negotiation have continuing, and, indeed, added significance in the postwar world. The author's main objective is to demonstrate, in the light of many precedents and different types of situations, the conditions that favor or impede negotiation. Except for the introductory chapters, each of the twenty-six chapters is concluded by a summary of the principles deduced from the foregoing pragmatic discussion. The summary at the end of Chapter X, which is entitled "Three Factors Which Impede Negotiation," can be taken as representative of the author's method:

> When there is a real or assumed significant disparity of power between the parties to a dispute or situation, or when one of the parties is imbued with a sense of growing power, then such disparity or sense of buoyant



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power may militate against resort to negotiation to settle the dispute or ameliorate the situation.

When, together with the difference in power level, the international commitments of the more powerful party are involved, then those commitments tend to exclude the concerned dispute or situation from, or render it less susceptible to, negotiation.

The personal feelings of heads of state or government or other responsible persons, when aroused, may seriously affect possibilities of and attitudes in negotiation, not only with respect to the situation or dispute in the course of which feelings have been aroused, but in all situations or disputes with the state whose rulers or representatives have been responsible for arousing those feelings.

The last chapter deals with the relation of negotiation and international law. Its general conclusion is that, while international law is as yet far from controlling the major aspects of interstate relations, the growing respect for, or commitment to, international law tends to restrain a state in the use of force and to counter the unrestrained exercise of strength by a superior power.

The current situation in the Vietnamese conflict tellingly illustrates Professor Lall's analysis of the factors that affect the possibilities for negotiations, since it contains almost all the crucial elements: two parties (the National Liberation Front and the South Vietnamese government) opposed in an essentially civil war and backed by outside forces of unequal strength (the North Vietnamese government and the United States), the weaker one, however, receiving the limited backing of two major powers (the Soviet Union and China). The Vietnam situation also illustrates the vital need for a certain balance in the interests and prospects of the parties as necessary preconditions of successful negotiation.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN
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Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence *edited by Emile Benoit with the assistance of Nils Petter Gleditsch. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, and New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—260 pp. $8.00.*

Seventeen conference papers rarely add up to a well-integrated volume. This is no exception, but the gourmet reader will easily select rare and tasty tidbits from this Oslo smorgasbord.

My own—and unavoidably arbitrary—selection would concentrate on the solid and imaginative papers of the editor himself, and of François

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Perroux, Alec Nove, and (in a joint paper) H. Linneman, J. P. Prone, and Jan Tinbergen.

The introductory paper of Benoit and the brilliant contribution of Perroux develop what is to me the crucial and—as usual—most neglected aspect of the problem, that is, the ways and means of reasserting man's control over his future, and of redirecting toward commonly shared constructive goals the tidal wave of intellectual, emotional, and material resources unwittingly wasted today in a nightmarish and self-feeding race toward mutual extinction. The revolutionary changes in current policy horizons needed to effect such a reorientation are candidly and realistically stressed by both authors, and persuasively argued on the basis of a similarly candid and realistic comparison of the terrifying, or inspiring, end-results of the two alternative paths abstractly described by the "variable-sum" game theorists of the strategy of conflict. Vincent Rock and Fritz Baade pursue the same theme by listing some of the joint international endeavors, called for by President Kennedy in his inaugural address, which might inspire world leaders and public opinion to wrest themselves free from the deadly vise in which they are now caught by mutual fears and by the momentum of the national industrial-military complexes denounced by President Eisenhower in his farewell address. Galtung's comparative data on the present state of public opinion in France, Norway, and Poland toward alternative uses of the resources now spent on armament provide an interesting postscript in this respect. Galtung believes that more imaginative and forceful leadership will be needed to—and could relatively easily—awake an apathetic and ineffective, but also volatile, electorate to opportunities which have not yet been presented to it as a real political issue.

The second theme of the book flows from the first. It discusses, in concrete terms, the world armament load and its opportunity costs in terms of alternative uses of the resources that might be freed by feasible reductions in this load. The quantitative estimates ambitiously and painfully assembled by Benoit and Lubell on "The World Burden of National Defense" would, alone, make this book a "must" in this field, even though their estimates already call for drastic—and, alas, upward—revisions (of fifty per cent or more in the case of the United States).

Maddison produces, as always, a lucid and suggestive statistical presentation of the impact of military expenditures on comparative growth rates.

I am far less impressed by Bornstein's and Eckstein's discussion of the economic pressures and/or inducements that might be applied by the West to alter Russian and Chinese attitudes toward disarmament.

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Indeed, the two authors themselves show a healthy skepticism for this approach to a problem that can better be tackled objectively by all parties on its own merits. Three articles on the economics of the arms race in developing countries such as Egypt and the economic consequences of disarmament in the United Kingdom and Norway are also lacking in depth and, therefore, are of only ephemeral interest. Finally, no reader of the curious paper of Barber, from the U.S. Defense Department, on "The Transfer of Defense Industry Capabilities to the Solution of Domestic Problems" should fail to compare it with its counterpart from the East by Urban, from the Academy of Science in Prague.

The third theme of the book is that of East-West coexistence. Linneman, Prone, and Tinbergen make a persuasive case for the growing convergence of the two systems, and Nove reappraises most imaginatively, iconoclastically, and constructively the major goals and instruments of East-West trade policies. Finally, the role of the international division of labor in the growth process and its still untapped potentialities for the future are highlighted by Profesor Vajda, from the Hungarian Economic Association.

In brief, this is a volume of very unequal quality, but whose best articles should not be missed by those who refuse to accept as inexorable the glide of an atomically interdependent world toward self-destruction.

ROBERT TRIFFIN
*Yale University*

The Nation Is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World *by Roger D. Masters. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.—x, 319, xiii pp. $6.95.*

This is another of the now many critiques of American foreign policy written in the idiom largely defined by Morgenthau, Kennan, Liska, and developed further through the application of game theory. Neither the approach nor the proposals are nearly so controversial as Professor Masters seems to fear in his preface.

Thus his conclusion that the policy of containment is quite possibly inherently "faulty and dangerous," and most certainly "virtually impossible to attain," was advanced by Walter Lippmann as early as 1947. Likewise, his call for an accommodation with China has been discussed seriously at several intervals since 1949. And a significant number of people of different political loyalties accept his general propositions "that the United States should adopt as its goal a gen-

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eral world-wide equilibrium, adopting alliances or accommodations with any power or powers that further this objective," and that it should undertake "a reduction of [its] commitments throughout the world during a period of revolutionary upheaval."

The real issue involves how to accomplish those objectives, and in confronting that question Professor Masters does not follow his own advice "that there is no substitute for a prudential consideration of the realities of power; no great society can survive if its policies toward others are dominated by passion or ideology." He realizes that flexibility and decreased commitments imply a turn toward what he calls "isolationism," yet he is not very rigorous in explaining the nature of that approach, and his argument against its viability contains a good bit of ideology.

He defines isolationism very narrowly as being "content with the defense of" American territory, and dismisses it with the remark that "international politics would not disappear if this country turned its attention entirely inward." The history is poor, the logic is poor, and the whole argument is poor. None of the advocates of what Professor Masters calls isolationism or neo-isolationism have ever agitated for turning the nation's attention entirely inward. That is part of the folklore of the liberal internationalist's ideology. The men Professor Masters calls isolationists have in truth called for pretty much the kind of flexibility and reduced commitments that he praises.

Professor Masters further argues that the American economy needs overseas markets and raw materials, and hence any attempt to embrace isolationism would "give rise to bitter and fundamental dispute in American politics." That is probably true, particularly as long as the alternatives are defined as being either markets and global commitments or no global commitments and no markets. That is the choice that Professor Masters appears to visualize, but it is far from being the limit of possible alternatives. But, even if that were the only choice, the "bitter and fundamental dispute" in America that he foresees would appear to be far less dangerous and destructive than continuing the present foreign policy.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
*University of Wisconsin*

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-62 *by David A. Baldwin. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—x, 291 pp. $7.95.*

This excellent study seeks "to clarify . . . the confused state of public debate on the issue of foreign aid. . . ." Although the title seems to

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imply broader scope, the author attempts no study of the results of U.S. actions; nor does he set out to make any complete and systematic analysis of the theoretical or practical possibilities, economic or diplomatic, of foreign aid programs. But his discussion does represent more sophistication than the non-specialist may appreciate or even assimilate.

The "blind spots" which he seeks to illuminate are both economic and political. For the serious reader he has succeeded in demonstrating the necessity and the possibility of integrating economics and political science. The economist will broaden his understanding of how the study of international relations and domestic governmental (political) processes influence choices among economic alternatives. The student of government should get, among other things, a sense of the differences between "real" and "money" aspects of economic development.

Not infrequently in the twenty years studied, loose terminology has been an unidentified impediment. Phraseology which lacks precision not only tolerates but actually encourages sloppy thinking and can thereby contribute to avoidable errors in policy. Men assuming to advise, and the fewer who have acted, on policy have all too often avoided facing up to really difficult issues, or aspects of problems, by using undefined terms—adequate, sound, necessary, good, bad, equitable, fair (profit), reasonable, discriminatory, control, favorable, stable, and so on. Until words such as these are defined for the purposes at hand, the sentences in which they appear can carry no clear meaning. Yet time and again the people uttering them—occupants of the White House, who may perhaps be pardoned (but not their advisers), and professors, who have no good excuse—have apparently felt that they contributed something toward understanding. If Professor Baldwin's study gets even a small fraction of the readership it deserves, officialdom—*and* academe—will be challenged, if not shamed, into sharper thinking.

The book, in a sense, consists of four closely related case studies. Each covers a period of years. A sort of theme runs through: U.S. policy moved from rejection to adoption of the "soft loan" (p. 7) method of giving aid. The author finds elements of continuity (p. 272), but also much change. For each period there is examination of economic growth abroad as an element of U.S. policy; the techniques for doing so (for example, stimulation of private capital and role of governmentally supplied capital); external and domestic reasons for the choices of techniques made (like attitudes of business and of Congress); pressures from United Nations; role of World Bank; rivalry from communism; and effectiveness of techniques used. Each chapter has a brief summary.

A small sampling of the contents can suggest coverage and quality. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has concentrated on "strategic nonlending," "to withhold loans in a strategic

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attempt to encourage (blackmail) the governments into changing their policies" (p. 37). Failure to liberalize trade on the scale envisaged early in the period increased the effective pressure for "soft" loans. The growth of nationalism among underdeveloped nations reduced the "probability that foreign governments would improve their treatment of private foreign investors" (p. 115). The fact that humanitarian policies by encouraging population growth might "conflict with rapid achievement of economic development" was widely ignored. "Congress typically resents being considered merely as a source of funds for the executive" (p. 162). "The executive branch . . . tended to treat governmental policies in recipient nations as constants . . . [and] ignored the fact that governmental policies and debt-servicing capacity are in fact interdependent" (p. 228). The author advances the "hypothesis . . . that a certain amount of vagueness with respect to the nature and purpose of a foreign aid proposal may actually facilitate the building of a consensus in support . . ." (p. 265).

The book is critical, not of individuals as such but of lack of clarity in thinking, of failure to question premises and logic. At times the author implies harsh appraisals of officials (and professors and commentators) for not "coming clean" and of congressmen for being slow to learn. Yet he also shows sensitivity for the difficulties of each group in winning acceptance by others of the positions it supports. This book is neither easy nor comforting; but it is enlightening, challenging, and constructive.

C. Lowell Harriss
*Columbia University*

The Inter-American System *by Gordon Connell-Smith. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1966.—xix, 376 pp. $8.75.*

Mr. Connell-Smith's *The Inter-American System* is the best book in any language on its subject.

The author, a lecturer in international affairs at Hull University, has written a close study of the history, juridical structure, and functioning of the seventy-five year old international organization. More than that, he keenly analyzes United States foreign policy in the western hemisphere, places that policy in the context of extra-hemisphere relations, and demonstrates the ways in which that policy has derived from, and now conflicts with, the inter-American system.

The central premise of the book is the not original concept that the inter-American system has always embodied two unequal forces: the

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overwhelmingly powerful United States, and all of the other, materially weak, Latin American nations. Mr. Connell-Smith brilliantly extrapolates this simple power thesis, beginning with the first Inter-American Conference (1889) and ending his book with a neat coup—a postscript chapter, written after the completion of his manuscript and at the height of the Dominican crisis of 1965, in which he persuasively proves his earlier arguments.

The author is a detached and devastating critic of the inevitable contortions through which the United States has gone to preserve its image of non-intervention and multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere while in fact pursuing usually contradictory national objectives. He examines the imbalance of power and objectives that has consistently distorted the proclaimed principles and actions of the regional system: he relates the Monroe Doctrine, the wider commitments of the United States since World War II (as in the United Nations), and the Alliance for Progress to the "Pan American" system.

The evidence is impeccably marshaled to support conclusions such as these: "The inter-American system is not a natural grouping, but primarily the creation of United States foreign policy" (p. 329); "It is difficult to see how the United States can be an effective leader of change in Latin America without undergoing considerable [economic and social] change herself" (p. 332); and "The self-image of the United States is extremely important in any analysis of inter-American relations, and, of course, of United States foreign policy generally. It has already been suggested that Latin America has provided something of a laboratory for the development of United States foreign policy" (p. 318). Such apparently modest statements might encourage those concerned with Southeast Asia to glance at the history of the inter-American system.

The only substantial negative criticism that the reviewer raises about *The Inter-American System* is that the book fails to convey the depth of Latin American historical and historiographical attitudes toward the regional system. But this calls for another book, not the more important one that Mr. Connell-Smith has chosen to write first.

The fact is, of course, that the inter-American system, as presented in this flawlessly printed book, has been, perhaps since its inception, a dead horse scarcely worth the beating. Mr. Connell-Smith has flayed and dissected the beast.

THOMAS F. MCGANN
*University of Texas*

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Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations *by Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966. —ix, 538 pp. $8.50.*

This is a scholarly and comprehensive account of a milestone in international relations in the atomic age. From the meeting of the Conference of Experts in July 1958 to the conclusion of the partial test-ban treaty in October 1963, the book covers every meeting between nuclear powers and every issue and incident that were familiar at the time to a concerned, if not always comprehending, public: test moratorium, danger from fall-out, techniques of test detection in the various media, and the politics and mechanisms of control. Though they add little to knowledge of how diplomats and politicians operate, the authors focus on the newest ingredient in the mix—the scientists and technologists. The dilemma of scientists when they act as policy-makers has been illumined before by analysts such as Robert Gilpin and by events like the Oppenheimer hearings, but there has never been so complete an exploration as in the present book of the complex impact of technology on political decisions, nor, indeed, so good an example of it to explore. Not only was technical knowledge about nuclear testing and its detection, especially by seismic methods, expanding from day to day, but some of the research that produced this shifting base of information was set in motion by the negotiations. There was little time for scientists to analyze experimental data, much less for civil servants to incorporate the findings into the customary slow formulation of policy in the departmental hierarchies. All this the authors competently and perceptively weave into the narrative. Their omission of extensive historical background is understandable, but brief reference to scientists' recent experiences that affected their behavior during the test-ban talks would have added useful perspective. The disposition of all concerned to rely on technical expertise owed much to the fact that discussions in the UNAEC's Scientific and Technical Committee in 1946 had produced the only substantial agreement in five years of negotiation on international control. Nor were those scientists who had directed wartime projects or campaigned successfully for a civilian atomic energy commission entirely inexperienced in drawing a line between technical and political advice. And development of policy for the space age might have been easier if their demands for technical advisers in government departments had been heeded ten years earlier.

Even an admirer of scholarly thoroughness may wish that the authors had treated their readers to an occasional change of pace. And while ample note is taken of the effect of individuals on the course of nego-

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tiation, especially with the change from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration, the participants do not come to life. We are told that the scientific community was at times deeply divided, but we never feel the tense drama of two old friends, Bethe and Teller, confronting each other on issues basic to science and its values. This careful and impartial study is, however, an important one for students of twentieth-century diplomacy and the newer field of science and public policy.

ALICE KIMBALL SMITH
*Cambridge, Mass.*

Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule *edited by Edward Allworth. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967. —xiv, 552 pp. $12.95.*

This volume, edited by a Turkic linguist and literary historian, contains a collection of essays by Mr. Allworth and five other authors. Its intention is to provide a historical survey of Central Asia during the first century of Russian rule. Several of the contributors command both Russian and the pertinent Turkic languages, and thus enjoy access to a greater variety of sources than most other historians of this area.

The overall tone of the book is "anti-imperialist," that is, anti-Russian. In an apparent effort to provide a corrective to the Soviet view which holds that the Russian conquest of Central Asia was historically progressive, most of the contributors seem to regard it as regressive, and, in the case of the editor, as positively disastrous. This bias is unfortunate, for even if one concedes that the Russian acquisition of Central Asia was an imperialist venture, and that both the tsarist and Communist authorities have treated this area as a colonial dependency, one need not deny the ruling power all positive achievement. Historians of Western imperialism in Africa and Asia no longer take so simple a view of the matter, and are willing to admit that "imperialism" has brought with it everywhere considerable economic and cultural benefits. There is no reason to assume that the Russian imperial record is fundamentally different. The anti-Russian animus of some contributors, notably pronounced in Mr. Allworth's chapters, on occasion leads to an extreme romanticization of Central Asian Muslim life and culture.

The most informative essays in the book are three geographical and economic chapters by Ian M. Matley. They reveal thorough acquaintance with the materials as well as impressive professional competence. Mr. Matley steers clear of emotional value judgments. What he has to

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say of the success and failures of the so-called "Virgin Lands" campaign, or of the problems facing Turkestani cotton culture, or the Kazakh mining industry is consistently judicious and persuasive.

The historical chapters are the work of a French scholar, Madame Carrère d'Encausse. She reveals good command of the sources and the factual material, but she shies away from analysis in favor of straight narrative history. On the intriguing subject of the motives behind the Russian conquest of Turkestan she offers little beyond vague generalities concerning pressures of merchants on the government. She also skims over the complicated and tragic story of the political purges in Turkestan in the nineteen-thirties. Madame Carrère d'Encausse provides some interesting information on the emergence of nationalist and reform *(djadidist)* movements among the Central Asian Turks. Her account, however, is not as informative as that found in Serge Zenkovsky's *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (1960), to which, incidentally, she makes no reference.

The editor, Mr. Allworth, opens the book with a long and confusing chapter called "Encounter." In it he makes a number of startling statements about Russian history, such as that Russia in the nineteenth century had a class of peasants called *smerdy* (a term that had gone out of use in the Middle Ages). He is more enlightening in his discussion of Central Asian literature, where he deals with many authors completely unknown to the Western reader. His account, however, would have carried more weight if he did not feel it necessary to hyperbolize the attainments of Turkestani writers. He depicts the mid-nineteenth-century Turkestani as something of a Renaissance figure, a person who "engrossed himself in magnificent literature . . . engaged in vigorous sports . . . conducted foreign trade . . . composed and performed original music, wrote elegant poetry" (p. 349). This description arched at least one skeptical pair of eyebrows, for nothing in the travel literature suggests that nineteenth-century Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand bore the slightest resemblance to Periclean Athens or Medicean Florence. V. V. Barthold, the greatest historian of Turkestan, was undoubtedly far closer to the mark when he described nineteenth-century Turkestan as one of the most backward areas in the Muslim world.

Mr. Allworth does not strengthen his case with his numerous translations of Turkestani poetry. These examples suggest that a reader who has no access to the original misses little. Typical are such lines of love poetry as:

> When you blossom like a tulip, intoxicatingly,
> How will the man who sees you not go mad? (p. 419)

or a war song in cheer-leader style:

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Kipchaks, Kirghiz, don't give in!
If this unbeliever takes Tashkent,
One day he will also draw near you . . . (p. 397).

The volume also contains chapters on the peoples and their languages by Karl Menges, on music by Johanna Sperber, and on art and architecture by Arthur Sprague.

RICHARD PIPES
*Harvard University*

Managerial Power and Soviet Politics *by Jeremy R. Azrael. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—ix, 258 pp. $4.95.*

There are two views on the political consequences of economic development; one foresees an evolution toward a liberal-democratic system, and the other anticipates an administrative-technocratic system. Both see the technical-managerial elite as the effective agents of political change. In this book, Jeremy Azrael submits these propositions to the test of Soviet historical experience. He concludes that neither one squares with Soviet experience. There, he argues, the political leaders have maintained their dominance over the engineer-managers, whose interests have been largely satisfied within a political system that is neither democratic nor technocratic. The conclusion is based on a close study of the role played by the successive "generations" of the technical-managerial elite in influencing the major political events of the times. The author has amassed an impressive body of factual and interpretive data on the positions taken by various groups of the managerial elite in each period. Where his interpretations of specific events differ from those of other authorities, he takes pains to point out the differences and to support his own case. It is a provocative contribution to the debate on the politics of industrialism.

A reader with a penchant for methodological clarity will wish that the author had devoted some attention to such questions as what one ought to understand by "power" and what kind of evidence is to count as a basis for deciding "how much power" a group exercises. In this study, the implied test of power seems to be whether the group has won out in a political struggle. In these terms the author's conclusion is supported by the evidence; political leadership has always dominated managerial interests. But if power is intended to mean the capacity to compel others to take account of one's objectives, then the managerial group appears to have exerted substantial power in various periods. The "bourgeois specialists" put up a strong fight indeed for a moderate first five-year plan, and managerial support was a major factor in Malenkov's short-lived tenure. If the test of the existence of power is the capacity to

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contend, rather than to succeed, then the evidence presented in the book lends itself to an alternative interpretation: at several crucial periods, the managerial elite manifested abundant power, although they never won out.

Will they try again? Azrael argues cogently that they will not; except for a small group of liberals and technocrats, the technical-managerial elite are satisfied with the present system in its broad outlines. His evidence is based not only on the published sources, but on a year's residence in the U.S.S.R. in 1958-59. This reviewer visited the U.S.S.R. in 1958, and can corroborate the sense of confidence and satisfaction felt by the technical elite at that time. But since then a lot has happened, particularly the sharp drop in the growth rate and the startling decline in the efficiency of capital investment. The attitude of Soviet participants in international conferences has shifted to a kind of sobriety bordering on pessimism. If economic efficiency does not improve, the liberals and technocrats may rise to another test of strength. They may not win, but it would be power nonetheless.

In an interesting concluding note, Azrael asserts the primacy of "politics" over "economics"; those who foresee the liberals or technocrats as the "gravediggers of Communism" are described as "economic determinists." It would be unfortunate if a battle line were drawn on the issue of the primacy of politics or economics. Something like a process of mutual interaction may be a more useful formulation. For if the economic travails of the U.S.S.R. today should lead to extensive change in economic organization, either liberal or technocratic, they will surely take such forms as reflect deeply held political commitments.

*Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* is not a definitive statement. It is a thoughtfully argued thesis, supported by abundant evidence—a significant contribution to a lively debate.

JOSEPH S. BERLINER
*Brandeis University*

Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 *by Carl A. Linden. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966—x, 270 pp. $7.50.*

Though Soviet politics continues to be conducted behind a heavy curtain of secrecy, during the past decade substantial progress has been made in understanding it. Progress has been accompanied by controversy among Western students of the subject, and no doubt has been furthered by it. Carl Linden, in his lucid, well-argued, and knowledgeable inter-

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pretation of the years in which Khrushchev was the chief figure in the Soviet leadership, here presents one side of that controversy.

According to Linden, after Khrushchev defeated his opponents, the so-called "anti-party group," in 1957 he was unable to consolidate the victory. As a result, in the next seven years the leadership was unstable and wracked by conflict. Khrushchev was prevented from realizing his radical program of reform, which aimed at an immediate and sharp rise in living standards, and to this end accepted a slow-down in the growth of the economy and defense forces. Foreign policy was subordinate to domestic policy. In order to facilitate the diversion of resources from military to consumer spending, Khrushchev sought to lessen international tension and, in particular, to improve relations with the United States. His program, which was coherent in conception, appeared inconsistent in execution because so many defeats were inflicted on it by his opponents and rivals in the leadership. The struggle against Khrushchev finally culminated in his ouster from the leadership.

In advancing this argument, Linden presents numerous facts and sheds considerable light on developments during Khrushchev's period of rule. At times, however, he disregards or minimizes developments which run counter to his thesis or put it in question. During the first two years after Stalin's death, for example, Khrushchev clearly was the protagonist in a successful struggle to maintain the primacy of heavy industry over light industry and to keep alive fears of "capitalist encirclement." Yet Linden refers to this as a time when Khrushchev "briefly assumed the pose of a defender of orthodox policy" (p. 23).

Actually, the admixture of orthodox militancy in his political character was more crucial than Linden recognizes. The man who precipitated two major crises over Berlin and who was responsible for placing ballistic missiles and jet bombers in Cuba was not wholly committed to maintaining "a relatively stable international environment, and . . . developing less dangerous forms of struggle with the adversary abroad"; he was also after major victories in the cold war.

On the matter of the extent and limits of Khrushchev's power in the period 1957 to 1964, Linden's thesis also meets difficulty. Linden says that Khrushchev won "supremacy" in 1957 and was "the recognized leader" during "the Khrushchev era"; this suggests that Khrushchev's powers were considerable. In his effort to show the *limits* of that power, Linden rightly stresses that he was unable to employ terror to achieve his ends (p. 36), yet he denies that Khrushchev was "a functional equivalent of a Stalin minus terror" (p. 2). He does not tell us, however, what that phrase signifies. One would like to know, for example, how much terror added to Stalin's power, in Linden's view, since as early as 1934, before Stalin first began to use terror against his own followers,

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he already "had piled up massive powers" (p. 14). Did Khrushchev also exercise "massive powers," or was he far weaker than the Stalin of 1934? Linden does not say.

In characterizing the instability of the leadership and the insecurity of Khrushchev's personal position, Linden several times emphasizes that he was not "above challenge," but he does not tell us what kind of challenge. That certain of Khrushchev's policy proposals were challenged, and consequently modified, has long been known and Linden has provided important new evidence of this. But was Khrushchev's position as "the leader" challenged openly at any time during the period of his rule? If not (and Linden does not show that it was), it seems hard to deny that the leadership in "the Khrushchev era" was characterized by stability, particularly when one considers that Khrushchev's policies produced a long series of failures after 1960, virtually unredeemed by any large success, without his suffering an evident loss of power. When Khrushchev was finally removed late in 1964, this was achieved by a highly secret conspiracy.

There is a further difficulty in Linden's view that the continuing conflicts over Khrushchev's power and reformist policies "eventually culminated in Khrushchev's downfall in October, 1964" (p. 38). If he was finally defeated by his conservative opposition, how are we to account for the fact that since 1964 there has not been a conservative reaction, but, if anything, a turn toward more basic reform?

This reviewer has outlined some of the points on which he disagrees with Linden; there is also much in his book to agree with, and much to learn from. The interested layman will find it highly informative, while anyone desirous of grappling with the still unresolved problems of Soviet politics will find important materials here for study.

MYRON RUSH
*Cornell University*

Patterns of Soviet Thought: The Origins and Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism *by Richard T. De George. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.—xii, 294 pp. $6.95.*

The title raises great hopes; the book frustrates them. To establish the patterns of Soviet thought De George has summarized the best-known works of Hegel, Marx, and Engels (half the book), and of Plekhanov and Lenin (a fourth), leaving sixty-odd pages for a little outline of official Soviet philosophy. With critical interpolations he has reproduced the historico-philosophical catechism to which Soviet students are subjected. From the first page the foreign reader searches in vain for the

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answer to an obvious question: Are the actual patterns of Soviet thought similar to these embalmed specimens? No doubt there are connections between the students' catechism and the patterns of thought they follow for the rest of their lives, but what are these connections? De George occasionally takes note of the problem, only to brush it aside with vague pronouncements on the importance of "theory." At one point (p. 234) he lists five basic doctrines, which "can be neither proven nor disproven by any given state of affairs, and so nothing can happen which either in theory or in practice would require their change." Discovering the significance of such doctrines is a tricky business, and De George soon drops it.

The subtitle also raises hopes that are frustrated. Summaries of texts arranged in chronological sequence do not constitute genuine history, do not reveal the origins and development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Without genuine history De George frequently falls victim to present-minded legends, especially those that have a strong appeal to anti-Communists as well as Communists. For example, he attributes to Lenin an understanding of *partiinost'* (partymindedness) that is indistinguishable from Stalin's, even though, many pages later, he notes that it was Stalin who put an end to the autonomy of philosophy in 1930. The book is full of such confusing loose ends.

De George has the beginning of a brisk incisive style, but he has not developed it. His writing is frequently slovenly. For example: "The Party is thus intimately linked with the development of Soviet thought and without understanding its theoretical basis the subserviance [*sic*] of Soviet philosophy and philosophers to the Party is almost incomprehensible. Yet it is a fact which must be understood if the patterns of Soviet thought are to be understood" (pp. 131-32). The reader can fly past "subserviance," but the fuzzy reference of pronouns and the meandering train of thought hopelessly bog him down. De George should study Fowler's *Modern English Usage*, especially such articles as "Yet —Illogical Pregnant Use." He should read George Orwell's "Politics and the English Language," conveniently available in the Anchor Book collection of Orwell's essays. If he objects that this is a mean review by a fussy pedagogue, I would agree, with apologies, but I would remind him that pedagogues, like pupils, grow mean when they are bored and frustrated. Perhaps this is the major pattern of Soviet thought that will come across to American students of this book.

D. JORAVSKY
*Northwestern University*

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The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis *by Z. A. Jordan. London, Melbourne, and Toronto, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xvi, 490 pp. $12.00.*

Professor Jordan, who teaches at the University of Reading, has been obliged to the Russian Institute of Columbia University for a period of relative leisure, between 1962 and 1964, required for the preparation of this weighty and important study. Let it be said at once that all concerned have cause for satisfaction at the outcome. There will inevitably be differences of opinion where a major work on so contentious a topic is concerned; but any reviewer worth his salt must begin by acknowledging his indebtedness to the author for having done what no one else has hitherto possessed either the patience or the competence to do: write the history of dialectical materialism as an evolving doctrine, from its beginnings in Engels to its final codification under Stalin and his successors.

To grasp what this implies it may be useful to contrast Professor Jordan's work with Gustav A. Wetter's massive study entitled *Dialectical Materialism*, originally published in German in 1952 and translated into English in 1958. This was promptly acknowledged as a standard work though in fact it suffered from two major flaws. In the first place, it centered almost entirely on Soviet literature, to the virtual neglect of Marx and Hegel; secondly, it applied the Aristotelian-Thomist canon in such a manner as to treat Soviet philosophizing as a heretical counterpart to the official teaching of the Catholic Church. This can be done up to a point, but only by ignoring Marx. Professor Jordan does not commit this error; hence the radical difference between the historical materialism of Marx and the dialectical materialism of Engels and his successors—from Plekhanov to Lenin and Bukharin—emerges from his account with a sharpness and clarity unsurpassed in previous literature on the subject.

What we have here, then, is not another dissection of what passes for philosophy in the U.S.S.R. (although Lenin's writings are discussed at some length, and even Stalin is accorded a chapter, which might with advantage have been omitted), but rather a critical history of Marxism, from its beginnings to its final petrifaction in the official ideology of the Soviet Communist party. The sources of Marx's theory of history are traced back to the naturalism of the French Enlightenment, and the resultant concepts are then critically confronted with the "materialist" ontology constructed by Engels on the basis of what the author describes as his revival of Hegelianism. The further evolution of the doctrine, down to and including the *Weltanschauung* officialized in the

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U.S.S.R., is treated as an unfolding of consequences already inherent in the original conception, although in relation to dialectical materialism properly so called—that is, the theory of nature, as distinct from the understanding of history—the famous partnership of Marx and Engels is seen to have from the start involved a certain degree of mutual incomprehension or incompatibility.

If the reviewer has a reservation, it concerns the treatment of Hegel, whose crucial role in enabling Marx to introduce an extra dimension into the naturalist positivism of his French forerunners appears to be understressed. Professor Jordan's discussion of this admittedly contentious theme is, however, free from the eccentricities put forward by K. R. Popper a generation ago, and although somewhat unfairly weighted in the direction of Comtean positivism (it was surely Comte and Darwin, rather than Hegel, who misled Engels into treating nature as a model for the understanding of history) his analysis is bound to carry weight even with readers who cannot follow him in every detail.

GEORGE LICHTHEIM
*London, England*

Biddle's Bank, The Crucial Years *by Jean Alexander Wilburn. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967. —149 pp. $6.50.*

Establishing the identity and motives of supporters of the second Bank of the United States is the purpose of Jean Alexander Wilburn's brief study. Where historians previously overlooked the existence of such supporters, Wilburn has found them among "citizens" in large portions of the South and West, state bankers, and Jacksonian politicians in Congress and in state legislatures.

An analysis of voting patterns in connection with the bill to recharter the bank in Congress reveals that Southerners and Westerners supported the institution, presumably, because of the need for banking resources for purposes of enterprise and economic development. A similar analysis of the vote on resolutions relating to the bank in the New York State legislature indicates that the bank won its greatest support in the western part of the state for the same reasons. A striking conclusion based on both congressional and legislative behavior in New York is that some Democrats who favored the big bank yielded to political expediency and compromised their convictions in order to facilitate the election of Jackson in 1832. The voting analysis constitutes the soundest portion of this study and establishes its greatest claim for serious consideration.

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Less persuasive is the methodology used to support the contention that state bankers viewed the Bank of the United States as an ally rather than a rival. Wilburn holds that memorials and petitions received by Congress may be regarded as reliable evidence of public opinion. Under some circumstances, this may be possible, but such evidence is at least open to question when it is understood that it was Nicholas Biddle who persistently urged state bankers to send their expressions of approval of the big bank to Congress. Hence, whatever efficiency state bankers declared they observed in the way the Bank of the United States performed its special functions as stated in their solicited expressions of approval, requires impressive substantiation from other sources before they are allowed to pass unquestioned. Unfortunately, Wilburn's study is lacking in this respect. Local records, printed primary sources, particularly state documents and newspapers, and manuscript collections of bankers other than Biddle's are neglected. Biddle, undiluted, befuddled the author. Despite the direct pressure that the banker brought to bear on his local brethren, Wilburn is never troubled by the question of whether their testimonials were acts of free will or evidence of Biddle's awesome power. That power was demonstrated more overtly in 1834 than in 1832; perhaps the panic of that year logically deserves the author's attention next.

NATHAN MILLER
*University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

The Oregon Question: Essays in Anglo-American Diplomacy and Politics *by Frederick Merk. Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967.—xiv, 427 pp. $7.95.*

Of the fourteen essays in Professor Merk's new volume—the third since his "retirement"—four, including a comprehensive and useful résumé, are new. The remainder, of which several have long been standard fare for students of the Oregon boundary controversy, appeared from 1924 to 1960 in various historical journals or, in one instance, "Albert Gallatin and the Oregon Problem," as a brief monograph in book form. Their republication between the covers of one book will be welcomed by professors and students and also by librarians, who must have deplored the wear and tear on their bound periodicals inflicted over many years by readers of these indispensable articles. Of the new essays, one, "The Oregon Question in 1818," discusses the failure of the early American negotiators to claim initially, for bargaining purposes, a line beyond their actual goal of the 49th parallel. Another, "Arbitration Only at the Cannon's Mouth!" recurs to the same idea. The

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refusal of the United States, at a later stage, to submit the controversy to arbitration, Merk explains, was due in part to the assumption that an arbitrator, who might be expected to "split the difference" between the rival claims, would of necessity draw the line to the south of the 49th parallel. Had the Americans originally claimed to 51° or further north, an arbitrator would have had better ground for fixing the boundary at 49°.

The third of the new essays, entitled "Sea Power and the Oregon Boundary Controversy," undertakes to refute two theses really or supposedly set forth by other writers: (1) that Lord Aberdeen's warning that the British navy was being put in shape to defend British rights in Oregon in 1846 frightened President Polk into abandoning a "serious" claim to the area north of the 49th parallel; (2) that alarm at French naval increases led the British government of Peel and Aberdeen to court the good will of the United States by abandoning the British claim to the Columbia River as the boundary. The first of these propositions is attributed to statements by this reviewer in an article of 1943 and in a subsequent textbook. A careful perusal of the passages cited will, I believe, convince an impartial reader that in the article and in both editions of the textbook it is made plain that Polk's assertion of the claim to 54° 40′ was a bluff, designed to bring the British to an acceptance of 49°, and that only the accelerated tempo of his retreat was attributed to the tidings of British naval preparations and a disposition to use them. Nor is it anywhere in these passages argued, as Merk implies, that a mere eight per cent increase in Britain's already overwhelming naval superiority was in itself a determining factor. That Lord Aberdeen's avowal of Britain's readiness to use her naval might led Polk to speed secret assurances of his really moderate position seems, contrary to Merk's contention, supported by persuasive evidence. This whole episode is now more adequately covered in Charles Sellers, *James K. Polk, Continentalist, 1843-1846* (Princeton, 1966). Merk's position on the other sea power issue seems on firmer ground, and I find no other flaw in this fine volume. The product of more than four decades of exhaustive research on the Oregon controversy is now available in convenient and attractive form.

JULIUS W. PRATT
*University of Notre Dame*

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The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852 *by Joel H. Silbey. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.—xii, 292 pp. $6.00.*

According to Joel H. Silbey, most American historians believe that "sectional differences, whether superficial and transient, or deeprooted and tenacious, were the predominant factors in shaping and influencing political decisions and actions in this country" in the eighteen-forties. In *The Shrine of Party* he attempts to demolish this supposed stereotype and to prove instead that party loyalty was more influential than sectional affiliation in determining how most congressmen voted on most issues. By analyzing roll-call votes in Congress he demonstrates that at least up to 1846 there was little sectional unity but a high degree of party loyalty on issues like the tariff, the rechartering of a national bank, and even territorial expansion. Even after the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso and the sharp debates on the slavery expansion question, congressmen still tended to vote along party rather than sectional lines on questions involving the public lands, internal improvements, and the tariff. Though sectionalism was increasing, "many political leaders still debated issues in partisan terms and still considered the national parties as the primary instrument of political action." Party loyalty persisted through the acrimonious arguments over the Compromise of 1850, and even at the outbreak of the Civil War there were many congressmen who, as sectional spokesmen complained, continued to worship at "the shrine of party."

Professor Silbey's thesis is unquestionably correct, though it is by no means so new or revolutionary as he suggests. Virtually all American historians have long recognized that the growth of sectionalism was slow and that the bonds of nationality were not completely loosened even when civil war broke out. This, after all, is the theme of the whole "Revisionist School" of Civil War historians. It is an idea basic to such books as Charles M. Wiltse's fine biography of John C. Calhoun, which demonstrates the South Carolinian's inability to rally his section behind him in the eighteen-forties, of Henry C. Hubbart's *The Older Middle West*, which shows the fundamental cleavages in politics within the states north of the Ohio River, and Roy F. Nichols' *Disruption of American Democracy*, which reveals how important the Democratic party was as a national force right down to the secession crisis. Even Frederick Jackson Turner, whom Professor Silbey attacks for his stress upon sectionalism, constantly warned that "it is misleading to write of the struggle of North against South, without recognition of the fact . . . that the nationalism of the two great parties continued to render collision between the slaveholding and the free states difficult."

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More novel than the substance of Professor Silbey's study is his method. Believing that historians can profit by using "ideas and techniques borrowed from other social sciences," he has relied heavily upon the Guttman scalogram, a device for measuring the relative intensity of attitudes and opinions, in order to characterize and categorize congressional voting patterns. If the objective of this interesting technique is to eliminate personal and subjective judgments from history, this application cannot be judged an unqualified success. For one thing, the actual roll calls used to construct Professor Silbey's fifty-four scalograms are reproduced in only one instance (the rest being part of his unpublished dissertation at the University of Iowa). In an elaborate appendix each congressman between 1841 and 1852 is given a scale rating on all issues, but since the determinants of those ratings are not reproduced here, they must be accepted or rejected on faith. In the numerous tables derived from these scalograms Professor Silbey rather mechanically groups the scaled scores, making, for instance, senators in the Thirtieth Congress with scores of 0-3 on slavery-extension issues proslavery, those with scores of 4-8 moderate, and those with scores of 9-13 antislavery. These distinctions may well be legitimate, but no justification is offered for them. In short, despite the elaborate statistical paraphernalia, the reader still has to rely upon Professor Silbey's judgment.

Ironically, the best test of that judgment is the fact that, despite its author's protestations, *The Shrine of Party* so largely confirms generally accepted beliefs about the eighteen-forties. This tribute to its soundness, however, vitiates Professor Silbey's hope that this book will make "a fresh start towards comprehending the politics of the pre-Civil War era."

DAVID DONALD
*The Johns Hopkins University*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I: 1856-1880 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xxviii, 715 pp. $15.00.*

To begin at the outside, it should be said at the start that this is a handsome, well-made book, in keeping with the high standards of design and manufacture so long maintained by the Princeton University Press. The paper is of fine quality, the type face large and clean, the organization of the page in satisfying proportion. The whole is a substantial, attractive, manageable book. It is well that such is the case, for this is the first of "some forty volumes" that will contain all the important letters, writings, speeches, and public papers of Woodrow Wilson.

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The editors engaged in this project, under the direction of the eminent Wilsonian scholar Arthur S. Link, have been at work almost ten years collecting, selecting, organizing, and editing the massive verbal record. When, some twenty years from now, the great enterprise is over, probably all that one can know from written evidence about Woodrow Wilson—and certainly all anyone needs to know about him from such evidence—will be readily available to those interested in his life and times.

Full description of the editorial procedures and apparatus used in bringing this seven hundred-page book to birth is unnecessary here. The sagacious policies developed in the past twenty years to govern the publication of the letter collections of other men important in our public life have been adhered to, with due regard for sensible modification to fit the needs of this venture. Suffice it to say that this first volume may be taken as a model performance within the great editorial context first established by Julian Boyd in his work with the papers of Thomas Jefferson.

To this general expression of respect for a distinguished editorial achievement one qualifying exception may be entered. The editors, in view of the huge mass of available material, have dismissed the possibility of an all-inclusive edition. They will select and seek to publish only those words of, to, or about Wilson that they deem essential to an understanding of his thought and activity. This is certainly most wise and commendable. But if the evidence in this first volume is an indication of the selective practices to be used in later volumes it may be useful now to encourage the editors to adhere more strictly to their own stated intentions. It is doubtful, for instance, that the reproduction in forty pages of extracts taken verbatim by Wilson from the *American Cyclopedia* or the works of Macaulay or Carlyle for his commonplace book serves to enlarge our essential understanding of Wilson's thought or activity. The same may be said for the inclusion of minutes of undergraduate club meetings, news items in undergarduate publications, or some of the more jejune contributions to the family correspondence. The criteria for sensible selection are hard to establish and harder still to act on, but confronted by a collection of more than half a million pieces even the recording angels must be assumed to be on the side of those who hold that too little is almost more than enough.

From the evidence that is offered in this first volume, what in the way of Woodrow Wilson does begin to emerge? Nothing really unexpected in these years from his birth in 1856 to his departure from the University of Virginia in 1880. He seems an earnest youth, a conscientious youth in the Presbyterian pattern of the times, but, withal, quite capable of entering naturally into the loyalties and affections of family

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and undergraduate life. He shows at his best—or at his most interesting—in his comments on the books he was continuously reading. In what he found to say about Shakespeare and Macaulay, for example, there is obvious indication of his later discriminating concern for matters historical and literary. It is interesting also to discover, several times, the young man's doubts that this republic "too founded upon the notion of abstract liberty" had the power to stay the course.

On the personal side of things, the publishers and editors apparently feel that the fuller exposure of the nature of his relationship with his father is the striking contribution of this volume. To some other readers it may seem that the more illuminating evidence appears in his correspondence with his mother. No doubt the next few volumes will supply much fuller information from which to judge what manner of man Wilson was growing up to be and how he was getting there. This volume starts us out on what, given the character and influence of the twenty-eighth president, must become a fascinating trail, and it gives complete assurance that those who guide us along the trail will perform their task with scrupulous care and skill.

ELTING MORISON
*Yale University*

Joseph Pulitzer and the New York WORLD *by George Juergens. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xvi, 392 pp. $10.00.*

The decision to publish a good doctoral dissertation for the pleasure or instruction of the general reading public can sometimes produce a somewhat less than satisfactory result. A case in point, in the estimation of this reviewer, is this study by Dr. George Juergens, assistant professor of history at Amherst College, which describes how Joseph Pulitzer transformed a failing New York *World* into "one of the most prosperous and influential dailies of its time," and the novel methods and techniques which he introduced.

The author concentrates on the years 1883-85, and frankly concedes that his work is neither a biography of Pulitzer nor a history of the *World*. And therein lies its major weakness. It is an effective investigation of Pulitzer's "genius"—mainly culled from the New York *World* itself—during these seminal years, without Pulitzer himself really being present. The publisher is as external and detached as a Platonic Idea. He never comes alive, but serves here only as a disembodied fountainhead of advice and decision for the journal's staff. In-

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deed, if he emerges at all he is less than admirable on more than one count.

While he is faithful to his frame of reference, Dr. Juergens' concentration on these two basic years has produced essentially a spot analysis and day-by-day cataloguing instead of an account of dynamic development. There is no sense of the evolution of a great newspaper, which is always an exciting prospect, especially in an era of personal journalism. To be sure, he has on several occasions ventured into future years to nail down a point or make a comparison, but the general reader as well as the cognoscenti might have gained much more from a history of the *World* for, let us say, a decade or fifteen years. In the latter case, 1898 would have made a most significant terminal year.

The author's approach has at least produced an excellent explanatory preface that is meatier in historical significance than many of his chapters, and in a cascade of documentation in which many of the adjunct footnotes compete in interest with the text. Let it be understood, however, that the book has many virtues. It is informative, well organized, well documented, and analytical. We learn that Pulitzer, a young Western journalistic Lochinvar (he had just turned thirty-six when he came to New York in 1883), created the first modern newspaper and that journalism was never to be the same in this country.

In his drive to boost the paper's daily circulation (an apparent obsession) from 15,000 in 1883 to 1,500,000 in 1898, Pulitzer concentrated on "sex, crime, tragedy," invaded privacy and retailed gossip and scandal in the guise of human interest stories, stressed personalities, developed a "slangy, colloquial, personal" prose style that on the other hand was "clumsy," and basically utilized a more sophisticated approach to sensationalism. Pulitzer catered to tastes more than we suspected, and used sly devices, artful headlines, and innuendo. He was frequently inconsistent and trapped by paradoxes. He could stoop to scurrility and was not above bigotry. His editorial personalizing of himself and the *World*, his lecturing and posturing, were juvenile and in bad taste.

A chapter is devoted to each innovation or policy in explaining the *World*'s rapid rise: "Sensationalism" (II); "Illustration" (III); "Sports" (IV); "A Newspaper for Women" (V); "A Gospel of Wealth" (VI); "The Immigrant" (VIII); "Discovering the Poor" (IX). Exceptionally good summaries are found in Chapter I, "Pulitzer Comes to New York," and Chapter X, "Crusading for Labor," which may have been the only genuine and consistent crusade among the several that he undertook, since the masses were his special concern. His encouragement of promising young men to enter journalism was also significant.

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Can Dr. Juergens be serious, however, in maintaining—in defense of Pulitzer's popular journalism—that, to the contrary, "an editor of a serious paper has the advantage, after all, of knowing what his subject matter will be, and when inspiration fails, of knowing that exhaustive coverage of the news is generally an adequate substitute for intelligent coverage" (p. 43). He must tell this to the editors of the New York *Times*, the Washington *Post*, the Manchester *Guardian*, and like newspapers! Moreover, if the author and the *World* join in belittling the New York *Times*' emphasis of informative and accurate reporting (see pp. 8, 67-69) at that time, and the author goes on to laud "the very substance of the *World*'s genius [in] that its editorials told reform-minded Americans of the nineteenth century pretty much what they already thought" (p. 286), then this juxtaposition reveals why the *World* entertained and highlighted the obvious while the *Times* enlightened, instructed, and supplied the data for thoughtful and substantive reasoning. Juergens has inadvertently explained why the historical profession has run to the *Times* for information on the contemporary scene far more than to the *World*. When it did crusade, the *World* seemed to lash out mainly with a controlled stroke at carefully measured tether-length. It is also hardly likely that Juergens is correct that Pulitzer drew some kind of moral line between his brand of sensationalism and Hearst's, proscribing the latter's use for the *World* (p. 45, n.2). Pulitzer was simply bested by his master at it.

There is no doubt that this volume will be compulsory reading in schools of journalism, and will find a merited place on the bibliographies of most history courses of the period. There is also little doubt that we are still in need of a full-dress history of the New York *World* as well as a biography of Joseph Pulitzer.

MARK D. HIRSCH
*Bronx Community College*

The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy *by Earl Latham. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—viii, 446 pp. $7.95.*

This volume is an outstanding addition to a valuable series of studies on communism and American life sponsored by the Fund for the Republic. The author, chairman of the political science department at Amherst College, employed an imposing array of written public records, most notably the hearings of congressional investigating committees, and an admirable selection of secondary sources, in an attempt to clarify the highly controversial and emotion-packed charges of Communist infiltration of the civilian agencies of the federal govern-

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ment from the early nineteen-thirties to the senatorial condemnation of Joseph McCarthy. Because of the author's high standards of scholarship and painstaking ojectivity, this study is a major contribution to American history. What might have been merely another cold war polemic is, instead, an original and penetrating analysis of some of the most complex matters encountered by the student of contemporary politics.

Latham chose to separate the "Communist problem," the facts about the Communist presence in the federal service, from the "Communist issue," how the public fear of subversive infiltration was utilized by partisans. On the basis of substantial evidence, weighed cautiously and thoughtfully, he concludes that the Communist problem was real, that there were a fair number of party members and supporters within the federal government during the nineteen-forties. Though these employes were without great influence and lacked a unified strategy, some of them were organized into groups, and some were engaged in espionage.

In the process of arriving at this conclusion, the author scrutinizes the Amerasia case (in retrospect an awesome monument to the careless security procedures of the time), charges against the Institute of Pacific Relations (which he finds exaggerated), and the Hiss case. Latham was able, on the grounds of coherence, consistency, and corroborative evidence, to judge as correct most of the testimony supplied congressional committees by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers—an unorthodoxy bound to draw wrath from certain liberal-radical quarters.

The study's examination of McCarthyism is the best yet to appear. It challenges the tiresome "status revolution" explanations, and argues that the roots of this curious phenomenon were essentially political. McCarthy was the agent of a powerful and traditional faction within the Republican party, clinging to a potpourri of nineteenth-century virtues Latham terms "fundamental conservatism." Deeply frustrated by the unforeseen victory of Truman in 1948, and boiling with rage against the demands of welfare-state policies and the Eastern wing of the party which accepted their perpetuation, this phalanx, assisted by conservative Democrats, took control of the Congress in 1950, "found a storm leader in McCarthy," and waged a vicious and ruthless campaign for victory in 1952. That very victory, Latham claims, deflated McCarthy, removing the utility of his attacks.

Of course, this does not explain the success and popularity of McCarthy's venture. That riddle remains to be answered convincingly. Moreover, the assertion that McCarthy*ism* quickly disppeared in late 1954 is most doubtful.

Not all of Latham's conclusions are inevitable (as he is quick to

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admit), and a few factual errors have crept into the text. But in general this book is of the highest quality and should receive a wide audience.

THOMAS C. REEVES
*University of Colorado*

Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States *by Joseph A. Schlesinger. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966.—xv, 226 pp. $6.00.*

For decades scholars have studied career patterns of elected officials, and, in a good many instances, after reading the results one admits the findings are interesting but is tempted to ask, "So what?" Too often there is little effort to show the significance of the evidence. But suppose someone were to collect biographical information on all holders of the office of governor and United States senator over a fifty-year period and then subject these data to intensive and imaginative analysis. Would that offer us any insights? Professor Schlesinger has done exactly that and the answer is definitely affirmative. Not only are the data collected in incredible volume, but almost every question that could be asked has been, and along the way some significant theory about American politics is derived. It is a book not easy to read, but well worth rereading.

What are some of those insights? In the first place, he demonstrates that the degree of party competition in states is not as decisive a determining factor for career patterns as one might assume. The character of party organization and the constitutional structure and *history* of a state seem to be more decisive. Regional patterns are shown for the typical initial elective office and for the last office held before attaining senatorial or gubernatorial position. One can at least speculate about the place of the legislature in state politics by noting whether that institution is commonly among the stepping-stones to higher office in a state (it is a common stepping-stone in the South and in New England). He demonstrates variations in career patterns that apparently follow from party organizational differences, observing that the stronger the central party's control the less likely a regular order of succession will be observed. In short, Schlesinger provides an interesting corroboration of observations made by V. O. Key and others about the impact of the party primary. The primary has had the effect of taking control over nominations out of the hands of party leaders and placing it in the hands of office-holders who use incumbency as a means to self-promotion.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the one which develops theoretical points. The usual theory of two-party competition says that both parties will seek median ground in order to compete effectively.

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Parties presumably do this because voter attitudes are distributed in a bell-shaped curve with most voters at the center. Yet, Schlesinger points out, this is not necessarily the actual distribution of voters. Democratic politicians since 1932 and Republicans before that had the advantage of greater popular support. Schlesinger observes that "[w]hen a party enters an electoral contest with a majority of the voters committed to its general position, its strategic problem is quite different from that of its opponent." He goes on to illustrate this with an analysis of Indiana and Michigan parties, pointing out that in the former most counties are competitive, whereas in Michigan most counties are not, although in both instances statewide elections are close. Political office-seeking in these two situations is not identical, and the typical theory of two-party systems has not taken this variation into account. Observations such as that make Schlesinger's book well worth pondering.

DUANE LOCKARD
*Princeton University*

Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values *by Herbert J. Muller. New York, Harper & Row, 1967.—xiii, 338 pp. $6.95.*

When an author is at some pains to state his purpose in putting pen to paper, he is entitled to have his accomplishment measured mainly in terms of that purpose. Professor Muller's subtitle is indicative of his special objective in this work. He spells it out with explicitness in his introduction, and throughout the text he repeatedly reminds the reader of the conscious limitations he has set upon his effort. It is not that of the definitive biographer, concerned with collecting and recording all the details of a full and active life. Neither is it that of the political scientist who seeks to fix the precise significance of that life in the history of a nation. It is, rather, the attempt of an articulate and thoughtful contemporary to sort out and set down, before the memories fade, the reasons why Governor Stevenson seemed to him to renew the hopes and lift the spirits of so many who knew him only as a public figure.

So viewed, Professor Muller has succeeded admirably; and this judgment carries not the faintest implication that his sights were set too low or that his achievement is only a minor one. Whatever more ambitious books about Adlai Stevenson may be written in the future, there will always be a real place for this one. It speaks for—and to—all those who recall, with regret for what is gone, the excitement and almost incredulous sense of recognition and reassurance which Governor Stevenson's entry upon the political scene evoked in millions of his

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fellow citizens. It will greatly help them, amid all the difficulties of communicating with the rising generations, in trying to explain to their grandchildren why this man gave an extra dimension to the public affairs of their own time. It is these who are greatly in Professor Muller's debt, and who will be guiltily relieved that he has done in this timely manner what each of them has felt some inner promptings to do for himself.

There would, of course, be differences in selection and emphasis. Some of the fiercer adherents might wonder whether there is much point in speculating about whether the Governor was a "great" man or whether he would have made a "great" president. Judgments in this regard are bootless at best, and tend to get entangled too much in the allegations of his incapacity for decision—a myth assiduously cultivated by his political opponents with a large assist from the working press, of which latter group Tom Wicker has shrewdly remarked that "reporters who insist the most on Stevenson's indecisiveness usually adduce the evidence that his speech-writing habits inconvenienced them." In any event, and as Professor Muller justly observes, the handling of the Bay of Pigs by the hardheaded perennial critics of Stevenson's asserted vacillation has served to put this matter back in perspective, as has also a backward look at the comparative performances during the McCarthy era of those who, like Stevenson, had to face the voters.

Among those whose good luck it was to be in Adlai Stevenson's immediate vicinity during his political and personal triumphs and adversities, there will be general rejoicing that Professor Muller has rejected the "tragic figure" approach. The Governor took the good days in stride without inhaling, and he absorbed the bad without any injured feeling that he was peculiarly in Fate's malign grip. When it was all over, his preoccupation would have been not with the lost elections, but with the blows it was given him to strike in good causes, the laughs had, the friends made. It would never have occurred to him that this life he had lived, although bearing its full measure of man's woe, had been other than joyously vital and rewarding.

CARL MCGOWAN
*U.S. Court of Appeals*

Negroes and the New Southern Politics *by Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. —xvi, 551 pp. $12.50.*

This volume is the long-awaited report of the extensive research by the authors on the political participation of Negro Southerners. Based

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at the University of North Carolina and financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, the authors employ a wide range of data: opinion surveys of Negro and white Southerners conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center; a special investigation of Negro college students; and such aggregate measures as voting, census, and lynching data on every Southern county with Negroes. Concrete detail is sought by special attention to four contrasting Southern communities.

The principal focus is on isolating the correlates of a "political participation scale." This measure records whether the respondent "talked politics," voted, campaigned, held office, or belonged to a political group. Since the study revolves around this critical dependent variable, it is unfortunate that it does not "scale" for Negro respondents. Disappointing, too, are the generally unimaginative analysis throughout the volume (save for interesting residual analyses in chapter six); the heavy-handed writing which is appropriate for neither professional nor lay readers; and the omission of relevant references from other disciplines (including work of the authors' Chapel Hill colleague, H. M. Blalock).

Despite these serious weaknesses, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* represents a major effort and uncovers a variety of findings. Not unexpectedly, Negro political partcipation is greatest among males, the middle-aged, and the middle class. The residual analysis reveals moderate relationships between Negro voter-registration rates by county with formal voter requirements, state factional systems, and the amount and type of racial organization; but only small relationships with partisan competition and racial violence. From these and similar results, Matthews and Prothro foresee increased political conflict as Negro Southerners "reenter the political system in massive numbers." They predict this conflict will take place within the Democratic party rather than through the creation of a viable two-party system. Once racial issues recede into class issues, a Southern two-party system resembling the national scene may finally evolve.

The most engaging section is a tangential report on a special Southwide survey of 264 Negro college students during 1962. Only one-fourth of the sample had actively participated in racial protest; and they were more often from urban, upper-status backgrounds, in urban, private colleges of quality, and the *least* anti-white and the most optimistic about future racial change. Though again apparently unaware of earlier and comparable social psychological work, the writers thus provide a convincing demonstration of the "relative deprivation" explanation of Negro unrest of the early sixties.

The most sophisticated and exciting feature of this work is the research design and its inclusion of both community and individual mea-

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sures. The data generated by this design are invaluable, but the routine analyses and pompous write-up do not do them justice. Contrary to the sweeping jacket claims of the publisher, this book is neither comparable to Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* nor is it "a major contribution to the literature of the social sciences." However, it is hoped that more informed and elegant analyses and reports on these data, by the authors and others, will be forthcoming.

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
*Harvard University*

The Negro in Federal Employment: The Quest for Equal Opportunity *by Samuel Krislov. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1967—viii, 157 pp. $5.00.*

The Negro Worker *by Ray Marshall. New York, Random House, 1967.—viii. 180 pp. $2.45.*

Negro employment in the federal government provides an indicator of our progress toward equality. It does not indicate the advancement of Negro skills so much as it reflects white attitudes. Since the revolution in white attitudes will have to come from the top, federal employment provides a good test of the commitments at the top. Reading the indicator shows some progress here (the Veterans Administration); no progress there (the Department of Agriculture). Krislov's treatment of the two million civilian employes is adequate, but he completely ignores the three and a half million military employes and the four million employes working on government contracts. An investigation is needed in both of these areas before we can evaluate commitments to equality. Surface reports seem to indicate substantial improvement in the military and very little improvement in indirect government employment. The reasons for this difference and the implications that follow from it need to be considered carefully.

In his general discussion of the role of merit and representation in bureaucracies, Krislov carefully avoids taking positions except when discussing the compensatory principle. "The principle of compensation for a minority is, however, a voracious one that knows no limit and demands abject psychological acceptance among the majority" (p. 78). He argues that compensation cannot be made for past wrongs since there is no logical place to stop compensating. This does not make sense. Just as a logical stopping place exists at equal opportunity (the position advocated by Krislov), another logical stopping point exists when equality has been achieved. Compensation can then be abandoned.

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*The Negro Worker* provides a good general statistical picture of the present economic position of the Negro and of recent efforts to help or hinder him, but it is primarily an account of relations between the Negro and the labor union movement. As such it partially succeeds in bringing *The Black Worker* by Spero and Harris up to date, but it is not detailed enough to do the job adequately.

Marshall quite rightly concludes that the present set of public and private policies and commitments will not accomplish very much very fast. Limited progress can be made by enlarging the present set of policies, but no breakthroughs will be achieved. What set of policies would be needed to achieve a massive improvement in the Negro employment picture? A labor economist with Ray Marshall's experience might have provided some insights into this intriguing question, but he did not do so.

LESTER C. THUROW
*Harvard University*

Married Women in the Labor Force: An Economic Analysis *by Glen G. Cain. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—xiii, 159 pp. $6.50.*

The dramatic increase in female participation in the labor force that started with World War II and continued even in peacetime has led to a number of studies of which this is the latest.

Three kinds of cross-section data are used: semi-aggregated data, the standard metropolitan area being the unit of analysis, are used from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 Censuses, with increasing numbers of areas through time; the 1/1000 Census sample of 1960 and a Survey Research Center sample used in the Growth of the American Family study are used in their full micro-detail, utilizing dummy-variable regression, though the Survey Research Center data are also used in semi-aggregated analysis.

A main focus of the analysis is an attempt to reconcile the increasing proportion of wives working over time as husbands' incomes go up with the cross-section finding that (other things equal) the higher the husband's income the less likely the wife is to work. Reconciliation is possible providing positive effect of a higher potential wage for the wife more than offsets the negative effect of her husband's higher earnings. Such a static model that assumes no changes in tastes or in aspiration levels is unfortunately typical of much economic analysis, but the empirical investigation is interesting and important in any case.

As befits a dissertation in economics, the book begins with formal

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models, difficult to interpret since they are to be applied both to semi-aggregated data and to micro-data, and including variables which are not operational at all and will be dropped before the data are approached. For the most part the author is refreshingly careful and candid in dealing with the problems of what the measured variables represent. The one exception is in dealing with metropolitan areas data, where the variables are all averages or proportions summed over the area. These "ecological correlations" are difficult at best to interpret.

One justification for area average data is that one can use the average earnings of women as an estimate of the potential earnings of wives not now working. On the other hand, in the later micro-data the author wisely uses an estimate of potential earning capacity based on previous occupation for those not working, or if that is not available, on educational attainment.

Strangely enough, when the author moves from area aggregate data to individual family data, it does not occur to him that such environmental factors as the extent of unemployment in the area can also be used with micro-data. He finds that unemployment of the husband does indeed stimulate the wife to work (p. 107), offsetting any differentials in area unemployment with which the husband's unemployment is correlated. But in the summary of findings, only the absence of an effect of area unemployment on wives working is recalled, as a rejection of the "added worker hypothesis" (that in times of financial strain, added family members enter the labor force). It would have been possible to disentangle these two effects by putting into the same analysis the level of area unemployment and whether the individual husband was unemployed.

The presentation of the multivariate analyses leaves something to be desired. The important differences between the gross and the net (adjusted by regression) effects of wife's potential wage are not presented. And since the convenient way to *calculate* dummy variable regressions is to omit one subclass of each characteristic (constraining its regression coefficient to zero), the reader is presented only with coefficients for the other subclasses, each of which represents in part a deviation from the (unknown) level of the omitted class. A simple transformation of the data would have made the results easier to read. For instance, the finding that "only when children aged 7 to 11 were present did Negro wives work more readily than white wives" (p. 120) is impossible to derive from the table of regression results (p. 108) without extensive calculations by the reader. (It turns out even to be wrong, the author having been misled by his own use of incomplete *and* overlapping categories.) The author concludes that the original hypothesis that the

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positive effects of rising wage rates for women had more than offset the negative effects of higher husbands' incomes was only partially supported, and that a more complete explanation would require the introduction of other factors, including changes in attitudes (or tastes).

In sum this book is a technical study that throws additional light on why more and more wives are working, but it is neither easy reading nor is it improved by the attempt to "test" a particular hypothesis.

JAMES N. MORGAN
*Survey Research Center,*
*University of Michigan*

Workers, Employers and Governments: A Comparative Study of Delegations and Groups at the International Labour Conference, 1919-1964 *by Torsten Landelius. Stockholm, P. A. Norstedt, 1965.*

The thesis of this sprawling volume is that despite the formal constitutional equality of nations participating in international conferences, "the equality is illusory, partly because of the vast discrepancies, of a quantitative as well as of a qualitative nature, between the resources contributed to the work of the conference by the member states." To demonstrate what strikes one as an obvious fact hardly in need of proof, Mr. Landelius has put an enormous amount of effort into studies of meetings of various International Labour Organization bodies. The results are not impressive.

The trouble is that the book is virtually devoid of analysis and generalization. What we have instead is a series of chronological accounts of issues faced by the ILO and the decisions that were taken. Most of the chapters end without any summary. The statistical tables are rudimentary, again without analysis. The study is more a collection of notes than a reasoned monograph. Cut down to half its present size, and with some guideposts to steer one through the maze of facts, it might have been interesting. As it stands, it is unreadable.

This is too bad, not only because of the effort and devotion that went into the book, but also because the ILO, which will soon celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, provides a rich body of experience for those concerned with international organization. Up to now, even the more sophisticated studies of the ILO have concentrated on the formal aspects of its work, and have neglected its real impact, which after all is the crucial factor in assessing effectiveness. It is obviously much easier to study the procedures by which international labor conventions are adopted and ratified than to measure the practical results of adoption.

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But there is a real question whether much of this activity has had any relationship to the basic purposes of ILO: to raise living standards and to promote economic development. The ILO itself has become aware of the problem, and has made great strides toward programs which are more meaningful in the contemporary world. Independent scholars, by undertaking careful work in countries in which the ILO has been active, will not only be of considerable help to the Organization, but in the process will learn much more about the potentialities of international organization than they will by poking about in the musty archives of resolutions long since forgotten.

WALTER GALENSON
*Cornell University*

The Financial Revolution in England. A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 *by P. G. M. Dickson. London, Melbourne, and Toronto, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xix, 579 pp. $16.00.*

The title of Mr. Dickson's study of government finance has an unabashed, old-fashioned ring. It harks back to the view of economic and social evolution as a series of revolutions—and of English economic history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a sequential and linked process of commercial, financial, agricultural, culminating in industrial, revolution. In fact, however, he is far less concerned with the general question of discontinuity in English history than with the characteristics and implications of developments in a particular sector of the economy at a critical period in its evolution. And to this extent, in a substantial and fearsomely well-documented and well-presented argument, he vindicates the main features of his approach. His most important argument sees the financial revolution as the process by which a highly developed and smoothly functioning capital market was created under the influence of government needs and actions—and with the result that administrative and social harmony was attained, economic growth ensured, and resources effectively mobilized through government borrowing, thus enabling England "to spend on war out of all proportion to its tax revenue, and thus to throw into the struggle with France and its allies the decisive margin of ships and men." Military success, in its turn, led to the expansion of economic empire and, therefore, the growth of overseas markets. "The essentially practical and successful character of English Government," which Mr. Dickson briefly contrasts with the French, is thus seen as directly and indirectly re-

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sponsible for the most far-reaching political and economic, international and national, changes.

Much of the book is in fact given over not to proving these various statements, but to dealing with the details of government finance. To an overwhelming extent, therefore, the book is for specialists in economic, and to some extent social, history who will be concerned with the chronology of the government's impecuniousness; the devices (increasingly sophisticated and institutionalized) which it used to secure money; the structure of credit and creditors which supplied its needs; and the operations of a complex and sensitive market for capital.

In these various respects, Mr. Dickson has made a signal contribution to our knowledge; he has pulled together various strands of history already reasonably well known and interwoven them with the original results of his own vast research. The book is bound to be a definitive treatment of the emerging institutional structure of public credit. Yet, in spite of his attempts to give it other emphases as well, it lacks the sort of analytical penetration which would have made more sense of the concept of a "revolution" in finance. Possibly this is because very little attention is paid to the private part of the capital market; it is difficult either to grasp the relative significance of the government within the whole sweep of financial history, or to get a systematic picture of the exact contribution which bigger loans, better securities, and more eager creditors made to the working of the economic system. Equally, the heavy concentration on institutional evolution makes it hard to agree (because the right comparisons cannot be drawn) with Mr. Dickson about the singular and supreme importance of the improvement of public credit. Until one has tackled the question of how resources were available for mobilization in the first place, or what alternative devices could have been used for that mobilization, it is too precipitate to place such an emphasis on the astuteness of Treasury officials or a particular pattern of capital flows.

BARRY SUPPLE
*University of Sussex*

The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939 *by F. S. Northedge. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—xi, 657 pp. $17.50.*

This is the first comprehensive study of British foreign policy between the wars to make extensive use of the new sources that are now available. Not only the *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39*, the most substantial single source, but the Cabinet Minutes and the Foreign

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Office files, now open to October 1922, have been drawn upon, together with relevant foreign materials. Mr. Northedge has studied this mass of material carefully and intelligently. The result is a detailed, clear, authoritative examination of British policy in a period when old landmarks had disappeared and when successive British governments, with no more than modest success, tried to make their way along paths that lacked the familiar guideposts.

It is no serious criticism that Mr. Northedge has written rather old-fashioned diplomatic history. He sticks solidly to the documents, with little attention to internal political changes and pressures or to the ebb and flow of economic tides. There are only meager characterizations of the leaders of policy, save for Baldwin and Chamberlain, and few references to public opinion. Until the final chapter, Mr. Northedge attempts little explicit analysis of the new factors that made the problems of English statesmen different. Still, within the limits of his method, he writes with sound command of his material and discriminating judgment.

No one would argue that the record of British diplomacy between the wars was distinguished; nor were its practitioners, despite their obvious shortcomings, wholly to blame. In 1916 Britain was the leader of the coalition against Germany. During the next twenty-three years she received repeated humiliations from the dictators and she emerged from the Second World War as a power of the second rank. British diplomatists, Mr. Northedge urges, were acting on assumptions and using instruments appropriate to an earlier day, which, they refused to recognize, had passed away for good. To be sure, British leaders were on the side of humanity. But their notion that modern war was so hideous that no civilized leader would deliberately promote one did more credit to their humane impulses than to their understanding of the interwar world.

In summary, three underlying premises influenced (and confused) British policy. First, there was the basic conservatism of a wealthy, satiated power with larger interests than it could easily defend. This made it uneasy toward revolutionary changes overseas. Secondly, the British tended to assume the primacy of economic considerations in matters of foreign policy. It was inconceivable to them that Lenin or Hitler should stick to their fanatical ideologies when presented with opportunities for profitable trade. Finally, British policy was affected and handicapped by social currents at home, specifically by the rise of the Labor party. The Left, however justified its complaints, sometimes applied pressure at the wrong place and time. For example, Mussolini's Ethiopian venture, which aroused the Left to violent (and legitimate) protest, was not as dangerous to the European balance as was Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland. But this was a blow against the Versailles Treaty and the Left took it in its stride.

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Meanwhile, British resources had gravely deteriorated. British naval power, the British economy, and the cohesion of the Commonwealth —none was what it had been. Yet, although the British failure was clearly a failure of resources, it was, Mr. Northedge suggests, even more a failure of ideas, or, to repeat, a failure to adjust ideas born in one age to the requirements of another.

†DAVID OWEN
*Harvard University*

The Growth of the British Party System *by Ivor Bulmer-Thomas. New York, Humanities Press, 1966; Vol. I: vii, 344 pp.; Vol. II: 328 pp. $16.50.*

The British party system has a "pre-history" and a "history," according to the author, who has been an M.P. in both major parties and an Independent, and has written a previous book on *The Party System of Great Britain.* The pre-history of the party system carries to 1830, when a "great movement of opinion" brought reform of the electoral system and with reform, the invention of extra-parliamentary party organization. "Pre-history" does not mean life before birth, because the party system "has a continuous history since the reign of Charles II" (Vol. I, p. 3). The reason for this beginning (rather than another) is to be found in the definition of a political party as a body associated to promote principles "by securing membership of the legislature and control of the executive functions of government." The legislature is specified to distinguish party from other groups promoting principles, and the reign of Charles II is the time when the struggle for supremacy "began to be settled" in favor of the legislature. But since membership in the legislature is sought for the purpose of controlling "executive functions," legislative sovereignty seems merely to be a new name for the new controllers after 1688. Why does a party system need a legislature at all?

Although the author remarks that parties did not become "respectable institutions" until after Burke defended them as such in 1770, he does not examine the opinion that stood in the way of their respectability. That opinion was hostile to party because party was conspiracy; and hence it did not conceive of a system of parties lodged in a legislature where after more or less mannerly disputation victories are conceded by the minority and not pressed by the majority. The pluralism which Bulmer-Thomas takes for granted in his definition of party had to be demonstrated in theory and practice before parties could become respectable institutions. The Whigs and Tories of the Exclusion Bill crisis did not

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constitute a "party system." They became conspiracies and were both forestalled by the conspiracy which established William III on the throne. Then or later the "continuous history" of the British party system might begin.

Despite his insights, Bulmer-Thomas shares the dominant assumption that extra-parliamentary organization is the outstanding event in party history, although it is unclear whether 1832 or 1867 is the date of that event. In this assumption the party system "grows" partly in response to extra-parliamentary (that is, ultimately democratic) opinion, and partly to remove all "executive functions" from the newly enfranchised voters. The democracy which the parties gave with the left hand they stole away with the right. For Bulmer-Thomas, the party system grows in fascination as it approaches the present: the first volume covers 283 years, the second forty. The "growth of the British party system" is to its present condition, and every problem of party government is understood as a triumph or at worst a heartbreak on the way. "Growth" is today's modest convention (and the modesty is also conventional) for yesterday's conventional "progress."

Bulmer-Thomas asserts, in company with most historians, that developments in the party system mostly "came about without forethought" (Vol. I, p. 19), but his practice is happily at variance with his theory. In practice he does not require that politicians, any more than historians, see far into the future; and when he wishes to illuminate a "development" in party history he quotes a politician of the time far more often than a historian. One development, the electoral defeat of Churchill in 1945, he himself describes with the aplomb of a skilled politician: ". . . the electors of 1945 were more concerned to take decisions about the future rather than to express a vote of thanks for past services" (Vol. II, p. 151).

This book is a useful narration of British party politics, based on printed sources and the best efforts of recent historians. Perhaps the author thought that if he had renounced dull professionalism and had written with the flair and flavor of independence, his book would have been less useful.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JR.
*Harvard University*

The British General Election of 1966 *by D. E. Butler and Anthony King. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1966.—xi, 338 pp. $10.00.*

David Butler has done it again. By co-authoring the 1966 British election study, he has maintained an unbroken association with all seven of the Nuffield general election books. First a junior collaborator in 1945

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and 1950, Butler became the sole author in 1951 and 1955 and then the senior co-author with Richard Rose in 1959 and with Anthony King in 1964 and 1966. Despite the contributions of his able partners as well as of other writers and research workers, the election studies can fairly be called the Butler books. They have a continuity of coverage and style bearing the mark of a strong-minded belief in the value of prompt, convenient compilation of what happened in each election. The 1966 volume is no exception in providing, as stated in the Preface, "information comparable to that contained in earlier volumes" (p. x). In fact, there is less chance for innovation here than in the 1964 study. The concentration on political strategy, first developed in 1964, is continued in the 1966 volume. With less than eighteen months between the two general elections, and so also between the two books, there was hardly time for innovation.

The book's coverage is usefully familiar: the brisk review of the previous Parliament, the dissection of reasons for the timing of dissolution, the day-to-day course of the centrally directed campaign, the role of the mass media, the ups and downs of the public opinion polls, the social backgrounds of the candidates, reports of ten constituency campaigns, and the full statistical presentation of the electoral results. As always, the writing is crisp and sensible. But it is not simply matter-of-fact. The authors make judgments. For example, they are willing to say: "If the Labour campaign resulted in victory, it was perhaps less impressive as an exercise in public enlightenment" (p. 180).

The 1966 election, the book makes clear, was not just a rerun of 1964. Unlike the close previous contest, Labour was favored to win a major victory from the start of the campaign. Wilson faced Heath instead of Home, but he did so from an office-holding vantage point. Wilson used this both to make Labour appear the responsible governing party and to make himself a figure suggesting competent, experienced leadership. He scored over Heath in the personality points that seem increasingly to count in the quasi-presidential politics of British television campaigns. And Wilson helped return a Labour majority containing a larger portion of university-trained professional workers, as opposed to manual workers, thus making it possible for the party's image to become still more safely middle class.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
*University of Wisconsin*

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The International Law Standard and Commonwealth Developments *edited by Robert R. Wilson. Durham, No. Carolina, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1966.—xii, 306 pp. $9.50.*

In this book we have yet one more excellent study in the series of more than twenty-five publications which have been produced by the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center since it was established, not much more than a decade ago. "The objective throughout the symposium," says the editor and chief contributor, Professor Robert R. Wilson, "has been to discern situations in which the fact of international law has, in some manner appearing to be significant, affected the Commonwealth story" (p. viii). In the result a wide range of topics has been covered. Profesor Wilson himself has analyzed the concept of independent national status as it has developed in the succeeding decades of the twentieth century in the attitudes of the Members of the Commonwealth, and in particular the differing views taken by the older or foundation members from those of the new members admitted after the end of World War II. The complicated question of nationality and citizenship is treated by Profesor Robert E. Clute in a most comprehensive and detailed chapter, though he is obliged to conclude that "although the status of Commonwealth citizen or British subject offers many advantages, these are not as widespread or numerous as the perquisites of the status of British subject within the Commonwealth prior to World War II" (p. 136). This is, if anything, something of an understatement, as is the remark of the same author at the end of his chapter on "Extradition" that "the Fugitive Offenders Act is beginning so show signs of strain" (p. 228). This latter chapter presents a first-rate account of the position about extradition and the working of the Extradition Act, 1870, and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and makes it possible for us to understand the issues that have arisen in recent controversial cases in Britain.

While the topics mentioned so far might seem to be of interest mainly to constitutional and international lawyers, the same cannot be said of Herman Walker's chapter on "European Integration" in which he explains with clarity and remarkable brevity the issues that arise from the juxtaposition of Commonwealth and Common Market—"communities both, they differ sharply in scope and composition, in character, in technique, and in tendency" (p. 165). His exposition is almost entirely economic, but it is fresh and stimulating, if a little out of place in a book on international law. In a way Walker's chapter illustrates the good and weak points of this book. It is a very good chapter on its subject; most of the other chapters also are very good on their par-

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ticular subjects and one is glad to have them in print. But what does it all add up to in terms of "the international law standard"? Not very much. This seems to be Professor Wilson's conclusion, for his last words are: "With the emergence of additional independent states as members, the element of international law in the Commonwealth relationship has become more obvious" (p. 267).

K. C. WHEARE
*Exeter College, Oxford*

The Early Rousseau *by Mario Einaudi. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967.—x, 294 pp. $7.95.*

Every generation has its own Rousseaus. Until a few years ago there was the Kantian Rousseau and the totalitarian Rousseau. These two seem to have disappeared. Instead we now have an existentialist Rousseau and a socialist one. These two are often combined into a single one. Professor Einaudi in this admirable study of the pre-1756 writings is not interested in the alienated soul-searcher. His is a radical, polemical, and intellectually self-confident Rousseau on the threshold of greatness. While there is much here that is already familiar to the readers of Starobinski and other editors of the latest edition of the *Oeuvres*, this is a solid, intelligent account of the essays that preceded *Emile* and the other great works. There can be little doubt now of the continuity of the major themes of Rousseau's thought. The critique of civilization, the hatred of inequality, and the vision of a just social order are now all clearly identified as they first emerged in Rousseau's mind.

There are, to be sure, some debatable interpretations. It is not really shown that his interest in economics was anything but an untechnical and rather general part of an encompassing moral concern. Did his dislike of cynical wealth, of impersonality, and of competitiveness really involve an insight into the economic structure of the modern world? After all, many writers of classical antiquity wrote about luxury and corruption in very similar terms and we do not impute to them a miraculous foresight into the problems created by the industrial revolution and the consumer society. Did Rousseau really see the contrast between economics and politics in the sense that these terms were to acquire much later? Surely the contrast between rural Switzerland and Paris was enough to stimulate his reflections and to explain his preference for undeveloped societies. Another difficulty is in the repeated claim that Rousseau had a deep faith in the future and that his ideal state was a blueprint for political action. No quotation is,

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or could be, offered in support of this notion. Indeed, Professor Einaudi cites Rousseau's gloomy view of Europe's prospects. The future was the paradise of the prophets of progress against whom, as is here amply shown, Rousseau directed all his efforts.

These doubtful interpretations are, however, part of all that is illuminating and convincing in this study. For it is designed to impress upon us not only Rousseau's intellectual independence, but also the very "objective," rather than introspective, character of his thinking. The seriousness of his quarrel with the *philosophes* is brought out with a perfect analysis of the divisive issues. This was no neurotic spat, but a clash between opposing social ideas. Again, Rousseau's debts to such notably scientific thinkers as Condillac are properly emphasized, as is the influence, both negative and positive, of Locke, Melon, and Mandeville, rather than of various divines and jurists whom he never read, or openly scorned. The now obligatory review of Engel's remarks on Rousseau may seem less pertinent. If it only shows the obvious, that Rousseau's socialism was not Marx's, it does make an important point in the context of this study. It emphasizes Rousseau's pre-eminent place in the history of egalitarian radicalism. This is Professor Einaudi's aim and in this his lucid and devoted commentary succeeds, above all because it helps Rousseau's own texts to speak directly and clearly to us.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
*Harvard University*

The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890 *by Vernon L. Lidtke. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xiv, 374 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Lidtke has provided us with a thorough, balanced, and well-written analysis of the German Social Democratic party during the period of its semi-suppression under Bismarck's Socialist Law. The book is based on extensive research in published and unpublished primary sources and on the skillful use of the vast secondary literature that deals with specific aspects of German socialism during this "heroic period" of its history.

Perhaps the most striking impression one gets from reading this book is the constancy of the problems with which German Social Democracy had to wrestle from its early beginnings to its demise in 1933. The struggle of "moderates" versus "radicals" dogged the party in the eighteen-seventies and eighties as it did in later decades. Related to this conflict was the question of how to maintain a picture of legality while striving

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for goals that were avowedly revolutionary—a task complicated by the fact that while the majority wished to attain these goals by nonviolent means, a vociferous minority was prepared to resort to violence. Significantly the Social Democrats failed to achieve unity on these issues even while oppressed by the Socialist Law.

As during all other periods of the party's existence, adherence to parliamentarism guided its policies during the era of the Socialist Law. Experience showed that the party owed its electoral successes to its presumed parliamentary influence (its followers gave it as much credit for Bismarck's social insurance program as they gave the government), and the electoral gains in turn caused the leaders to intensify their participation in parliamentary work. They also felt an obligation toward the voters not to squander in sterile obstruction what little actual influence they could wield.

Yet ambiguities persisted, and many leaders continued to look on parliamentarism as merely a tactical weapon rather than the key to the permanent improvement of labor's status. In their view labor would not attain its rightful position until the existing social and economic order collapsed. In the eighteen-eighties they embraced Marx's social and economic views which until that time had had only a limited impact on the party.

Lidtke attributes the adoption of Marxist tenets to the social alienation of German labor for which the doctrine of the class struggle provided a plausible explanation. Doubtless the causal relationship as developed here did exist, yet one wonders whether Lidtke's description of the Social Democrats as "hated, despised, and condemned by the dominant classes of German society" does not require some qualification. There is some evidence in the book that the *Reichstag* did not take the revolutionism of the radical Social Democrats very seriously; there was some cooperation between Socialists and non-Socialists, including even conservatives, in the *Reichstag* and in *Reichstag* elections; and public opinion sided repeatedly with the Social Democrats in cases of patently unfair prosecutions. Lidtke is, of course, right in stressing that the dominant classes in any society determine the possibilities of social integration, but the question arises nevertheless whether a more skillful Social Democratic leadership, and one less beset by inner uncertainties, might not have been able to utilize these less uncompromising attitudes more effectively on labor's behalf. Perhaps not, but it is a question which this stimulating and continuously interesting book does raise.

ANDREAS DORPALEN
*Ohio State University*

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Albert Ballin, Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888-1918 *by Lamar Cecil. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. —xxi, 388 pp. $9.00.*

This delightfully written book will make good reading for amateurs. The professional historian, particularly the one who has lived at the time with which the book deals, will have his doubts. First, the title violates the principle of "truth in advertising." The item is neither a full-fledged biography of the German shipping magnate, let alone an entrepreneurial biography, nor is it representative of "business and politics" in Wilhelmine Germany. Second, about half of it is taken up by a description of the historical background of Ballin's political activities, a background which is well known and has been better set forth elsewhere. Third, in concentrating on Ballin's political activities without showing them against the background of his extensive business dealings, the author creates an unduly unfavorable picture of the man who was, after all, a great business leader. Yet it also shows up most of the earlier Ballin biographies as presenting too favorable a picture. The book indicates once again, after almost fifty years of business history, that no historian who is not thoroughly versed in this field should tackle a businessman's biography. Only on the basis of a well-balanced and understanding total picture of Ballin's character, business career, and "extra-curricular" activities would it be possible to comprehend the politician Ballin. More specifically, only on such a basis could we judge whether his political activities were disguised business activities and, if so, to what extent. For lack of it, Ballin's attempt at gaining political influence appears to me the result of social ambitions of a lowly-born self-made man.

Ballin evolves from the presentation as a man of failing health, suffering from mental strain, so that even the daily business routine could not be taken at ease. In his later years, instead of enjoying vacations, he had to put himself under medical care. Highly successful in his business, he considered himself qualified to advise not only the powerful imperial and Prussian officials but also the emperor himself, though an analysis of the advice he proffered reveals political naïveté and dilettantism. How else can one characterize the proposal to the government through HAPAG, his shipping enterprise, to create surreptitiously a German naval base in the Caribbean? Did he display greater political wisdom as an original backer of Tirpitz' creation of a fleet of battleships which made friendly relations with England impossible and, when World War I broke out, showed its complete uselessness? Only when it was too late did Ballin come to his senses and turn temporarily against the admiral, and even then his attitude remained ambivalent. Finally, Ballin's war aims and a good many of his proposals of the war years were not very practical either.

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Lack of realism was typical of the "politician" Ballin, and this statement pertains both to foreign and domestic policy. His extensive contacts in England were not used by Ballin to gain an unbiased picture of the situation. As the author expresses it: "He was simply blinded by a noble but, under the circumstances, foolish hope" that Britain would not go to war. Actually it was worse than that. When the war was on, Ballin accused himself rightly of lack of courage in his intercourse with the emperor. Cecil shows that Ballin actually played the role of the upstart that he was, and not that of the responsible adviser with a dignity of his own. During the war Ballin was at times painfully aware of his own contributory guilt to the disaster through incorrect reporting.

As to his misunderstanding of the German internal power structure, Ballin believed that he could gain political influence by person-to-person contacts with high government officers and "His Majesty." Consequently he entirely neglected prior to the war parliamentary contacts. He did not cooperate with any political party, none was good enough for him; and only during the war did he engage in lobbying. He joined a number of semi-political organizations without contributing time or effort to any of them. As a matter of fact, by studying Ballin one can readily see that in pre-World War I Germany business leadership was an exacting job which forbade routine participation of businessmen in political life on a parliamentary or pressure-group level.

Ballin had a rude awakening when he discovered that his political influence was nil. His self-deception on this point may have been partly due to the all but schizophrenic social world in which he lived. His contacts reached into the highest levels of an aristocratic society, but the Hamburg patricians, his neighbors, do not seem to have taken him in. His friends were almost exclusively wealthy Jewish financiers, powerful Jewish owners of newspapers, and journalists. He had no relations with the great Gentile industrialists of his time, and he could not create satisfactory working relations with his employes. He was the master in his own house just as was the contemporary industrialist, Freiherr von Stumm.

Under such circumstances Ballin's self-deception resulted in arrogance and tactlessness. He judged almost every one of the high German officials of his time in an overbearing tone, although outside of his business he was certainly not wiser than they. Moreover he entirely misjudged his status in the stratified society of Germany when he suggested a successor to a chancellor who was still in office. In so doing, he did not even know that his "candidate" was not acceptable to the emperor. When in a letter to a high official he spoke in 1917 of World War I "als diesem dümmsten Krieg" (this most stupid war) he showed a lack of historical instinct without which nobody can aspire to statesmanship.

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Whatever valuable information the book contains can be found in Chapters V through X. Yet under one and the same misleading title the work deals with two different phenomena without the author's clearly realizing the problem. On the one hand, he treats Ballin's political activities which could be subsumed under a title such as "A Businessman's Dabbling in Politics: the Case of Albert Ballin." On the other hand, he presents Ballin's negotiations with government authorities in the interest of his enterprise, the kinds of activities which are described in textbooks on business and government. Granted that the borderline cannot always be clearly established, but in principle it must be seen and should have been brought out. The author's description shows what is not unknown, namely, that under certain circumstances, particularly in war, certain industries—oil, steel, armaments, shipping, and the like—can become enmeshed in politics.

In view of the fact that the book deals with two different phenomena, the reviewer concludes that what is valuable in it could have been said, albeit in less detail, in two articles in professional journals. He feels this way all the more since no conclusion from the case of Ballin can be drawn which would throw light on business and government in Wilhelmine Germany. Ballin's story was unique.

FRITZ REDLICH
*Belmont, Mass.*

Parliament in the German Political System *by Gerhard Loewenberg. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967.—xviii, 463 pp. $10.00.*

This definitive study of the *Bundestag*, the lower house of the German Parliament, deserves to become a standard reference work not only for students of German politics but for anyone interested in the comparative analysis of legislative processes. Professor Loewenberg has spared no pains to provide a carefully researched descriptive account of every conceivable aspect of the operation of the chamber during the first sixteen years of its existence. Without doubt, it far surpasses, in depth as well as breadth, all previous studies on the subject. The author has not only made exhaustive use of primary sources for his detailed analysis of the *Bundestag* and its members, but he has skillfully incorporated into his study relevant investigations by other scholars heretofore available only in German. Excellent tabular presentations greatly enhance the value of the volume and extensive footnote references serve as a guide to further study. Regretfully, either the author or his publisher failed to insist on the inclusion of a bibliography;

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it would have made it a good deal easier to identify the frequent "op. cits." scattered through the footnotes.

Despite its title the book is essentially far closer to the historical-descriptive approach employed by such scholars as Dicey, Jennings, and Beer than to the systemic studies favored by so-called "behaviorists." Professor Loewenberg's preoccupation with the universe of the *Bundestag* causes him to pay perhaps too little attention to other components in the political system which influence and are influenced by legislative processes. For example, the innovative practice of judicial review through the Federal Constitution Court received but scant mention; lobbying and other interest-group activities seem to deserve far greater consideration. And while one-fifth of the book is devoted to a thorough analysis of the background of the deputies, these data fail to show, as promised, how such factors influence political behavior (except to suggest that a deputy interest-group affiliation closely corresponds to the specificity of his legislative functions).

Despite its great virtues, the book suffers from two shortcomings. The first is not so much the author's fault as an inherent characteristic of the highly dynamic and transitional German political system. In this sense a study which may be said to have been long overdue can at the same time only be considered an interim analysis. Practices which are spoken of in the present tense have been subject to considerable modification since publication of the book (for instance, the formation of a "grand coalition" between the two parties commanding over ninety per cent of the votes in the *Bundestag* in the fall of 1966). What is the virtue in a historical study tends to become a drawback in the analysis of on-going system: detailed accounts of past events tend to freeze into still photograph processes which in fact are undergoing profound changes under the impact of extra-parliamentary environmental pressures. The role of the *Bundestag* during Adenauer's long chancellorship (1949-63) provides few clues to its role under radically altered political conditions in the post-reconstruction era.

The second drawback of the study appears to be a failure to view the *Bundestag* as an organizational structure which functions essentially as an instrument of party government. Loewenberg, like many German commentators, seems to find fault with the control of the legislature by professional party managers and with the bargaining processes between key elites which deny the chamber a more decisive and impressive part in public policy-making. But for better or for worse, the complexity of a modern polity, this dispersion of formal decision-making authority in the Federal Republic, and the prevalent climate of political opinion in Germany promote the concentration of power

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in the hands of relatively few party leaders. Within the organizational structure of the *Bundestag* it becomes their task to assure the smooth operation of the legislative system through informal arrangements which match positions with skills and tend to reduce rather than enhance parliamentary participation in the making of authoritative decisions.

Such criticism, however, is in no way meant to detract from Professor Loewenberg's very real accomplishment, which, in terms of the author's explicit objectives, is unlikely to be improved upon in the near future—except in a second edition of the book itself.

LEWIS J. EDINGER
*Columbia University*

City and Regional Planning in Poland *edited by Jack C. Fisher. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966.—xxvi, 491 pp. $15.00.*

"This book provides what no other study has attempted, a documentary record of city and regional planning as conceived and practiced in the People's Republic of Poland." With this description, the editor introduces us to the first of such studies projected for countries throughout the world. If the venture matures, and if the quality of this volume becomes the standard, we will be greatly enriched.

Twenty articles are arranged in three major divisions: city planning, regional planning, and national economic planning. Except for the editor, who introduces each division, the authors are all Polish nationals, mainly architects, economists, and planners. To rely heavily on persons having firsthand acquaintance with any system has evident advantages. To do so exclusively, when the principals are unlikely to speak other than official commentary, results in a curiously flat and one-sided presentation. Yet even this is educative.

For in a Socialist state, the architect or planner is servant to the regime, and his spatial (physical) plan is handmaiden to the national *economic* plan, the postwar succession—in Poland—of three, six, and now five-year plans. No longer are physical plans of regions or towns "wishful"; they have become, instead, "plans of action" for the realization of the nation's economic goals (p. 45). To grasp this nexus between central economic and spatial planning, one should compare the function of a regional plan in Poland with its function here. In America, regional plans tend either to be hortatory or single-faceted (for example, Bay Area Rapid Transit); and sometimes the most ambitious plans are wholly unofficial (for example, the upcoming Second Regional Plan for the Metropolitan New York area). Moreover, regional plan enthusiasts stress the realization of *local* needs—like mass transit, water supply,

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tax base, education—through coordinated, *local* decision-making. In Poland, regional plans are compulsory, one for each of the 22 voivodships (17 provinces, five major cities), and they must advance the nation's economic goals, as elaborated by the State Planning Commission, by situating industrial complexes, new towns, and transportation media. This is not to say, however, that the plans are simply imposed from above, for a dialogue does exist—which is well-described—between central and local planners.

No longer does the system produce "typical capitalist towns—disorderly, overcrowded and unsanitary" (p. 116). Today's Socialist cities are "functional," "efficient," "purposeful." And, one might add, spiritless and drab. As we read about it here, planning in Poland seems to have little to do with people, and when they are mentioned, they are written about with as much passion as is used to discuss the transporting of water. Indeed, the impersonality of the authors' prose seems consistent with the impersonality of the process they describe. One doubts that the writings of Philip Johnson or Charles Abrams—even in translation—would ever seem so lifeless. On the other hand, and maybe this is the point, the statements of our official planners probably would.

CURTIS J. BERGER
*Columbia University Law School*

Les Régions Italiennes *by Claude Palazzoli. Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1966.—ix, 635 pp. 77, 90 F.*

Despite a tedious, repetitious style so typical of the Continent's academic writers, this is an important book deserving a very wide readership. Students of comparative law will find it a gem of positivistic exegesis. Hopefully, Italian juridical scholars will recognize the virtues of an analytical approach that greatly transcends the abstract, arid, scholastic exchanges that constitute their major stock in trade. The enormous contradictions and confusion characteristic of Italian jurisprudence are nowhere more apparent than in the subject treated by this volume. The mischief that can be wrought by scholars who are oblivious or disdainful of empirical reality is brilliantly and exhaustively explored as Palazzoli moves methodologically from constitutional and legal theory concerning regional government to *la pratique*, or what has been happening in reality in Italy.

Above all, this book has much to teach all of those social scientists interested in the field of political development. It is especially instructive for those who eschew institutional analysis or who tend to make of the polity an abjectly dependent phenomenon, with no independent power

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of its own to shape political and social processes. I know of no other work in print that more persuasively delineates the critical relationship between law, administration, and formal institutions, on the one hand, and the operation of the polity, on the other. Until the literature of political development is reinforced by many more such studies, our capacity to understand and perhaps to direct political development will remain amateurish and superficial in its theoretical formulations, mischievous or dangerous in its social and political consequences.

Palazzoli explores the viability of the "Regional State" as a governmental formula falling somewhere between the classic unitary and federal forms. His conclusion is essentially pessimistic, and his judgments are amply supported by the Italian experience. The tensions between Rome and the regions, the tendency of Rome to centralize and of the region to demand autonomy from Rome while trying to centralize within its own jurisdiction, are exhaustively treated in both the legislative and administrative sectors. The willingness of national leaders to make a formalistic mockery of autonomy whenever the national (that is, political) interest requires it is repeatedly documented. The failure of Italy's complex regional formula to diminish the centrifugal forces implicit in a persistent crisis of national integration is arrestingly laid out and meticulously analyzed within the author's legal-institutional framework. Scholars and policy-makers concerned with the problem of resolving national integration crises in the developing nations would do well to read Palazzoli on such topics as "unequal integration," "the limits of autonomy," "regional participation," and "synchronization." It is clear that he feels, as do many Italians, that *political* regionalism is not viable in the contemporary Italian context and that a kind of *economic* regionalism, requiring some basic structural changes in both the national and regional systems, is the only realistic hope, and a faint one at that.

Palazzoli several times concludes that the creation of the "Regional State" requires a spirit and an ambiance that juridical mechanisms alone cannot impose. These conditions are, of course, social, political, and psychological and they, too, require much more analysis than they are accorded in this volume. But Palazzoli did not intend to write such a book and should not be judged on that basis. He remarks at one point that the subject of regionalism is "infinitely subtle and conditioned by nuance." We are greatly in his debt for having illuminated the nuances of a neglected aspect of comparative government.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
*Yale University*

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Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry *by Harold L. Wilensky. New York and London, Basic Books, 1967.—xiv, 226 pp. $5.95.*

"Too many critics of the organizational and political sources of our troubles see diabolical plots where there is only drift, a taste for reckless adventure where there is only ignorance of risks, the machinations of a power elite where there is, in William James' phrase, only a 'bloomin,' 'bussin confusion.' " Thus does Wilensky introduce one of the most important and least understood problems of our, or any, time, namely, the role of information in the forming of policy and the guidance of organizations. This is a topic that has recently been treated in special fashions under many rubrics, management control systems, communication in organizations, various versons of decision theory, and so on. Wilensky's book is, to my knowledge, the broadest treatment of the subject, and a broad treatment has been in order for some time. Furthermore, Wilensky writes from the point of view of a person acquainted with the actual operating problems of organizations. As the quotation above indicates, it is easy for the ignorant to evaluate the way in which our affairs are guided, but much more difficult for the informed to do so. Wilensky is informed, and he offers neither pat solutions nor easy analyses.

Because modern interest in the role of information in the formation of policy and guidance of organizations is both rather recent and fragmentary, the student of this question must roam widely in his search for material. Wilensky does this, using such examples as the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor, problems of intelligence in the military in general, some successful business frauds which went undiscovered for surprising lengths of time, and so on. One must observe that at times he seems more enamored of the details of such illustrations than their contribution to the general argument warrants. But, on the other hand, the reader is likely to find his anecdotes as interesting as did the author.

There are generalizations, which like good generalizations should seem to be generally true. For example: "The more an organization is in conflict with its social environment or depends on it for the achievement of its central goals, the more resources it will allocate to the intelligence function and the more of its resources will be spent on experts whom we might call contact men." With statements such as these, Wilensky's perspective is not always entirely clear. This seems to be a statement of how an organization *ought* to behave. It is probably true that one way or another most viable organizations *actually* behave in such a fashion.

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More characteristic of Wilensky's prescriptive statements, however, is that they reflect irresolvable dilemmas. For example, he is at all points in the book simultaneously aware of the fact that one must organize for intelligence, and that at the same time the organization which one sets up will have its own characteristic built-in sources of screening and distortion. He suggests, in turn, that the executive who values strategic information must regularly go outside his established information system to check on its limitations and to give himself more options than it affords. But how can he do this and simultaneously retain organizational morale in order to make sure that the formal system does as good a job as a formal system can?

For my money, Wilensky does not pose the dilemmas of organizational intelligence sharply enough. A good intelligence system involves the balancing off of formal and informal processes. It demands systematic behavior supplemented by appropriately chosen random behavior. It involves managerial skill and judgment of the highest order. This could be presented more clearly in Wilensky's book, but he has started us on the road with a thoughtful, informed, and erudite volume. It will be our own task to take up where he has left off.

RAYMOND BAUER
*Harvard University School of Business*

Africa in Search of Democracy *by K.A. Busia. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—x, 189 pp. $4.25.*

If one were called upon to identify a single theme which epitomizes Dr. K. A. Busia's message in this volume, it would surely be that Africa is made up of pluralistic societies and that democracy offers the best hope of reconciling pluralism to the broader society of the nation. Where other African leaders have found it necessary or desirable to try to suppress or even obliterate the tribal communities which represent the traditional African social-political groupings, Dr. Busia would gratefully welcome them as a vital link with the past and as the buildings blocks for the nations that are coming into existence.

Without necessarily accepting the particular institutional forms which democracy has developed elsewhere, Dr. Busia holds that the values of democracy have universal validity. In his view, democracy, founded on respect for the dignity of every human being, is government by consent and requires a wide range of civil liberties if it is to be meaningful. Repudiating both the single-party system into which African governments so easily slipped and the military regimes which so often replaced it, he takes it to be an essential condition of democracy that the

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citizen be able to choose freely by ballot between opposing candidates for office. The more detailed implementation of democratic principles must be adapted to the practices, needs, and beliefs of the people in question.

For Africa this means in the first instance the need to recognize that "behind Africa's search for modernization and for new political and social institutions lie [*sic*] an interpretation of the universe which is intensely and pervasively religious. It influences the decisions and choices which Africa is making."

It is to this contention that he devotes his first chapter. The more applied feature of his argument, however, is his insistence that in Africa the essential bond of union is still kinship. The territory of the state commands no original loyalty, but is made up of the several territories defined as the living space of the different groups of kinfolk. Tribalism holds no terrors for him; he is ready explicitly to assert that the African situation calls for "the concept of a nation of different tribes," diverse in tradition and culture, but recognizing that they can make headway only if they stick together as a nation. Instead of seeking to achieve a monolithic unity by coercion, he would seek accommodation with tribal loyalties and even hope that tribal pluralism might serve as a bulwark of democracy against the encroachment of dictatorship to the lures of which developing peoples seem so prone to succumb.

The author speaks with the voice of reason and tolerance, but, unhappily, it still remains to be established that either his Ghanaian countrymen or his fellow Africans are as resolutely in search of democracy as he is or are even prepared to take heed of reasonable and tolerant counsel.

Curiously, neither the book itself, published in 1967, nor the dust jacket makes any mention of the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime early in 1966, which enabled Dr. Busia to return from the long period of exile in which this book was written and re-established him as a significant factor in his country's political life.

RUPERT EMERSON
*Harvard University*

Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition *by Ali A. Mazrui. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.—xi, 287 pp. $5.95.*

Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa *by Claude E. Welch Jr. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966.—xv, 396 pp. $8.00.*

It is unlikely that any other recent subject in world affairs has generated as much published verbiage as that which is concerned with the

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international behavior of the new states of tropical Africa. Lengthy discussions of evanescent groupings joined uncritical accounts of *ad hoc* utterances by African leaders to create new space problems in libraries without contributing very much to the enlightenment of readers already bewildered by the appearance of several dozen new states on the international scene. Hence, these two books are particularly welcome because they are worthy additions to the very small collection of works on the subject which provide us with new information or with new analytic points of view. They form an interesting pair because they are complementary in several ways: Ali Mazrui is concerned with generic ideas while Claude Welch is concerned with institutional processes; Mazrui draws much of his material from an intimate knowledge of and special concern with East Africa, while Welch is especially concerned with West African experiences; Mazrui is more familiar with English-speaking Africa as a whole, while Welch stresses relationships between English- and French-speaking states. From another point of view their approaches have much in common: both authors avoid preconceived frameworks and seek to achieve some understanding of general questions by examining specific cases.

Mazrui's originality stems from his realization that to seek understanding of fundamental ideas requires going beyond speeches. He is therefore determined to interpret African political thought "not merely on the basis of what African leaders say, but also on the evidence of general behaviour and emotional orientation in specific situations" (p. ix). The major theme of the book, reflected in the title, is that the generic idea providing the motive for much African political activity is still "self-government," but that after independence this takes the form of "the African's ambition to be his own policeman" (p. x). In the process of examining this drive, Mazrui critically explores the usually unspoken and sometimes contradictory assumptions which underlie aspirations toward unity, such as the racial as against the continental conceptions of Africanness. Going beyond this, he brings about a confrontation between different ambitions which are often held simultaneously, such as national and international unity or international unity and neutralism, often questioning their compatibility. In spite of Mazrui's occasional impatience with careful examination of empirical data and a tendency to substitute brilliance for discipline, it can be asserted that if political philosophy means lifting political discourse above contingencies and detached reflection combined with a profound moral commitment to universals, then this work constitutes the beginnings of philosophical analysis of the African situation.

Welch represents a much more matter-of-fact approach: by analyzing in detail through fairly conventional methods four efforts to create

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suprastate political unions in West Africa between English-speaking and French-speaking territories, he sets out to test some propositions concerning the conditions under which unity can or cannot be achieved. The two more interesting cases, constituting the bulk of the book, concern attempts to recreate once-existing political units of the German colonial empire which were split up after World War I; the two others, handled more sketchily, are the disparate cases of Senegambia and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union. Although Welch is reluctant to present firm conclusions, he does suggest that the odds are on the side of further manifestations of the desire to maintain territorial integrity; in a postscript, written after the fall of Nkrumah, he asserts with greater confidence that "where the demands of Pan-Africanism conflict with the imperatives of nation-building, the latter will likely triumph" (p. xii). This proposition may not appear very original to a student of international politics, but it does introduce a note of tough-mindedness in a field where it rarely prevails.

ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG
*University of Chicago*

African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy edited *by Vernon McKay. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1966.—xiii, 210 pp. $6.00.*

There are three things about Africa upon which all the authors in this symposium agree. One is that Africa is weak. Zartman: "It is hard to defend the external interests and security of the state when one's voice is small. . . ." Kamarck: "The African countries are highly dependent economies." Foltz: ". . . an African government cannot avoid depending on the outside world if it wants a respectable Army." Lystad: "The aggressively declared African hostility to neocolonialism symbolizes the continued existence of a high degree of frustration." Cowan: "The continuing need for aid forces certain compromises with the ideals of total independence. . . ." Thorne: ". . . African countries must depend substantially on the outside world for the resources and expertise needed to develop the modern sectors of their society and economy."

The second, in the words of editor Vernon McKay, is that, as a consequence, "radicalism is inherent in the new Africa." The third is that there is in this radicalism something "irrational." Zartman sees ideology in Africa as a weapon of the elites which functions as a substitute for real power—a passing one. Kamarck deplores the fact that Africans are

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"not yet conscious of the costs that must be paid" to develop a modern economy. Foltz worries about his own "discouraging projections" about the increased role of the military. Lystad calls for the world to be patient with the "aggressiveness" which he sees resulting from the frustrations of "ill-defined, poorly integrated, poorly equipped transitional societies." Cowan fears that "any established pattern of foreign-policy decisions may be quickly upset by idiosyncratic action on the part of one individual." Thorne also explains "irrational" actions by "frustration."

The book ends with an appeal by McKay for policy-relevant research that holds fast to the "ideal of rigorous objectivity" but does not deny "the right of scholars to different points of view." My own point of view is that if one is weak, and oppressed, there is nothing irrational about either aggressiveness or radicalism. Indeed what is unreasonable and irrational is to accept the existing system that perpetuates, if not causes, the weakness. Such an assumption does not seem to be central to this book. It is written from a point of view exterior to Africa and it offers prudent advice of moderation and understanding. Such advice may be virtuous, but it also may mean that a similar book, written twenty years from now, would come up with the same unhappy evaluation of the state of things African.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
*Columbia University*

Minority Politics in the Punjab *by Baldev Raj Nayar. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xiv, 373 pp. $9.00.*

Dr. Nayar has given us an informative work, refreshing in style and sophisticated in analysis. If this study is given the attention it well deserves, current myths about inherent or unavoidable dangers to the integrity of India stand to be dispelled.

This analysis of the complex political history of the Punjab carries significance well beyond problems peculiar to that state. The author successfully challenges the assumption so often underlying studies of India that social conflict is to be deplored and that, in India, linguistic, regional, and caste divisions present such dangers to national unity that they bid fair to split the nation into many independent states. Dr. Nayar's study of the Punjab demonstrates how imperative it is to examine the interrelationships between social and political division. "One finds," he concludes, "that there is no simple correlation between cleavages on the one hand and disintegration on the other, but rather a complex relationship which may often serve to sustain a strong and viable center"

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(p. 335). His study of the interplay between competing social, religious, and political forces in the Punjab makes an excellent case in point.

This highly informed work clearly depicts the background of the demand for the formation of a new state from the territories of the Punjab. The linguistic region called Punjabi-Suba (a separate Punjabi-speaking state) did not present a united front against the center, but, quite to the contrary, consistently sought the central government's intervention in order to moderate the conflict between the several groups within the region. The author has spelled out the serious divisions within each of the two major religious groups in the Punjab. Harijan Sikhs opposed the demand for Punjabi Suba for fear of domination by the non-Harijan Sikhs; in like manner Harijan Hindus opposed (unsuccessfully) the demand for a separate Hariana state. The non-Harijan Sikhs are further divided into Jat and non-Jat, and the Hindus of the Hariana region, in turn, are split between Jats and Harijans, each group representing different interests.

Dr. Nayar presents an astute analysis of relative party strengths in the Punjab. Despite highly organized (though not united) opposition, the Congress marshaled political support at all levels. Of the four major parties in Punjab (Congress, Jan Sangh, Akali Dal, and Communist), only the Congress and the Jan Sangh emerged as all-Punjab parties. The performance of the Akali Dal in 1962 (when it contested as an independent political party) demonstrates that it did not command the support of a majority of even the Sikh community for whom it had, from the beginning, claimed to be the sole spokesman.

The author successfully argues the case against linguistic determinism and in doing so clarifies the manner in which social diversity bears upon national unity and democracy in India. His important conclusion is that the divisive tendencies which have seemed to threaten India's national unity also hold an important promise. For as national leaders rise to the challenge of protecting minorities, safeguarding liberties, promoting egalitarianism, and accommodating social change, they are building upon and strengthening the values of political democracy.

JOAN V. BONDURANT
*University of California, Berkeley*

China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 *by Thomas J. McCormick. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1967.—241 pp. $6.50.*

In recent years, a new school of writers on American foreign relations has emerged from the University of Wisconsin. William Appleman

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Williams is its master, and his *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* its basic test.

*China Market*, one of the more impressive outputs of this school, amplifies and provides evidence for some of Williams' pivotal generalizations. It portrays American business and political leaders perceiving excess productive capacity and, thinking domestic remedies dangerously revolutionary, placing their hopes on expanded overseas markets, especially in underdeveloped areas with no industrial plant of their own. China's pathetic showing against Japan in the war of 1894-95 turned their eyes toward her. European moves then aroused fears of China's partitioning and prompted the McKinley administration to act. As a first step, the United States acquired a connecting line of coaling stations and goods depots: Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines. Second, the American government devised the Open Door notes, embodying a policy superbly suited to its goal. The Chinese market would remain open, with the United States bearing no responsibility for China's internal welfare and running only minimal risks.

Though McCormick, like Williams, regards "open door imperialism" as a tragic mistake, postponing social change at home and leading to later needless involvement in international conflict, he argues vigorously that men of the age knew exactly what they were doing. They were, he declares in the Preface, "amazingly consistent and conscious in their efforts to create a workable, tactical blend of informal empire and insular imperialism, of marketplace expansion and political protection, of private initiative and governmental responsibility."

Here, McCormick is least persuasive. It is one thing to show that concern about overproduction influenced thought, quite another to show that this concern provided *the* motive power for action. And, indeed, McCormick is too sensitive a historian to make his narrative suit such a scheme. Thus, when he describes the dispatch of the first Open Door note, he has to list many other factors that placed narrow limits on the choices open to McKinley and his secretary of state, among them judgments about other nations interested in China; belief that any course leading to war would cost votes; fear that any taking of mainland territory would add strength to the "anti-imperialist" opposition; and an assumption that open cooperation with any other power or combination of powers would run afoul of the non-entanglement tradition.

What McCormick demonstrates is that spreading belief in the importance of foreign markets had become by the late eighteen-nineties a consideration policy-makers took into account, along with other considerations, when they calculated what could and could not be done in circumstances seemingly requiring that something be done. While a more modest achievement than that advertised in the Preface, this is nonethe-

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less a significant contribution to ultimate understanding of an important and complex series of events.

ERNEST R. MAY
*Harvard University*

The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan *by George Oakley Totten III. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966.—xv, 455 pp. $12.50.*

This is a study of the environment, leadership, base, support, and characteristics of the "noncommunist proletarian parties" that existed in Japan from 1925 to 1940. Mr. Totten's appendix table shows eighteen parties formed during that period, and his list of Diet candidates shows 78 who succeeded out of 328 who stood for five national elections. In 1937, when 38 (out of 72) candidates were successful, they attracted nearly a million and a half votes. Given the repressive nature of the prewar Japanese state this represents a considerable achievement, and it is essential to an understanding of the rebirth of social democracy in postwar Japan. Mr. Totten's subject is important, it has been little studied outside Japan, and it is of the greatest importance for contemporary Japan.

It is also extremely confusing. Dissolution under pressure from the police and splits caused by factionalism and multiplied by the proclivities of the social democrats' intellectuals for theory made for a thicket of terminological and organizational distinctions. Mr. Totten has labored mightily to bring order out of this through classification of groups and sub-groups. Even so it will be a hardy reader who picks his way through the party and union affiliations without error. The trouble is, as Mr. Totten grants, that "we must bear in mind that the concept of 'social democracy' itself is only a tag used for purposes of analysis and seldom if ever designates a movement of ideological or organizational unity and consistency."

The continuity between names and groups in the prewar and postwar scene in labor and socialism is striking. The present parties not only have the same leaders, but also many of the same problems. They continue the argument about having a class party or a more broadly based movement, and they maintain much of their earlier ambivalence about parliamentarianism.

A bonus value of the book is found in the numerous and useful scraps of information which serve as sidelights on the period it treats. One learns the history of May Days in Japan, the nature and sequence of police controls, suppressive laws, and rightist incidents. He is in-

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formed about the vicissitudes of the prewar labor movement, and organizations for the Korean minority and the pariah class in Japan.

Mr. Totten emphasizes in his narrative and evaluation the importance of the restricted time schedule within which the Japanese labor and social movements had to fit. Because social democracy was largely a product of the years after World War I, it had immediately to take account of the Communist movement. Equally important are the book's reminders that the bases for opposition to capitalism in prewar Japan were not restricted to social democrats and radicals. Agrarian and "Japanist" rightists also accepted the unflattering image of greed and corruption that the Socialists held of the business-backed parties. As a result many social democratic leaders looked to the army for help in checkmating capitalism in the nineteen-thirties, and not a few of them were swept into a movement for national socialism.

The author leaves detailed discussion of ideology for a later work, and aspects of his interpretation of the relations between the social democratic, Communist, and rightist movements remain incomplete. But this is an important start, and the painstaking preparation the volume shows guarantees it a long life. Another volume done together with Allan B. Cole and Cecil H. Uehara carries the story into postwar Japan.

MARIUS B. JANSEN
*Princeton University*

Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan *by Allen B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.—xvii, 490 pp. $12.50.*

The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 *by Robert A. Scalapino. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967.—viii, 412 pp. $6.50.*

Both books are remarkably similar in their content, structure, and methods. One is concerned with the postwar movements of the Socialist parties (SP) and the other with the Japanese Communist party (JCP). They first describe the historical development of parties and end with a chapter entitled "Prospectives and Problems."

Scalapino describes and analyzes the shifting policies of the JCP from the lovable image sought by the party immediately following World War II to the current policy of left-wing independent Pyongyang-type communism. His breakdown of postwar JCP movements into "Making Com-

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munism Lovable," "The Shift to the Left," and the like roughly corresponds to that of standard books in Japanese on the postwar JCP such as the one by Koyama. Cole *et al.* divide their book into four functional categories—history, party doctrines, politics, and the parties' relations to the several segments of the Japanese society. Whereas Cole *et al.* conclude that the SP are not without some hope, Scalapino ends with a pessimistic note for the JCP. He feels that the nature of Japanese society today indicates that the time has passed when Communists would have had some chance. There are no chances of success for the JCP "barring external interference."

The greatest contribution of both books to the growing academic community lies in their painstaking politico-historical description of the Communist and Socialist parties. Although they are not strictly scientific in their purpose as well as methods, they are scholarly in their approach to the subjects, subjects which could easily arouse blind prejudice. These two books represent the two most comprehensive and well-written books on the postwar JCP and the SP. Although Scalapino traces the history of the JCP to the prewar periods, as the title of his book indicates, his main concern is with the postwar period. Cole *et al.*, on the other hand, deal exclusively with the postwar period, for Totten has written a volume on prewar Socialist movements.

Cole *et al.* are less concerned with theory or model building than Scalapino. They end the book with a rather brief "Prospectives and Problems," while Scalapino spends more time explaining the whys of the JCP by comparing it with Italian and other Communist party models elsewhere.

Scalapino writes with his usual eloquence and meticulousness throughout the book. Probably because of multiple authorship, Cole's book contains a few factual errors (pp. 3, 4, 12, 15, 25) and at least one interpretive error of public opinion data (pp. 437-38). Mendel's data are misinterpreted. They state, "of all men, 5 percent were opposed [to rearmament] compared to 32 percent for all women." It so happens that "-5" and "-32" in Mendel's data represent epsilon values or percentage differences and not the actual percentage as Cole *et al.* took them to be.

Having hinted at some basic questions about the authors' orientations to the study of political parties or political oppositions in a democracy, it may be appropriate at this time to conclude that further, more comparative studies on these subjects by men of such caliber will be most fruitful for the building of political science. Such a task, howevere, is not an easy one, as Dahl acknowledges in his recent book on *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. Yet, the Achilles heel of books of the type reviewed here is that they make it impossible or well-nigh impossible to make any comparison of Communist or Socialist parties across cultures, for there

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are no common frameworks or classification systems among the different authors. Notwithstanding this impediment, these two books are sufficiently detailed in historical analysis to provide us with extremely useful insights and data for both students of comparative politics and those of Japanese politics. Both books, no doubt, will become standard references on the JCP and the SP.

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The Communist Movement in Iran *by Sepehr Zabih. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—x, 279 pp. $6.00.*

With this book, Professor Zabih has provided a most useful pioneering outline of the Communist and Communist-allied movement in Iran from the Boshevik Revolution until 1965. The story is one of several dramatic periods of Communist and leftist influence in politics—such as the *Jangali* movement that ruled in Gilan after World War I; rule by the Democratic party in Azerbaijan at the end of World War II; and Tudeh party influence at that time and near the end of the Mossadegh regime—followed by periods of suppression, jailings, and executions. The basic facts of Communist history in Iran and the changes in party, program, and policy over four decades are here brought together for the first time in English by an author who has used basic Persian and Russian sources.

The author stresses the difficulties felt by the Iranian Communist movement as a result of the need to adjust to changes in Soviet foreign policy. This is a theme which applies to Communist movements all over the world, but in the case of Iran, a relatively small and strategic neighbor of the Soviet Union, its application is unusually strong. Thus, after both World War I and World War II the Soviet Union, realistically recognizing the improbability of a victorious Communist revolution in Iran, sought at various times down to the present to accommodate itself to the existing regime, thus putting revolutionary Communists in a difficult dilemma. The author notes that one result of the current Soviet rapport with the Shah's regime has been a growing popularity of Chinese-style communism among young Iranians abroad, and predicts that this new trend may grow in the future.

Although thorough on Communist history, the book gives too little consideration to background and causation. Mercifully free of the heavy and often dubious theorizing that characterizes some recent works in the social sciences, *The Communist Movement in Iran* tends toward heavily factual and somewhat external narrative history. The book places a na-

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tural stress on Soviet policies in Iran, but it is surely impossible to understand the recurrent popularity of communism in Iran without presenting more data on the British and American control of that country against which leftist nationalists were reacting. The author also appears to rely almost exclusively on printed sources, whereas an extensive use of interviews of persons touched by the ideas and movements he discusses might have enabled him to give a more vivid and complete picture of the effect of communism on Iran and Iranians.

This book, to its credit, stimulates questions even if it does not always answer them. Why has communism in Iran and in the Middle East generally accomplished so little in organizing the peasantry, whereas in the Far East its greatest success has come through peasant-based guerrilla movements? Why has the Iranian Left, which in the period 1951-53 was stronger than the Left in the Arab countries, subsequently fallen so far behind in influence? Is this entirely due to repression by the current regime, or are there other factors?

The book suffers from several minor transliteration errors or inconsistencies in both Persian and Russian; the use of "naturalization" for "nationalization" of oil, several times; and a few typographical errors.

Despite these shortcomings, which may have been overstressed, *Communism in Iran* is a serious and important work presenting a thorough and documented narrative of one of the leading forces in recent Iranian history. Professor Zabih should be congratulated for his cogent and objective presentation of a most difficult subject, and it is to be hoped that he will write further books as filled with important data as this one is.

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A Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio *by Michael Belshaw. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967. —xxiv, 421 pp. $10.00.*

Here an economist writes an anthropological monograph, to be reviewed by a sociologist for a political science journal. It is difficult to extract any standards of judgment from such a mélange. Perhaps that is why the study of economic development is at the same time so exciting and so exasperatingly heterogeneous in quality.

The task Belshaw has set himself is to describe everything he could think of related to economic development in a Mexican village of some eight hundred people. The data base for this description is rather thin—about three months work by five people (pp. xxiv-xxv). Comparable amounts of field work have gone into several brilliant books in this area;

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Edward Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* is an example. But those are slim volumes with much theoretical inspiration. Fat volumes of the "everything about the ——— people" variety usually require a lot more field work. Consequently many chapters of Belshaw's book begin or end with a statement that the data are insufficient to answer the problem of the chapter (see, for example, pp. 189, 286, 290).

Rather than advance new theoretical ideas, or provide us with a thorough account of how things work in Huecorio, Belshaw has used what data he had to address several leading issues in the theory of economic development. For instance, he asks whether the marginal productivity of labor in agriculture is zero or negative, as has been hypothesized. His answer is that it is positive. I would add the judgment that compared to other enterprises in Mexican society, it is only an epsilon above zero—certainly nowhere near the competitive urban unskilled wage rate.

He asks whether the community can organize itself for collective purposes. His answer is, Not very well. Compared to many accounts of poor villages, I would say they do surprisingly well in the circumstances. One of the crucial circumstances is that the village cannot tax itself for collective projects.

He asks whether people there fit Everett Hagen's stereotype of traditional-authoritarian-fatalist (outlined in *On the Theory of Social Change.*) His answer is that some do, most do not. He takes this as evidence that they have changed. I agree that they are not like Hagen's traditionalistic peasants; whether that indicates change depends on whether you believe Hagen's diagnosis of traditionalism. I do not. At any rate, Belshaw advocates credit, technical help, and education to encourage entrepreneurship, rather than depriving people of status so that they can become creative. His policy recommendations, therefore, have nothing to do with his acceptance of Hagen's sociology of entrepreneurship.

Overall, I do not think the book represents the best strategy in the use of limited field-work time. A well-designed study of agricultural production functions, or a well-designed study of entrepreneurial activities, or a detailed study of the population problem, would have been within the limits of the resources available for data collection. A *good* fat volume is not possible with those resources. At the end of each chapter, Belshaw's obvious intelligence and his tidbits of information had convinced me that a good study on that topic in Huecorio would have been very worthwhile.

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# Book Notes

The recent history of Syria presents the political scientist with a problem that is both fascinating and puzzling. For fifteen years after it achieved independence—from 1943 to 1958—Syria enjoyed a rate of economic and social advance matched by very few underdeveloped countries. This was achieved with practically no outside help and within the framework of a capitalist economy, by a frugal and enterprising bourgeoisie and innovating landlords. It was achieved, moreover, in spite of repeated military coups d'état, that made and unmade governments but hardly impinged on the lives of most people. By contrast the last ten years have seen not only rising political instability and increased bloodshed but a sharp leftward shift that has led to a drastic land reform, the nationalization of most industrial and financial activities, and a thorough disruption of the economy.

Many factors contributed to this result, including external pressures generated by the cold war, regional and inter-Arab rivalries, friction between the various Syrian groups and sects, and struggles between competing army factions. But a powerful factor has also been the activity of the Ba'th party which originated in Syria in 1943, spread to surrounding Arab countries, briefly held power in Iraq, and, in alliance with army groups, has been the dominant force in Syria since around 1956. Its history and ideology are the subject of *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party* (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1966; xvi, 218 pp., $6.50) by Kamel S. Abu Jaber. The book is based on a wide reading of the available Arabic literature and a considerable number of interviews conducted in Lebanon and Syria. Although awkwardly written and somewhat naïve in approach (a fact parly attributable to the inchoate state of Bat'h doctrine and the chaotic state of Syrian and Iraqi politics), this book represents a useful contribution to the study of an intricate, obscure, and yet important chapter in the recent political history of the Arab countries.—CHARLES ISSAWI, *Columbia University.*


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*Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966; 304 pp., $6.00) by Andreas Kazamias is a concise and comprehensive study of education in Turkey from the early Ottoman empire to the present. The author initially reviews and synthesizes historical material on Ottoman and Turkish social and political institutions, with emphasis on the central role played by education in both the selection of the traditional elite and in shaping the ideas of the modernizing elite in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Professor Kazamias proceeds to a good survey of the present Turkish educational system and its strengths and weaknesses for social, economic, and political modernization. In addition, he studied the social background and attitudes of 5,126 *lise* (academic secondary school) students in 1962-63. His data on the nationalism and secularism of these students receiving an elite education, and on the occupational, educational, and geographical background of their parents and grandparents, support and confirm the recent study of Frederick Frey *(The Turkish Political Elite).* Perhaps the most interesting finding of the present study is the discovery that while Turkish students continue to find careers in business unattractive, there has been a sharp increase in their desire for high positions in the technical and free professions (engineering, science, law, and medicine) and a substantial decline in their aspirations for high administrative and military office. Mr. Kazamias does not, however, give an adequate explanation of either the causes of these changing attitudes or their consequences for economic and political development. The most serious omission in this book is the lack of historical or contemporary information on military education in Turkey. An analysis of the education for professional military officers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the degree to which the military curriculum and recruitment was similar to and different from the secondary and higher education for the political elite, might help to explain why the military officers took the lead in the Young Turk and Ataturk revolutions and in promoting modernization. Even more important, it might lead to an explanation of why Ataturk—in contrast to most military revolutionists—promoted a civilian and parliamentary government, and why the senior commanders of the Turkish armed forces today remain committed to preserving Turkish parliamentary democracy.—ELLEN KAY TRIMBERGER, *Columbia University.*

The figure which symbolizes the intrusion of the military into diplomacy and which, in popular mythology, is often synonymous with spy, has now been examined in great detail by Alfred Vagts, an acknowledged authority on military history, in *The Military Attaché* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967; xiv, 408 pp., $10.00). The book is

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divided into two sections. In the first, Vagts traces the development of the institution of the attaché in Europe and the United States since 1800, when it emerged. Originally conceived as a reporter on the military establishment of the host country, the attaché gradually encroached on political territory and came to compete with or even duplicate the task of the diplomats. Vagts draws the most flagrant examples of this encroachment from German history, where before the First World War the service attachés, acting under the orders of their military superiors, undermined, even countered, official diplomacy. The second section of the book examines the functions of the attaché which, as Vagts demonstrates, cannot be delineated along hard, fast lines. It is impossible to determine, first, where diplomacy ends and military reporting begins, and, second, to which superior, military or diplomatic, the attaché should render allegiance. Vagts also touches on the variety of functions in which the services of the military attaché have been enlisted: he was used for espionage, as the military's instrument in its struggle with the civilian government for supremacy in foreign affairs, and, in Europe before 1914, as link whereby the Kaiser and the Czar could circumvent their respective ministers.

The bulk of the book is narrative and one regrets the frequent superficiality of the analysis. The very abundance of illustrative detail is conducive to repetition and tends at times to obscure historical developments and their implications.—C. M. KIMMICH, *Columbia University.*

*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965* (New York, Columbia University Press in cooperation with the United Nations, 1967; xi, 954 pp., $21.75) reflects accurately and effectively the range and uniqueness of the United Nations' activity during the period covered. Members of the Secretariat staff who are responsible for this publication deserve the thanks and gratitude of all those who have a serious interest in following the work of the organization, and particularly of those who do not have easy access to the official records. It is of interest to review the volumes that have appeared in this series since 1946-47. One notes many improvements over the years: better organization, greater conciseness, the inclusion of texts of resolutions with pertinent data, and the listing of documentations on questions considered. The volumes down to 1953 inclusive ran to over 900 pages. From 1953 to 1959 the average length was over 600. Since 1960 there has been a tendency to larger volumes, and the present one is back in the range of 900-1,000 pages. Does this reflect greater and more important activity on the part of the organization? Or does it possibly indicate that at least on some questions there has been a tendency to go into greater detail in reporting what member rep-

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resentatives propose and say? The increase from 710 pages for 1964 to 954 for 1965 is in part explainable by the fact that the nineteenth General Assembly did not really function and proponed questions to the twentieth. However, we note that the 1965 volume is over a hundred pages longer than the 1963 volume and that in turn was longer than its predecessor. Thus we become aware of a trend which is explainable but may cause difficulties if allowed to continue unrestrained. One suggestion for checking this trend would be that surveys be made somewhat less detailed. This would not reduce the cost of preparation but it would help to keep the volume the serviceable tool it has come to be.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, *Columbia University.*

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